The Right of Privacy in Arkansas: A Progressive State by Entrikin, J. Lyn
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 35 Issue 3 Article 1 
2013 
The Right of Privacy in Arkansas: A Progressive State 
J. Lyn Entrikin 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, jlentrikin@ualr.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Lyn Entrikin, The Right of Privacy in Arkansas: A Progressive State, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 439 
(2013). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
439
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN ARKANSAS: A PROGRESSIVE STATE  
J. Lyn Entrikin* 
“Arkansas has a rich and compelling tradition of protecting individual 
privacy. . . . [A] fundamental right to privacy is implicit in the Arkansas 
Constitution.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Summarizing Arkansas privacy law just two decades ago, Professor 
John Watkins observed that caller ID services, electronic eavesdropping 
devices, and CD-ROM files of computerized personal information all posed 
significant risks to Arkansans’ privacy interests.2 Twenty years later, a pro-
liferation of technological advances enables invasions of privacy by various 
means, including data mining, social media, internet search engines, spy-
ware, and online identity theft.3 The stakes have never been higher for state 
laws protecting the civil right of privacy.  
Today, privacy law in the United States amounts to an increasingly 
complex patchwork of state and federal provisions.4 With respect to infor-
mational privacy, United States law is an example of the sectoral approach 
to regulation, which layers discrete state and federal constitutional and statu-
tory privacy protections over a backdrop of state common law rules largely 
drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.5 A sectoral approach to in-
 * Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at 
Little Rock. The author expresses appreciation to the William H. Bowen School of Law for 
providing research support, and to Cassandra Howell for soliciting the Article and for out-
standing work as Teaching Assistant from 2011 to 2013. The author also thanks Riley Graber 
for superb research assistance.  Finally, the author acknowledges Max Entrikin for inspiring a 
lifelong fascination with the right of privacy and for exemplifying the values associated with 
its protection. 
        1.  Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 349–50 (2001), quoted with 
approval in Ark. Dept. Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 10, 380 S.W.3d 429, 435. 
 2. John J. Watkins, The Privacy Tort: An Arkansas Guide, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 91, 91 
(1993). 
 3. See, e.g., Rodolfo Ramirez, Online Impersonation: A New Forum for Crime on the 
Internet, 27 CRIM. JUST. 6 (Summer 2012).  
 4. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904 (2009). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977); see Schwartz, supra note 
4, at 932 (“The classic example of an ALI process for improving state law is the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which sets out Prosser’s privacy torts and heavily influences state law.”); 
see also id. at 922 (“Overall, the approach in the United States to information privacy law in 
the private sector has been through sector-specific laws containing FIP’s [fair information 
practices], which have been enacted by federal and state lawmakers.”). 
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formational privacy rights regulates a narrow range of privacy interests, as 
opposed to an “omnibus” law, which offers general standards that govern 
when no sectoral law unambiguously applies.6 On the other hand, autono-
mous privacy, the right to make decisions free from governmental interfer-
ence regarding one’s intimate and family relationships, is protected to a 
greater or lesser extent by federal and state constitutions as interpreted by 
the courts.  
Constitutional privacy jurisprudence reflects the substantial change in 
social norms relating to privacy interests over the last twenty years.7 To a 
limited extent, federal constitutional law acknowledges a substantive right 
of autonomous privacy, not only with respect to parenting8 and reproductive 
decisions,9 but also conduct within non-marital, consensual sexual relation-
ships.10 Numerous federal and state statutes recognize sectoral privacy 
rights,11 including the extensive privacy protection of personal health infor-
mation guaranteed by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA).12 At the same time, state and federal Freedom of In-
formation Acts allow broad public access to government information.13 Yet 
 6. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 905. 
 7. E.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 641, 80 S.W.3d 332, 356 (2002) (Brown, J., 
concurring) (“Societal mores change. . . . The unmistakable trend, both nationally and in 
Arkansas, is to curb government intrusions at the threshold of one's door and most definitely 
at the threshold of one's bedroom.”). 
 8. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000). 
 9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating, as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause, a Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate sexual conduct between two 
persons of the same sex), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
The case . . . involve[s] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The peti-
tioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean 
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a 
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full 
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. . . . The 
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion 
into the personal and private life of the individual. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
 11. An example of a federal sectoral privacy statute is the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998, which governs the use of personal information about children on the 
internet. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 924.  
 12. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).  For a summary of its key provisions, 
see OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (May 2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. “A major purpose of the Privacy Rule is to 
define and limit the circumstances in which an individual’s protected hea[l]th information 
may be used or disclosed by covered entities.” Id. at 4. 
 13. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -109 (Repl. 2002 
& Supp. 2011). 
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even those statutes offer important exceptions that recognize the need to 
balance the right of public access against the privacy rights of government 
officials and Arkansas residents whose personal information may be at risk 
of disclosure in public records.14
Both state and federal courts have recognized a right of privacy with 
respect to private consensual adult relationships.15 But these implied privacy 
rights clash with statutory and state constitutional provisions that restrict 
who may marry. For example, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage 
Act in 1996.16  One section of the Act, generally known as DOMA, defines 
“marriage” for purposes of federal law to mean only “a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife.”17 Further, DOMA expressly 
authorizes states to disregard same-sex relationships legally recognized as 
marriages by other states, as well as any rights or claims arising from those 
same-sex relationships.18 The United States Supreme Court recently held 
that by defining “marriage” for purposes of federal law to exclude same-sex 
marriages presently recognized under the laws of eleven states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, section 3 of DOMA violates the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.19 While the Court deferred to the States to decide in 
the first instance whether same-sex marriages are valid, the Court’s decision 
will no doubt lead the Arkansas Supreme Court to revisit the dimensions of 
the state constitutional right of privacy. 
In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court joined a small group of other 
state supreme courts that have interpreted their respective state constitutions 
to provide a civil right of privacy against government intrusion,20 independ-
 14. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (excepting “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(12) (Supp. 2011) (excepting “[p]ersonnel records 
to the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy”); see also McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 230, 766 S.W.2d 909, 
914 (1989) (balancing plaintiff’s constitutional privacy interests against public’s interest in 
open access to criminal investigation records). 
 15. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 
S.W.3d 332, 350 (2002). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2695 (2013).
 17. 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; see also Ark. Const. 
amend. 83, § 1 (“Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.”). 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 19. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. In a related case, the Court dismissed for lack of 
standing an appeal from a declaratory judgment that California Proposition 8, which refuses 
recognition of same-sex marriages, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660, 2668 (2013).
 20. See generally Jeffrey A. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law,
37 RUTGERS L. J. 971, 1002–07 (2006) (citing cases). In 1987, for example, the Texas Su-
preme Court recognized an implied state constitutional right to privacy in striking down a 
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ent of any interstitial right of privacy implied in the United States Constitu-
tion.21 Relying on the state’s fundamental right of privacy, the court held 
that the Arkansas constitutional right “protects all private, consensual, non-
commercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults.”22 In 2011, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court cited the state constitutional right of familial privacy23 in 
state agency policy requiring employees to take polygraph tests. Tex. Employees Union v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. 1987). Also 
in 1987, the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted its state constitutional provision barring 
intrusions into “private affairs” to preclude interference with the individual right of autonomy 
to terminate life support. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987). In 1992, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that its state constitution implicitly granted a fundamental 
right to privacy independent of any rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Da-
vis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that right to privacy encompasses 
procreational autonomy, thus protecting former husband’s right to object to former wife’s 
proposed donation of frozen embryos to childless couple). These developments in interpret-
ing state constitutions occurred at a time when the United States Supreme Court was becom-
ing increasingly conservative and notably less inclined to expansively interpret the federal 
Constitution.  
 21. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (2002) (“[A] fundamental 
right to privacy is implicit in the Arkansas Constitution.”). As the Arkansas Supreme Court 
acknowledged, the Arkansas Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy. Id. 
at 624, 626, 80 S.W.3d at 345, 346. Unlike the Arkansas Constitution, a few other states’ 
constitutions have been amended to expressly grant a right of privacy. Shaman, supra note 
20, at 974–75 (listing Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, and Montana); see also Jegley, 349 
Ark. at 626, 80 S.W.3d at 346; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L.
REV. 477, 483 & n.25 (2006). For a thoughtful and comprehensive history of the Arkansas 
Constitution and its amendment and interpretation, see Jerald A. Sharum, Note, Arkansas’s 
Tradition of Popular Constitutional Activism and the Ascendancy of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33 (2009). As Sharum has observed, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has taken an increasingly active role in interpreting the state constitution to 
confer civil rights broader in scope than those protected by the United States Constitution, 
perhaps triggered by Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). Sharum, supra, at 80. In 
Sullivan, the Court reversed a holding of the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreting the United 
States Constitution to provide more generous protections against pretextual searches than had 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772. But the Court explicitly held that state 
courts may interpret their own state constitutions to do so. See id. On remand, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court reached the same result it had before, but this time by interpreting the Arkan-
sas Constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures more generously 
than the counterpart protections in the Fourth Amendment. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 
657–58, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (2002).  
 22. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350 (striking down the Arkansas sodomy 
statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997) (current version at § 5-14-122 (Supp. 
2011)), as applied to private, consensual, noncommercial, same-sex sodomy); see also Pas-
chal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, at 11–12, 388 S.W.2d 429, 436 (reversing conviction of high 
school teacher for engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with an 18-year-old student as 
violating defendant’s constitutional right of privacy). 
 23. See Ark. Dep’t. of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 26, 380 S.W.3d 429, 
443. 
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striking down a statute, enacted by initiative in 2008,24 that would have 
barred individuals from adopting or serving as foster parents if living with a 
sexual partner outside a marriage relationship recognized as valid under 
Arkansas law.25 Yet the court has not decided whether the privacy protec-
tions recognized as implicit in the Arkansas Constitution extend to informa-
tional privacy. 
This Article outlines Arkansas’s civil right of privacy as it stands in 
2013. Compared to the civil and constitutional privacy protections of many 
other states, Arkansas’s privacy law for the most part is quite progressive.26
But while the Arkansas Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the state 
constitution to grant a fundamental right of privacy to Arkansans, the consti-
tutional right protects against intrusions only by government agencies and 
officials. Over the last two decades, the Arkansas General Assembly has 
enacted a number of sectoral statutes that sanction privacy invasions by spe-
cific means such as spyware and phishing.27 But the enforcement of criminal 
privacy statutes largely depends upon the discretion of state and local prose-
cutors. These statutory efforts to protect privacy, however well meaning, are 
unlikely to have much effect because of limited government resources and 
the political priorities of elected prosecutors.  
For all of these reasons, Arkansas common law, which offers civil 
remedies against privacy invasions by non-governmental entities, remains 
an important source of privacy protection. As this Article will explain, state 
common law privacy rights have evolved substantially since 1962 when the 
Arkansas Supreme Court first implicitly recognized a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy by misappropriation of one’s likeness.28 Yet several is-
sues remain unresolved, including the scope of the privacy protection the 
court has found implicit in the Arkansas Constitution.  
This Article synthesizes legal authority defining the Arkansas civil 
right of privacy and identifies issues yet to be resolved. Part I provides a 
brief overview of the fascinating history of privacy law in the United 
States.29 Part II addresses the evolution of the common law right of privacy 
 24. Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act, commonly known as “Act 1” (approved 
Nov. 4, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-301 to -305 (Repl. 
2009), invalidated by Cole, 2011 Ark. at 26, 380 S.W.3d at 443). 
 25. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 26, 380 S.W.3d at 443 (holding ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-301 to -
305 unconstitutional). 
 26. An exception is the Arkansas Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cannady v. St. 
Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d ___. See infra notes 361–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-111-103 (Repl. 2011). 
 28. See Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962) 
(dicta).
 29. This section is largely drawn from J. Lyn Entrikin, The Right to Be Let Alone: The 
Kansas Right of Privacy, 53 WASHBURN L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2014).  
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in Arkansas beginning as early as 1909, as well as the state constitutional 
right of privacy first acknowledged in Jegley v. Picado.30 Part III details the 
elements of each of the four iterations of the Arkansas common law right of 
privacy as interpreted by state and federal courts. Part IV identifies issues 
related to the Arkansas right of privacy that the courts have not yet fully 
resolved, including the extent to which Arkansas law recognizes a private 
cause of action for invasion of privacy as an alternative means of enforcing 
criminal statutes implicating privacy interests. Part V concludes.  
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Not often does a law review article lead the way for United States 
courts to recognize a novel legal right that was unrecognized at common 
law.31 The earliest cases debating the existence of the personal right of pri-
vacy were a direct outgrowth of an 1890 article co-authored by two law 
partners and published in the law review of their alma mater.32 The trigger 
for the article was the proliferation of news media commentary on the social 
events of the day, facilitated by invasive new technologies.33
By the close of the nineteenth century, photography had become ubiq-
uitous in the United States.34 George Eastman patented the Kodak box cam-
era on September 4, 1888, making photography accessible to the general 
 30. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).  
 31. RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 57, 63 (2010); see 
FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED 
RIGHT 61–62 (2009) (“‘The Right to Privacy’ was that rarest of law review articles: a treatise 
so well reasoned and so compellingly argued that it helped to reshape American legal theo-
ry.”). While most American states have judicially recognized the right of privacy, “other 
common law jurisdictions languish in a quagmire of indecision and hesitancy.” WACKS,
supra, at 63. Underscoring the increasing worldwide interest in privacy rights is the Great 
Britain controversy about reporters employed by now-defunct News of the World hacking 
into the voice mail of cell phone users. See James Poniewozik, The Humbling of Rupert Mur-
doch, TIME MAG., Aug. 8, 2011, at 32. See generally ABA PRIVACY & COMPUTER CRIME 
COMM., INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004).  
 32. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890); see also Benjamin C. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right of Pri-
vacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy,” 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002); Amy Gajda, 
What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press 
Coverage That Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 36. 
 33. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 5 (2008) (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 32); see also Bratman, supra note 32, at 626; Gajda, supra note 32, at 59–60. See gener-
ally MILLS, supra, at 29–35 (describing evolution of increasingly intrusive technology and 
resulting challenges for protection of personal privacy).  
 34. See Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the 
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991). 
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Box,42 a deeply divided New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment 
awarding money damages to Abigail Roberson, an eighteen-year-old whose 
photograph had been displayed without her consent on 25,000 advertising 
posters for baking flour.43 The court’s refusal to recognize a cause of action 
drew criticism from across the country.44 In response to the public outcry, 
the 1903 New York Legislature hastily enacted a statutory right to privacy, 
narrowly framed to provide a civil remedy for those whose names or like-
nesses have been appropriated for trade or advertising purposes without 
their written consent.45
Like New York, other state appellate courts declined to recognize a 
common law right to privacy, instead deferring the issue to their respective 
state legislatures.46 A few states followed suit, enacting legislation similar to 
New York’s.47 But several other states, by judicial declaration, recognized a 
more sweeping right to privacy.  
Co. 1891) (granting continuing injunction barring use of plaintiff’s name and endorsement on 
defendants’ advertising). But cf. Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 
271, 271–72 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) (declining to enjoin unauthorized distribution of photos of 
plaintiff’s infant daughter absent claim to vindicate property rights belonging to plaintiff), 
aff’d, 31 N.Y.S. 17 (N.Y.C. & Co. Comm. Pleas Ct. 1894); see Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 
22, 26 (N.Y. 1895) (declining to enjoin defendants from erecting statue of plaintiffs’ dece-
dent, a private philanthropist, on grounds that subject of alleged privacy invasion was de-
ceased); see also Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 288 (Mich. 1899) (“We 
are not satisfied that . . . one has a right of action either for damages or to restrain the posses-
sor of a camera from taking a snap shot at the passer-by for his own uses.”). Note that the 
earliest recognition of the right of privacy was by courts sitting in equity. See generally Rob-
erson v. Rochester Folding Box, 64 N.E 442, 444–47 (N.Y. 1902).  
 42. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (4-3 opinion) (holding that New York does not recognize 
common law right of privacy), rev’g 71 N.Y.S. 876 (App. Div. 1901). But see N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 51 (enacted 1903) (recognizing civil right of privacy for using one’s name or 
likeness, without written consent, for trade or advertising purposes). 
 43. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442. For a fascinating and humorous account of the aftermath 
of this decision for Ms. Roberson and Chief Judge Parker, who authored the decision (and 
later ran for public office), see Daniel J. Kornstein, The Roberson Privacy Controversy, The 
Historical Soc’y of the Courts of the State of N.Y. (Issue 4, 2006), at 3, available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/pdf/ HSNLVol.4.pdf; see also LANE, supra note 31, at 
64–70 (discussing Roberson controversy). 
 44. Bratman, supra note 32, at 641, 648–50. 
 45. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009); see N.Y. LAWS 1903, ch. 132, § 2. 
The companion criminal statute, § 50, defines the conduct as a misdemeanor. N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009); see N.Y. LAWS 1903, ch. 132, § 1. Section 51 creates a 
private cause of action for a violation of the criminal statute.  
 46. E.g., Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 99–100, 109 (R.I. 1909) (declining to 
judicially recognize right of privacy absent legislative action); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 75 
N.W.2d 925, 927 (Wis. 1956) (declining to judicially recognize the right because state legis-
lature had recently failed to enact bills that would have done so).  
 47. Bratman, supra note 32, at 641 (citing Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Priva-
cy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1354 n.90). Examples are Virginia (enacted 1904) and Utah 
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The first to do so was Georgia. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insur-
ance Co.,48 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a plaintiff had stated a 
claim against an insurance company for printing his photograph in a news-
paper advertisement without his consent.49 In recognizing a civil remedy for 
invasion of privacy, the court drew from natural law principles, state and 
federal constitutional protection of individual liberty interests, and a Georgia 
statute authorizing any court to “frame’” a remedy, if necessary, for a vio-
lation of any right within its jurisdiction.50 In the end, the Georgia Supreme 
Court boldly (and accurately) predicted that one day the right of privacy 
would be generally recognized in the United States:  
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper 
limits . . . the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture 
without his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose 
of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this 
right, that we venture to predict that the day will come that the American 
bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of 
eminence and ability . . . .51
After Pavesich, other state and federal courts adopted varied perspec-
tives on the question.52 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, following the 
New York Court of Appeals, rejected the common law right of privacy in 
1909, noting it was “unable to discover the existence of the right of privacy 
contended for.”53 That same year, the Arkansas Supreme Court first 
acknowledged54 but then narrowly sidestepped the issue in an action chal-
lenging the use of photographs of two criminal detainees in a “rogues’ gal-
(enacted 1909). See Note, The Virginia “Right of Privacy” Statute, 38 VA. L. REV. 117, 117 
(1952).  
 48. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
49. Id. at 80–81. 
 50. Id. at 69–70 (quoting Ga. Civ. Code § 4929 (1895)).  
 51. Id. at 80–81; see DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 1:1, at 1-7 (2002) (nearly all 
jurisdictions recognize right of privacy). 
 52. See, e.g., Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 108 (R.I. 1909) (refusing to judicially 
recognize right of privacy, following Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 
1902)); Hillman v. Star Publ’g Co., 117 P. 594, 596 (Wash. 1911) (rejecting right of privacy 
absent legislation outlining parameters). But see, e.g., Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Knox 
Cnty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. App. 1908) (following Pavesich); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 
120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. App. 1909) (following Pavesich); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 
1080 (Mo. App. 1911) (following Pavesich). 
 53. Henry, 73 A. at 109. 
 54. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 551, 117 S.W. 746, 747 (1909) (dissolving tempo-
rary restraining order prohibiting federal officers from using photographs of arrestees solely 
to identify them in various localities where federal offenses charged were allegedly commit-
ted). “The complaint . . . present[s] an interesting question concerning what is now termed by 
modern authorities the ‘right of privacy,’ or the right of an individual to . . . restrain an im-
proper use of his photograph without his consent.” Id., 117 S.W. at 747.  
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lery.”55 On the merits, the court declared that law enforcement officers’ use 
of detainees’ photographs solely for identification purposes was not improp-
er.56 Thus, it declined to address whether Arkansas would recognize a com-
mon law right of privacy in other contexts.  
In 1911, the Missouri Court of Appeals, relying on Pavesich, recog-
nized a five-year-old boy’s common law cause of action against a Kansas 
City jewelry store for using his image in a newspaper advertisement without 
consent.57 Just a year later, a federal district court, also in Missouri, pointed-
ly declined to resolve “the irreconcilable conflict of opinions and views of 
courts of last resort in various jurisdictions.”58 The court posited that even if 
a right of privacy did exist, it would surely not extend to a public education-
al institution seeking to enjoin a biscuit company from using the col-
lege’s name and emblems for commercial purposes.59 Thus, Vassar 
College was denied an injunction prohibiting the marketing of “Vassar 
Chocolates” in packaging that displayed knock-offs of the college seal, pen-
nant, and motto.60
In 1939, the American Law Institute (ALI) recognized the evolving 
common law right of privacy in the first version of the Restatement of 
Torts.61 The Restatement outlined a single common law cause of action for 
invasion of privacy based on two alternatives: first, disclosing another per-
son’s private affairs to others; and second, exhibiting another’s likeness to 
the public.62 To recover, a plaintiff was required to establish not only that 
the invasion was an unreasonable and serious interference with the plain-
 55. Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 81, 122 S.W. 115, 115–16 (1909) (declining to 
address alleged common law right of privacy in action to enjoin publication of arrestees’ 
photographs in “rogues’ gallery” absent allegation of use by law enforcement officers for 
purposes other than identification). 
56. Id., 122 S.W. at 115. 
 57. Munden, 134 S.W. at 1077. “If a man has a right to his own image as made to appear 
by his picture, it cannot be appropriated by another against his consent.” Id. at 1078. 
 58. Vassar Coll. v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 985 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (bill in 
equity). 
 59. See id. at 984–85. The federal district court distinguished cases involving private 
persons suing for invasion of privacy, observing that a public corporate institution depends 
on publicity to fulfill its role as an institution of higher education. “Where a person is a public 
character, the right of privacy disappears.” Id. at 985 (citing Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 
F. 434 (D. Mass. 1893)); see id. at 994. Today, the common law right of privacy is generally 
considered a personal right that does not apply to corporations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652I cmt. a (1977); see also West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 
648 (Tenn. 2001) (right to privacy cannot attach to corporations or other business entities).  
 60. Vassar Coll., 197 F. at 984–85. 
 61. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). “A person who unreasonably and seriously 
interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness 
exhibited to the public is liable to the other.” Id.
 62. Id. 
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tiff’s privacy interests, but also that the defendant should have foreseen that 
the plaintiff would justifiably feel “seriously hurt” by the challenged con-
duct.63 Having met these requirements, the plaintiff was not required to 
prove either physical harm or pecuniary loss to recover damages.64
Almost from the beginning, state courts citing the Restatement provi-
sion recognized privacy invasions that went beyond the essential elements 
outlined by the ALI. For example, in 1941 the Oregon Supreme Court rec-
ognized an invasion of privacy when an optical corporation, without con-
sent, signed the plaintiff’s name to a telegram urging the Governor to veto a 
bill that would have prohibited corporations from dispensing optical glass-
es.65 While the facts involved neither disclosure of the plaintiff’s private 
affairs to the public nor the exhibition of the plaintiff’s likeness, the court 
nevertheless recognized a right of privacy that was invaded when the de-
fendant “appropriated . . . for [its] own purposes . . . [plaintiff’s] name, his 
personality, and whatever [political] influence he may have possessed.”66
In 1960, Dean William Prosser published an influential law review ar-
ticle acknowledging four related but distinct aspects of the common law 
right of privacy.67 Prosser’s proposed formulation included (1) intrusion on 
seclusion, solitude, or private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing 
private facts; (3) publicity casting plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
and (4) appropriation of name or likeness for the defendant’s advantage.68
Each of the four privacy torts protects related but distinct privacy interests.69
 63. Id. § 867 cmt. d.
[L]iability exists only if the defendant's conduct was such that he should have re-
alized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only 
where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues. 
These limits are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who has never 
manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the public, or where photo-
graphs of a person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously taken and pub-
lished. . . . It is only when the defendant should know that the plaintiff would be 
justified in feeling seriously hurt by the conduct that a cause of action exists. If 
these conditions exist, however, the fact that the plaintiff suffered neither pecuni-
ary loss nor physical harm is unimportant. 
Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438, 439–40 (Or. 1941).
 66. Id. at 448. 
 67. Prosser, supra note 39, at 383. 
 68. Id. at 389. 
 69. For a concise but accurate delineation of the differences among them, see Williams 
v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 658, 669 (W.D. Ark. 1983).  
Intrusion and disclosure require the invasion of something secret, secluded or 
private; false light and appropriation do not. Disclosure and false light depend 
upon publicity while intrusion and appropriation do not. False light requires fal-
sity or fiction while none of the other three do. Appropriation requires a use for 
defendant's advantage while the other three do not.  
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Soon after publication of Dean Prosser’s article, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court acknowledged a narrow common law right of privacy for the first 
time when a photography corporation used the plaintiff’s studio photographs 
for advertising purposes without her consent.70 Citing Prosser’s seminal arti-
cle at the end of a footnote along with several other secondary authorities 
addressing the right of privacy, the court implicitly recognized the tort he 
had classified as appropriation of likeness for the defendant’s advantage.71
Fifteen years after the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the 
common law right of privacy in Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd,72 the ALI 
adopted Dean Prosser’s formulation of the four privacy torts in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.73 Since then, the great majority of states, including 
Arkansas,74 have adopted all or most of the four distinct causes of action 
outlined by Dean Prosser in 1960.75
III. EVOLUTION OF THE ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Although the point is seldom emphasized in the cases, each variation of 
the common law right of privacy recognized in Arkansas is an intentional 
tort.76 Because intent is an essential element of the claim, the plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted intention-
ally. To establish intent, Arkansas law requires more than proof that the 
Id.
 70. Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962) 
(dicta). 
 71. Id. at 497 n.1, 353 S.W.2d at 23 n.1. Olan Mills has been cited numerous times as 
the first case in which the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the common law right of 
privacy. E.g., HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES §
33:11, at 639 (5th ed. 2004). However, the defendant in that case did not dispute either the 
invasion of privacy or plaintiff’s lack of consent. Olan Mills, 234 Ark. at 497, 353 S.W.2d at 
23. Rather, the defendant appealed only the $2,500 award of damages, arguing the plaintiff 
could not recover for mental anguish alone in the absence of physical injury. Id. at 498, 353 
S.W.2d at 24. The court rejected the argument, analogizing the facts to cases in which the 
court had upheld damages for mental suffering and humiliation caused by wanton or willful 
conduct without accompanying physical injury. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24 (citations omitted). 
Olan Mills admitted that it had customarily secured written consent before using customers’ 
portraits for advertising purposes, but had failed to do so in this case. Therefore, the court 
simply concluded that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24.
 72. 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962) (dicta). 
 73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977). 
 74. See Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 638 n.8, 590 S.W.2d 840, 845 n.8 
(1979).  
 75. ELDER, supra note 51, § 1:1. The sole exceptions are Wyoming and North Dakota. 
Id. But cf. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (narrowly recognizing only misap-
propriation of name or likeness for trade or advertising purposes). 
 76. See, e.g., Smith v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 867, 872 (W.D. Ark. 
1985) (dicta) (most forms of invasion of privacy require intent as an element).  
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defendant intended to do the act that in turn caused the harm.77 The plaintiff 
must show that the defendant believed the tortious results were substantially 
certain to follow from defendant’s conduct.78 In other words, the tortious 
harm not only must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant; the 
injury also must have been subjectively foreseen by the defendant to support 
liability. 
Moreover, a plaintiff who files a privacy claim in state court must satis-
fy Arkansas pleading requirements to withstand a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim. Arkansas is a fact pleading state and does not recognize 
notice pleading.79 In alleging violation of the right of privacy, a claimant 
must, at minimum, specifically identify the nature of the privacy claim as-
serted.80
A. Common Law Right of Privacy 
While the Arkansas Supreme Court gave an approving nod to the de-
velopment of the common law right of privacy in other states as early as 
1909,81 it was a relative latecomer in fully recognizing the cause of action 
grounded in Arkansas common law. In 1957, in Webber v. Gray,82 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court upheld an injunction against a jilted paramour who 
 77. See Talley v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 274, 620 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1981) 
(declining to adopt “tort concept that one intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of 
his acts” for purposes of construing insurance policy exclusion for results of intentional con-
duct); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (defining “intent”). 
 78. Under Arkansas law, “intentional torts involve consequences which the actor be-
lieves are substantially certain to follow his actions.” Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 
460, 692 S.W.2d 615, 617 (1985), cited with approval in Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 
115, 123, 226 S.W.3d 800, 808 (2006); cf. Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 719–20, 945 
S.W.2d 933, 935–36 (1997) (for employee to file tort action against employer for damages in 
lieu of workers’ compensation, employer must have had “desire” to bring about consequenc-
es of acts, or must have premeditated the tortious acts with specific intent to injure; intention-
al torts involve consequences the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from the 
actions (citing Miller, 286 Ark. at 461–62, 692 S.W.2d at 617–18)). 
 79. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 8; see also Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 7, 678 S.W.2d 361, 
363 (1984) (“Simply because the complaint said that the action was one for ‘invasion of 
privacy’ would not make it so; we must look to the alleged facts.” (citing Bankston v. Pulaski 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 281 Ark. 476, 665 S.W.2d 859 (1984))); cf. Steinbuch v. Hachette Book 
Grp., No. 4:08CV00456 JLH, 2009 WL 963588, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2009) (dismissing 
false light claim for failing to “make any specific allegations as to how the book casts him in 
a false light”).  
 80. See Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 264, 937 S.W.2d 653, 657 (1997) (refus-
ing to develop privacy claim for plaintiffs, who failed to identify which privacy theory ap-
plied and cited no authority to support alleged invasion of privacy). 
 81. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 552, 117 S.W. 746, 747 (1909); see Mabry v. 
Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 83, 122 S.W. 115, 115 (1909); see also Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. 
Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962) (dicta). 
 82. 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957). 
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had repeatedly harassed the plaintiff over several years.83 While the allega-
tions might have supported a common law cause of action for what is now 
commonly known as intrusion on seclusion,84 the complaint sounded in eq-
uity and failed to raise the right of privacy as the basis for a common law 
claim.85 While sitting in equity, the court’s reasoning was nevertheless con-
sistent with the policies underlying recognition of the common law right of 
privacy.86
In Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, the Arkansas Supreme Court up-
held a jury verdict awarding damages to a woman whose photograph had 
been used without her consent to advertise the defendant’s photography 
studio.87 The only dispute on appeal was whether the court would sustain the 
 83. Id. at 295–96, 307 S.W.2d at 84. 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see also ARKANSAS MODEL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013). 
 85. As a general rule, an equitable remedy is not available unless the plaintiff lacks a 
complete legal remedy. Townsend v. Ark. State Hwy. Comm’n, 326 Ark. 731, 734, 933
S.W.2d 389, 391 (1994); McGehee v. Mid South Gas Co., 235 Ark. 50, 55, 357 S.W.2d 282, 
286 (1962). In Webber, because the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the injunction in sub-
stantial part, the court implicitly held that no common law right of privacy existed in Arkan-
sas at that time. See Webber, 228 Ark. at 295–96, 307 S.W.2d at 84 (“He has no remedy at 
law against the almost incessant harassment which the record discloses he has been subjected 
to over a period of years.”). 
 86. See Webber, 228 Ark. at 293, 307 S.W.2d at 82–83. 
For several years appellant has written numerous letters and notes to appellee 
in an effort to force him to renew their association. These notes and letters, 
signed and unsigned, were delivered by mail and by the appellant leaving them 
in or upon appellee's automobile, his residence and place of business. Similar let-
ters have been written by appellant to appellee's mother, wife, employer and the 
real estate company from which appellee purchased his home and, in which, ap-
pellant states that appellee is the father of her unborn child and is soon to be 
faced with a paternity suit. Appellee estimated that he had received at least 200 
such communications within a year prior to the last hearing. 
 [A]ppellant caused a picture of herself and the announcement of their ap-
proaching marriage to be published in a local newspaper. [S]he made written ap-
plication for a marriage license in their names . . . without his knowledge or con-
sent. Almost daily appellant accosts appellee on the streets in an attempt to en-
gage him in conversation. Since appellee’s marriage . . . , appellant has followed 
appellee and his wife to town in her car nearly every work day and left a note or 
letter in or upon his car when he refused to talk to her. On numerous occasions 
she has parked her car within a few feet of appellee's home for long periods. The 
telephone at appellee's home rings frequently when the caller merely ‘hangs up’ 
upon answer being made. 
Id. at 292, 307 S.W.2d at 82. Upholding the injunction even though the rights implicated 
were not property rights, the court concluded, “The acts of the appellant . . . might be classed 
as trivial if they had been merely sporadic or of short duration. But appellee has the right to 
pursue his lawful daily occupation and family activities unhampered by the protracted moles-
tations of the appellant . . . .” Id. at 293, 307 S.W.2d at 84. 
 87. 234 Ark. 495, 498–99, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962).
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award of damages for emotional distress alone in the absence of physical 
injury.88 The court did not address the privacy claim on its merits because 
the defendant conceded that the plaintiff had established the elements of 
invasion of privacy; the only issue in dispute was the amount of damages 
awarded.89 Nevertheless, Olan Mills has been cited repeatedly by the Arkan-
sas appellate courts as the first case in which the common law right of pri-
vacy was recognized. 
Not until 1979 did the court explicitly adopt the four common law pri-
vacy actions as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Dodrill v. 
Arkansas Democrat Co.,90 the court upheld summary judgment granted to 
the news publisher in a case filed by an attorney plaintiff for defamation and 
invasion of privacy.91 In a previous action, the attorney had been suspended 
from the practice of law, subject to readmission if he successfully sat for the 
Arkansas bar exam.92 After retaking the exam and passing it, he alleged that 
the defendant newspaper erroneously reported that he had failed the exam.93
Before affirming summary judgment on the merits, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court expressly adopted the four privacy torts as “codified” in the Restate-
ment.94
Since 1979, the Arkansas courts have repeatedly acknowledged the 
four common law privacy torts as defined in the Restatement.95 After Olan 
Mills, no cases involving appropriation of name or likeness have reached the 
 88. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 89. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 90. 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979). 
 91. Id. at 637–38 & n.8, 590 S.W.2d at 844–45 & n.8.  
 92. Id. at 631, 590 S.W.2d at 841; see In re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 
(1976). 
 93. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 633, 590 S.W.2d at 842. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment on both claims, reasoning that the attorney plaintiff was a public figure and that he 
failed to show that the newspaper acted with actual malice. Id. at 633–34, 590 S.W.2d at 842.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed this holding on appeal. Id. at 639–40, 590 S.W.2d at 
846. 
 94. Id. at 637–38, 590 S.W.2d at 844–45; see id. at 638 n.8, 590 S.W.2d at 845 n.8 
(holding that “Arkansas has been included in [the] majority [of jurisdictions that recognize 
the right of privacy] with the decision in Olan Mills . . . .”). 
 95. E.g., Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 263, 937 S.W.2d 653, 657 (1997) (cita-
tions omitted) (“Arkansas has recognized the existence of four actionable forms of invasion 
of privacy . . . .”); CBM of Cent. Ark. v. Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 225–26, 623 S.W.2d 518, 
519–20 (1981) (recognizing intrusion on seclusion); Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at 
845 (recognizing false light publicity); see ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 
(Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (appropriation of name or likeness) 
(citing Olan Mills Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962)); ARKANSAS 
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422 (public disclosure of private facts); see also Wood v. 
Nat’l Computer Sys., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Arkansas law) (publicity 
given to private facts); Stanley v. Gen. Media Comm’ns, 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706–07 (W.D. 
Ark. 2001) (appropriation of likeness; false light). 
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Arkansas appellate courts. Intrusion on seclusion and false light publicity 
appear to be the privacy torts most often litigated in Arkansas appellate 
courts.96 While the state courts have not addressed a claim for publicity giv-
en to private facts, the federal courts have done so on occasion.97 Part III 
addresses each of the four privacy torts in more detail.  
B. Constitutional Right of Privacy 
The underpinnings of the Arkansas Constitution’s right of privacy were 
recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court as early as 1924 in Coker v. City 
of Fort Smith.98 A city ordinance prohibiting prostitution also prohibited any 
male over the age of fourteen from accompanying, day or night, “‘without 
there being any necessity therefor . . . any woman known or generally reput-
ed to be a prostitute or lewd woman.’”99 Coker was convicted of a misde-
meanor and fined for violating the statute, and he appealed, challenging its 
constitutionality.100 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the ordinance 
went too far by effectively denying a prostitute the value of residing in the 
city by denying the privileges that “give that right its value.”101 While the 
ordinance did not directly prohibit a prostitute from accompanying a male in 
the city, it effectively denied her that right by criminalizing the conduct of 
her male companion.102
Coker did not expressly rely on the Arkansas Constitution as the basis 
for invalidating the Fort Smith ordinance. The court simply held that the 
relevant portion of the ordinance was “too broad in its terms, and was be-
yond the power of the [city] council to enact, and [was] therefore invalid.”103
The court reasoned, however, that the ordinance limited the liberty interests 
of “lewd” women as well as their male companions,104 directly implicating 
what would later become known as the “right to be let alone.” Further, the 
 96. See, e.g., Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d 
___ (intrusion on seclusion); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 
(2002) (intrusion on seclusion, false light); Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 
(1984) (intrusion on seclusion); Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (intrusion on seclu-
sion); Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (false light); Coombs v. J.B. Hunt Transp., 
Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 24, 388 S.W.3d 456 (2012) (intrusion on seclusion); Addington v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003) (intrusion on seclusion, false 
light). 
 97. See Wood, 814 F.2d 544; Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, 446 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D. 
Ark. 2011). 
 98. 162 Ark. 567, 258 S.W. 388 (1924).  
 99. Id. at 568–69, 258 S.W. at 389 (quoting Fort Smith city ordinance). 
 100. Id., 258 S.W. at 389. 
 101. Id. at 573, 258 S.W. at 390. 
 102. Id., 258 S.W. at 390.
 103. Id., 258 S.W. at 390. 
 104. Coker, 162 Ark. at 573, 258 S.W. at 390. 
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court cited two cases from Texas and Missouri, each of which had struck 
down similar enactments on state and federal constitutional grounds.105
In 1973 in Carter v. State,106 the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed 
the constitutional privacy issue more directly. The appellants challenged the 
constitutionality of the Arkansas criminal sodomy statute107 on multiple 
grounds. They had been convicted for engaging in intimate conduct in a 
vehicle parked at a public rest stop and tourist information facility, within 
view of others who had parked trucks, automobiles, and campers there.108
The appellants’ main argument was that the statute violated their right of 
privacy under various amendments to the United States Constitution.109
The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to strike down the statute, ob-
serving that it carried a strong presumption of constitutionality.110 Moreover, 
the presumption of validity was “enhanced by the highly persuasive fact that 
the [criminal sodomy] statute was long unassailed.”111 The court emphasized 
that the defendants’ conduct leading to the conviction occurred not in pri-
vate, but in a public place.112 The appellants unsuccessfully cited cases that 
“demonstrate[d] . . . the expansion of the ‘right to privacy in matters of inti-
mate personal preference’ . . . based upon the courts’ having taken cogni-
zance of dramatic changes in social conditions which have made legal doc-
trines once appropriate become unsuited for contemporary society.”113 The 
court avoided the issue by deferring to the legislative branch, observing that 
“[i]f social changes have rendered our sodomy statutes unsuitable to the 
society in which we now live, we need not be concerned about the matter 
 105. Id. at 571–72, 258 S.W. at 390; see Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628, 629 (Mo. 1896) 
(“We deny the power of any legislative body in this country to choose for our citizens whom 
their associates shall be.”); Ex parte Cannon, 250 S.W. 429, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923) 
(“[T]he various subdivisions of section 2 of this ordinance . . . demonstrate that it is violative 
of the fundamental guaranty of both the federal and state Constitutions to every citizen of life, 
liberty, and property.”).
 106. 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973). 
 107. ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-813 (Repl. 1964), invalidated by Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 
600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002). 
 108. Carter, 255 Ark. at 227, 500 S.W.2d at 370. 
 109. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370.  
 110. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370. 
 111. Id. at 228, 500 S.W.2d at 370 (citations omitted). “[I]f such a statute were in viola-
tion of federal constitutional principles, surely the thought would have long since occurred to 
the many legal scholars and jurists of this state. Appellants have not, by their multifaceted 
attack, met their very heavy burden of showing that this statute is unconstitutional.” Id., 500 
S.W.2d at 370. 
 112. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370. The court could have avoided the constitutional issue entire-
ly simply by holding that even if the appellants did have a right of privacy, they had waived it 
by virtue of engaging in prohibited conduct in a public place in view of others. 
 113. Id. at 230, 500 S.W.2d at 371. 
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because there is a branch of our government within whose purview the mak-
ing of appropriate adjustment and changes peculiarly lies.”114
Five years later in 1978, the court addressed the constitutional rights of 
arrestees in Bolden v. State.115 The appellants argued in part that they were 
prejudiced because the prosecution had failed to comply with Rule 8.1 of the 
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “[a]n arrested 
person who is not released by citation or by other lawful manner shall be 
taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.”116 The court 
agreed with the appellants’ argument that Rule 8.1 was mandatory, but disa-
greed that the State’s failure to comply warranted dismissal of the charg-
es.117 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged in passing that the rule was de-
signed in part to protect arrestees’ privacy and liberty interests, which are 
among the fundamental constitutional rights of arrestees protected by both 
the state and federal constitutions.118
A decade later, a divided court addressed asserted constitutional priva-
cy interests with respect to public records in McCambridge v. City of Little 
Rock.119 The case involved certain records and photographs associated with 
the 1987 murder-suicide of John Markle, the son of Mercedes 
McCambridge, then a well-known actress.120 McCambridge and the Markle 
estate sued the City and its police department in an effort to prevent the re-
lease of information as to which McCambridge claimed a constitutional 
right of privacy.121 The trial court held that the challenged records were sub-
ject to disclosure under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.122 On 
 114. Carter, 255 Ark. at 230, 500 S.W.2d at 371.
 115. 262 Ark. 718, 723–24, 561 S.W.2d 281, 284 (1978).   
 116. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.1. 
 117. Bolden, 262 Ark. at 724, 561 S.W.2d at 284. 
 118. Id., 561 S.W.2d at 284. As the court observed,   
Rule 8.1 is designed and has as its purpose to afford an arrestee protection 
against unfounded invasion of liberty and privacy. Moreover, the person under 
arrest taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay will have the 
charges explained, will be advised of his constitutional rights and will have 
counsel appointed for him, if an indigent, and arrangements for bail can be made 
expeditiously. Such action may avoid the loss of the suspect's job and eliminate 
the prospect of the loss of income and the disruption and impairment of his fami-
ly relationship. Indeed, these are basic and fundamental rights which our state 
and federal constitutions secure to every arrestee. Hence, we conclude that Rule 
8.1 is mandatory in its scope. 
Id., 561 S.W.2d at 284 (emphasis added).   
 119. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989). 
 120. Id. at 224–25, 766 S.W.2d at 911; see Archive of Obituary of Mercedes 
McCambridge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/18/arts
/mercedes-mccambridge-87-actress-known-for-strong-roles.html. 
 121. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 224–25, 766 S.W.2d at 911. 
 122. Id. at 225, 766 S.W.2d at 911.     
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appeal, McCambridge argued in part that releasing the records would 
amount to a violation of her constitutional right of privacy.123
Relying on recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court acknowledged that McCambridge had a valid privacy inter-
est in at least some of the criminal investigation records.124 The court ob-
served that fundamental privacy interests include the protection of family 
relationships.125 Those interests were directly implicated in McCambridge 
because one of the documents she sought to protect from disclosure was a 
long letter her deceased son had written to her just before committing the 
murder-suicide.126 However, the court reasoned that her constitutional priva-
cy interest extended only to “personal matters,” defined as information that 
a person has intentionally kept private, that could be kept private absent 
governmental action, and that would be embarrassing to a reasonable person 
if disclosed.127 Applying that standard to the facts, the court concluded that 
some of the documents in question involved matters personal to 
McCambridge.128
Having determined that McCambridge had a constitutional privacy in-
terest in some of the documents, the court proceeded to balance her constitu-
tional privacy interest against the government’s interest in public disclosure 
recognized by the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.129 After consider-
ing each record one by one, the court concluded that the balance weighed in 
the government’s favor, and therefore none of the records were exempt from 
disclosure under the Act.130 The court acknowledged that McCambridge’s 
privacy interest in the contents of the letter her son had written to her was 
especially high, observing that “[w]hile public figures cannot expect the 
same degree of privacy as private citizens, they can reasonably expect priva-
cy in personal letters to or from their children.”131 Nevertheless, the govern-
ment also had a strong interest in the letter’s content because it was relevant 
 123. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912.  
 124. Id. at 228–30, 766 S.W.2d at 913–14 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 
(1977) (holding that one facet of constitutional privacy interests includes the right of an indi-
vidual not to have his private affairs made public)). 
 125. Id. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914 (citing Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 
458 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). 
 126. Id. at 231–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915.   
 127. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914 (citing with approval Bruce E. 
Falby, Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal Matter: Perfecting 
Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEO. L.J. 219, 240 
(1981)). 
 128. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 914. In particular, she had a privacy interest in two letters Markle 
had written to his attorney, in Markle’s diary, in the letter Markle had written to her, and in 
the photographs. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 914.   
 129. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458). 
 130. Id. at 231–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915.  
 131. Id. at 232, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
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to solving the crime.132 The court concluded that the government’s interest 
in disclosure outweighed McCambridge’s privacy interests.133
McCambridge was an important case in the development of Arkansas 
privacy law because it recognized, for the first time, evolving federal prece-
dent recognizing a constitutional privacy interest in information regarding 
intimate personal matters. The case also expressly acknowledged that the 
right of privacy extends to family relationships.134 In citing Whalen v. Roe,135
the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged two basic aspects of constitu-
tional privacy interests: informational privacy, the interest in avoiding dis-
closure of information pertaining to private matters; and personal autonomy, 
“the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions.”136 The first of these was implicated in McCambridge; the second 
would await direct recognition by the Arkansas Supreme Court thirteen 
years later in Jegley v. Picado.137
The Arkansas Supreme Court once again addressed a constitutional ar-
gument pertaining to informational privacy in Arkansas Department of Hu-
man Services v. Heath.138 Heath, a middle school principal, was the subject 
of a report to the Department of Human Services alleging a possible incident 
of child abuse for paddling a student.139 He challenged the report and ulti-
mately obtained a ruling from the circuit court declaring that the report of 
child abuse was “unsubstantiated.”140 While the Department did not appeal 
that decision, it challenged the circuit court’s order directing it to remove the 
report from the state’s Child Abuse and Neglect Central Registry.141
The challenge was based on a state statute142 that required the Depart-
ment to expunge all unfounded reports from the registry after three years.143
The Department interpreted the statute’s affirmative mandate to mean that 
expungement before three years was not discretionary but rather prohibited 
as a matter of law.144 The issue on appeal was whether retaining the report in 
 132. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 915.
 133. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 232, 766 S.W.2d at 915. 
 134. Id. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914. 
 135. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 136. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 229, 766 S.W.2d at 913 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 
599–600). 
 137. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002). 
 138. 312 Ark. 206, 848 S.W.2d 927 (1993). 
 139. Id. at 208, 848 S.W.2d at 928. 
 140. Id., 848 S.W.2d at 928. 
 141. Id. at 208–09, 848 S.W.2d at 928.  
 142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-505 (Supp. 1991) (repealed 2009). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Heath, 312 Ark. at 209, 848 S.W.2d at 928. 
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the state registry after the circuit court had found it unsubstantiated violated 
Heath’s constitutional due process, equal protection, and privacy rights.145
First, after reviewing the legislative history, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court agreed with the Department’s interpretation that the statute required 
even unsubstantiated reports of child abuse to be retained in the registry for 
three years.146 Nevertheless, the court held that the statute did not violate due 
process because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that it implicated any 
property interest, even after the court conceded that the registry information 
may have been harmful to his professional reputation.147 The court also re-
jected Heath’s equal protection argument, concluding that the state had a 
rational basis for classifying subjects of unsubstantiated reports of child 
abuse differently than innocent persons who had never been accused of child 
abuse.148
Finally, the court turned to the appellant’s privacy challenge. Consider-
ing the statutory safeguards that required the Department to flag unfounded 
reports of child abuse and to restrict disclosure of the information,149 the 
court held that no constitutional privacy interest was implicated by main-
taining Heath’s name in the state registry.150 In reaching that conclusion, the 
court cited United States Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedents up-
holding analogous government listings of data over privacy challenges.151
With this background, the Arkansas Supreme Court revisited the con-
stitutionality of the Arkansas criminal sodomy statute in 2002 in the water-
shed case Jegley v. Picado,152 which struck down the state’s criminal sodo-
my statute153 as applied to private adult consensual sexual relationships.154 A 
group of gay and lesbian Arkansas citizens filed a declaratory judgment 
 145. Id., 848 S.W.2d at 928. The circuit court held in part that retaining the record in the 
registry would violate Heath’s due process rights. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Heath, 307 
Ark. 147, 148, 817 S.W.2d 885, 886 (1991). On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not 
specify whether it resolved the issue on state or federal constitutional grounds. See Heath,
312 Ark. at 209, 848 S.W.2d at 928. 
 146. Heath, 312 Ark. at 209, 848 S.W.2d at 928.
 147. Id. at 211–14, 848 S.W.2d at 929–31 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). 
 148. Id. at 214, 848 S.W.2d at 931. 
 149. Id. at 215, 848 S.W.2d at 932 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-506 (Supp. 1991) 
(repealed 2009)). 
 150. Id. at 215–16, 848 S.W.2d at 931–32.
 151. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (declining to address privacy issue be-
cause challenged state statutory scheme evidenced proper concern with individual privacy 
interests); Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1988) (observing that the “con-
stitutional right to privacy is generally limited to only the most intimate aspects of human 
affairs”). 
 152. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
 153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997) (current version at § 5-14-122 (Supp. 
2011)). 
 154. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 632, 638, 80 S.W.3d at 350, 354.  
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action challenging the constitutionality of the statute.155 The court reviewed 
the ongoing development of the federal right of privacy, observing that the 
United States Supreme Court at that time had declined to recognize “a fun-
damental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”156 under the federal Con-
stitution. Yet the court concluded that the Arkansas Constitution did protect 
that right, holding that “the fundamental right to privacy implicit in our law 
protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy be-
tween adults.”157 The court cited Coker in support of a broad reading of the 
Arkansas Constitution to the extent of protecting a prostitute’s right to be 
accompanied by a man within city limits.158 The court also reasoned that the 
Arkansas Constitution requires the General Assembly to extend all privileg-
es and immunities to all citizen classes alike.159
Jegley represented the Arkansas Supreme Court’s willingness to read 
the Arkansas Constitution to provide greater privacy protections for personal 
autonomy than did the United States Constitution, as then interpreted. In 
2002, the United States Constitution’s zones of privacy had not yet been 
interpreted to protect consensual private sexual activity by same-sex cou-
ples.160 Yet Jegley foreshadowed by just a year the United States Supreme 
Court’s 2003 decision overruling its own precedent by holding that the 
United States Constitution affords homosexuals a fundamental right to en-
gage in consensual sexual activity.161
 155. Id. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334. 
 156. Id. at 624, 80 S.W.3d at 344. 
 157. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350 (Imber, J., writing for the majority). A concurring jus-
tice agreed but in narrower language: “I agree with the majority that the right to privacy is a 
fundamental right under the Arkansas Constitution and that it is violated by enforcement of 
the sodomy statute against consenting adults engaged in noncommercial sexual activity in the 
bedroom of their homes.” Id. at 640, 80 S.W.3d at 355 (Brown, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). The distinction between all consensual sexual activity between adults and that occur-
ring “in the bedroom of their homes” would later cause Justice Brown to dissent from a deci-
sion extending Jegley to protect consensual adult sexual activity outside a couple’s own bed-
room. See infra notes 219–31 and accompanying text (discussing Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 
127, 388 S.W.3d 429). 
 158. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 628, 80 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Coker v. City of Ft. Smith, 162 
Ark. 567, 258 S.W. 388 (1924)). 
 159. See id., 80 S.W.3d at 347 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 18). 
160. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
 161. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  
Th[is] case . . . involve[s] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from 
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The 
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State [of Texas] can-
not demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime [of sodomy]. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause 
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.  
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As might be anticipated, Jegley has opened the door to a number of 
other challenges to Arkansas statutes implicating the fundamental constitu-
tional right of privacy recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court. These 
cases raise important questions about the scope of the state constitutional 
privacy right. In particular, it remains debatable whether the right applies 
solely to decision making about intimate private consensual sexual activity 
between adults in their own homes, or whether it reaches more broadly to 
include informational privacy rights. 
For example, in 2005, in Polston v. State,162 the court considered the 
constitutional right of privacy of felons in the context of a statute authoriz-
ing DNA sampling.163 Under the State Convicted Offender DNA Database 
Act,164 felons must submit to the taking of DNA samples for inclusion in the 
State Convicted Offender DNA Database.165 Polston had been convicted on 
guilty pleas to several drug-related offenses.166 The court first held that 
mandatory DNA sampling was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment, in particular because “a convicted person has a diminished 
expectation of privacy in the penal context.”167 Also, the court reasoned that 
the nature of the challenged intrusion was not substantial under United 
States Supreme Court precedent.168 Given these considerations, the appel-
lant’s privacy interests were outweighed by the state government’s substan-
tial interest in collecting and maintaining DNA samples from convicted fel-
ons.169
The appellant, citing Jegley, also asserted that by collecting DNA sam-
ples from non-violent felons, the state violated his state constitutional right 
of privacy, independent of any protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.170 The court crisply dismissed the argument without elabora-
tion, implicitly distinguishing Jegley as having implicated only the right to 
intimate sexual activity in one’s own home.171
Id.  
 162. 360 Ark. 317, 201 S.W.3d 406 (2005). 
 163. Id., 201 S.W.3d 406.
 164. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1101 to -1120 (Repl. 2009).
165. Id. §§ 12-121-1103(9) to -1109(a).   
 166. Polston, 360 Ark. at 322, 201 S.W.3d at 407.
 167. Id. at 326, 201 S.W.3d at 410 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984)). 
 168. Id., 201 S.W.3d at 410–11 (citing, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)). 
 169. Id. at 327, 201 S.W.3d at 411. 
 170. Id. at 331, 201 S.W.3d at 414. 
 171. Id. at 331–32, 201 S.W.3d at 414. “We fail to see how our precedents recognizing a 
citizen's fundamental right to privacy in his or her home offer any support for Polston's ar-
gument that he, a convicted felon, has a fundamental right to privacy implicit in Arkansas law 
that would exempt him from the DNA testing at issue in this case.” Id. at 332, 201 S.W.3d at 
414. 
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A year later in 2006, a clergyman challenged the constitutionality of an 
Arkansas criminal statute,172 contending that it infringed his constitutional 
right of privacy.173 The statute in question in Talbert v. State174 prohibits 
clergymen from using their positions of trust and authority to engage in sex-
ual activity with another;175 the victim’s consent is not a defense.176 On ap-
peal from his conviction, the clergyman argued that the statute infringed his 
constitutional right to privacy under both the United States and Arkansas 
Constitutions, citing Lawrence v. Texas177 and Jegley v. Picado respective-
ly.178 As for the due process argument based on Lawrence, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that the appellant had no constitutional right to abuse 
his position of trust and authority as a clergyman to engage in unwanted 
sexual activity with his victims.179 Turning to his claim based on the Arkan-
sas Constitution, the court held that the statute did not infringe on the appel-
lant’s constitutionally protected right to engage in “private, consensual sex,” 
readily distinguishing Jegley on its facts.180
Also in 2006, in Department of Human Services & Child Welfare 
Agency Review Board v. Howard, 181 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a 
ruling declaring unconstitutional a regulation adopted in 1999 by the Child 
Welfare Agency Review Board providing that “[n]o person may serve as a 
foster parent if any adult member of that person's household is a homosexu-
al.”182 On appeal by the State Department of Human Services, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that the regulation exceeded the 
agency’s statutory authority and violated the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers. The court reasoned that the regulation failed to promote the health, safe-
ty, and welfare of children as required by the agency’s authorizing statute183
and “rather act[ed] to exclude a set of individuals from becoming foster par-
ents based upon morality and bias.”184 The majority declined to address the 
alternative constitutional arguments the plaintiffs had asserted to the circuit 
 172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) (Repl. 2006) (current version at § 5-14-
126(a)(1)(C)). The statute prohibits “a member of the clergy [who] is in a position of trust or 
authority over the victim [from using] the position of trust or authority to engage in sexual 
intercourse or deviate sexual activity.” Id.
 173. Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006). 
 174. Id., 239 S.W.3d 504.
 175. Id. at 265, 239 S.W.3d at 508 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(B)). 
 176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(b). 
 177. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 178. Talbert, 367 Ark. at 269–71, 239 S.W.3d at 511–12. 
 179. Id. at 270, 239 S.W.3d at 512. 
 180. Id., 239 S.W.3d at 512 (emphasis added). 
 181. 367 Ark. 55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006). 
 182. Howard, 367 Ark. at 58, 238 S.W.3d at 3. 
 183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-405 (Supp. 2011). 
 184. Howard, 367 Ark. at 62, 238 S.W.3d at 6.  
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court, including the argument that the regulation violated their state constitu-
tional right of privacy, because those issues were not properly before the 
court on appeal.185
Justice Brown concurred but wrote separately to emphasize that he 
would have reached the privacy issue.186 Citing Jegley, Justice Brown rea-
soned that the challenged regulation “overtly and significantly burden[ed] 
the privacy rights of couples engaged in sexual conduct in the bedroom 
which . . . has [been] specifically declared to be impermissible as violative 
of equal-protection and privacy rights.”187
There is no question but that gay and lesbian couples have had their 
equal-protection and privacy rights truncated without any legitimate and 
rational basis in the form of foster-child protection for doing so. Indeed, 
in Jegley, this court held that privacy rights attending sexual conduct in 
the bedroom between two consenting adults was a fundamental right un-
der the Arkansas Constitution that required strict scrutiny and a compel-
ling state interest to justify interference with it.188
As explained later, Justice Brown’s concurring opinion in Howard fore-
shadowed the court’s unanimous decision five years later in Arkansas De-
partment of Human Services v. Cole.189
The same year the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Talbert and How-
ard, the Eighth Circuit addressed the federal and state constitutional right of 
privacy in Sylvester v. Fogley.190 A former Arkansas police officer alleged 
that his superiors had violated his constitutional right of privacy under both 
the United States and Arkansas Constitutions by investigating his consensu-
al sexual relationship with a complaining witness.191 The officer had been 
assigned to investigate a complaint by a married couple who believed one of 
their employees had embezzled funds from their co-owned business.192 The 
husband later complained to police superiors that the officer had engaged in 
sexual relations with the complainant wife.193 After an investigation con-
firmed the complaint and revealed other indiscretions by the officer, he was 
dismissed.194 He later sued, alleging that defendants’ investigation into his 
consensual sexual relationship with the female complaining witness violated 
 185. Id. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8–9.  
 186. Id. at 66–70, 238 S.W.3d at 9–11 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 68, 238 S.W.3d at 10 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 
(2002)). 
 188. Id. at 70, 238 S.W.3d at 11.  
 189. 2011 Ark. 145, 380 S.W.3d 429. See infra notes 203–17 and accompanying text. 
 190. 465 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 191. Id. at 852. 
 192. Id.
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 854–55.  
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his constitutional right to privacy under both the United States and Arkansas 
Constitutions.195
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment entered for the de-
fendants,196 but declined to consider the substantive right of privacy on 
which the officer’s claim was based.197 Nevertheless, the court expressed 
pointed skepticism about the asserted constitutional privacy right, noting 
that “‘[o]bscure’ might best describe the right of privacy.”198 The panel 
acknowledged that the Arkansas Supreme Court had identified a fundamen-
tal state constitutional right of privacy in the context of private, noncom-
mercial, consensual sexual relationships, and therefore strict scrutiny was 
the appropriate judicial standard for reviewing an alleged government in-
fringement.199 Assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff officer had such 
a right, the court nevertheless held that the government had a compelling 
interest in investigating allegations that his conduct had seriously compro-
mised the embezzlement investigation.200 Furthermore, the court held that 
the nature and scope of the investigation had been narrowly tailored to the 
government’s compelling interest.201 Therefore, the government’s interest in 
protecting the integrity of the criminal investigation and thus “administering 
a fair and unbiased criminal-justice system” was compelling, and the inves-
tigation had been narrowly tailored to serve that interest.202
Next in the chronology came Cole,203 an important case that helped 
clarify the boundaries of the state constitutional privacy right recognized in 
Jegley v. Picado. In 2008, a majority of the voting electorate approved an 
initiative enactment—the Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act of 2008 
 195. Id. at 852–55. 
 196. Fogley, 465 F.3d at 860. 
 197. The court acknowledged that “police officers generally have a right of privacy in 
their private sexual relations.” Id. at 858 n.6 (citing cases from other circuits). But the court 
also observed that the courts did not agree on the appropriate standard of constitutional re-
view when those activities are investigated by police departments. Id.  
 198. Id. at 857.  
 199. Id. at 857–58 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350
(2002)). The court also observed that unlike the Arkansas Supreme Court in Jegley v. Picado,
the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas had implicitly applied a rational-basis 
standard, suggesting that the constitutional right to engage in consensual homosexual sexual 
conduct was not a fundamental right. Id. at 857 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
 200. “First, we conclude that a police force has a compelling interest in precluding a 
criminal investigator from having sexual relations with witnesses or victims involved in an 
underlying criminal investigation.” Fogley, 465 F.3d at 859. 
 201. “Second, we conclude that the [Arkansas State Police’s] investigation of [the] alle-
gations was narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in administering a fair 
and unbiased criminal-justice system.” Id. at 860. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, 380 S.W.3d 429.  
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or “Act I”—in the general election.204 The statute provided that no individu-
al could adopt a child or serve as a foster parent in Arkansas if that person 
were cohabiting in a sexual relationship outside a marriage considered valid 
under Arkansas law.205 By its express terms, the statute applied both to co-
habiting heterosexual couples as well as same-sex couples.206
The plaintiffs were unmarried adults who sought to become adoptive or 
foster parents in Arkansas, as well as adult parents who wished to preserve 
their right to determine who might adopt their children in the event of their 
death.207 They challenged the statute’s constitutionality on various 
grounds.208 The circuit court, following a hearing, agreed with the plaintiffs 
and granted summary judgment on their argument that the statute violated 
their due process, equal protection, and privacy rights under the Arkansas 
Constitution.209 Specifically, the circuit court reasoned that the initiative 
statute “‘significantly burden[ed] non-marital relationships and acts of sexu-
al intimacy between adults because it force[d] them to choose between be-
coming a parent and having any meaningful type of intimate relationship 
outside of marriage, [which] infringes upon the fundamental right to privacy 
guaranteed to all citizens of Arkansas.’”210
On appeal by the state, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.211 First, 
the court agreed that the statute burdened the plaintiffs’ fundamental consti-
tutional right to privacy, and therefore heightened scrutiny applied.212 The 
court articulated that interest as prohibiting “[t]he intrusion by the State into 
a couple’s bedroom to enforce a sexual prohibition.”213 Act I substantially 
burdened the constitutionally protected interest in “engag[ing] in private, 
consensual sexual conduct in the bedroom by foreclosing their eligibility to 
foster or adopt children, should they choose to cohabit with their sexual 
partner.”214 The court’s reasoning reflects that the state constitutional right 
implicated was the right of personal autonomy to make decisions implicat-
ing relationship and familial interests. 
Second, while the state asserted that the enactment sought to advance a 
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of Arkansas children, the court 
concluded that the initiative measure failed to use the least restrictive means 
 204. Id. at 2, 380 S.W.3d at 431. 
 205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304(a) (Repl. 2009). 
 206. Id. § 9-8-304(b). 
 207. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 3, 380 S.W.3d at 432. 
 208. Id. at 4, 380 S.W.3d at 432. 
 209. Id. at 5–6, 380 S.W.3d at 432–33. 
 210. Id. at 6–7, 380 S.W.3d at 433 (quoting unpublished circuit court opinion). 
 211. Id. at 25–26, 380 S.W.3d at 442. 
 212. Id. at 21, 380 S.W.3d at 440. 
 213. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 18, 380 S.W.3d at 439. 
 214. Id., 380 S.W.3d at 439. 
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to serve that interest because it categorically prohibited unmarried couples 
from adopting or becoming foster parents.215
In deciding Cole, the unanimous majority opinion repeatedly refer-
enced the constitutional privacy rights of cohabiting sexual partners, wheth-
er heterosexual or homosexual, to decide whether to become parents.216 The 
constitutional challenge by the plaintiffs, who were all cohabiting partners, 
would not have permitted the court to go further in its holding. Yet the opin-
ion left open the question whether the court would extend the state constitu-
tional privacy right beyond a cohabiting couple’s bedroom.217 That oppor-
tunity was presented recently in a criminal case involving a high school 
teacher who had engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with an eight-
een-year old high school student.218
A deeply divided court addressed the parameters of the state constitu-
tional privacy right in Paschal v. State.219 Paschal appealed his convictions 
for second-degree sexual assault and bribing a witness.220 He and an eight-
een-year-old high school student had engaged in a consensual sexual rela-
tionship221 in violation of an Arkansas statute prohibiting a public school-
teacher from engaging in sexual contact with a student under age twenty-
one.222 A majority of the court affirmed his conviction for witness bribery 
but reversed his convictions for sexual assault, reasoning that the criminal 
statute was unconstitutional as applied because it criminalized private con-
sensual sexual activity between adults and therefore infringed Paschal’s 
fundamental right to privacy.223 The majority quoted directly from Jegley v. 
Picado in defining the Arkansas constitutional right of privacy: “‘[T]he fun-
damental right to privacy implicit in our law protects all private, consensual, 
noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults.’”224 The statute in 
 215. Id. at 21, 380 S.W.3d at 440.
 216. Id. at 9–11, 14–15, 380 S.W.3d at 434–35, 437.   
 217. See id., 380 S.W.3d at 434–35, 437.  
 218. See Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429. 
 219. 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429 (4-3 opinion). 
 220. Id. at 1, 388 S.W.3d at 431.  
 221. The state did not dispute that the sexual relationship was consensual or that the stu-
dent was an adult for the duration of the relationship. Id. at 8, 388 S.W.3d at 434; see ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-25-101(a) (Repl. 2009) (defining anyone age 18 to have reached the age of 
majority for all purposes).
 222. Paschal, 2012 Ark. at 8, 388 S.W.3d at 434 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-
125(a)(6) (Supp. 2011)). 
 223. Id. at 14–15, 388 S.W.3d at 437 (Hannah, C.J., writing for the majority). Justice 
Daniel wrote a separate opinion concurring with the majority opinion to the extent it reversed 
the sexual assault convictions. However, he also would have reversed the conviction for 
witness bribery for reasons beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 15–17, 388 S.W.3d at 
438–39 (Danielson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 224. Id. at 11, 388 S.W.3d at 435 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Jegley v. 
Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (2002)). 
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question made consensual sexual activity between these two adults a crime, 
and therefore it could not survive constitutional challenge.225 The fact that 
one was a high school teacher and the other an adult student was not rele-
vant. 
Three justices joined in two lengthy dissenting opinions.226 They inter-
preted Jegley v. Picado narrowly, reasoning that the state constitutional pri-
vacy right protects “the right . . . for consenting adults to have sexual rela-
tions in the privacy of their homes.”227 They also characterized as “absurd” 
the majority’s interpretation of the Arkansas constitutional right of privacy 
to extend to a teacher’s sexual contact with an eighteen-year-old student at a 
school where the defendant taught.228 Analogizing to Talbert, the dissenting 
justices reasoned that the teacher-student relationship is inherently fraught 
with potential coercion because teachers hold a position of trust and authori-
ty that is subject to misuse.229 Under the circumstances, the dissenters rea-
soned that the statute did not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, 
and therefore the court needed only a rational basis to uphold it.230 From the 
dissenters’ perspective, the state had a legitimate interest in enacting a stat-
ute protecting schoolchildren from the problems inherently associated with 
sexual conduct involving school employees, and the challenged statute was 
rationally related to that interest.231
In Paschal, a bare majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted 
the Arkansas fundamental constitutional right of privacy broadly enough to 
protect any noncommercial sexual activity or conduct between consenting 
adults. Over the objections of three justices, the majority declined to confine 
the privacy right to the bedrooms of cohabiting adults, a rationale the court 
had unanimously embraced in Cole in striking down Act I. Because the 
court was so divided, Paschal raises unanswered questions about just how 
 225. Id. at 11–12, 388 S.W.3d at 436. The majority recognized the possibility that the 
Arkansas General Assembly may have intended the statute to mean that a high school teacher 
is inherently in a position of trust and authority over all students, even adults, but the court 
observed that the legislature had not done so. Id. at 11, 388 S.W.3d at 436 (implicitly distin-
guishing Talbert v. State, 349 Ark. 600, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2002), in which the court upheld a 
conviction of a clergyman who had engaged in unwanted sexual activity with two victims by 
abusing his position of trust and authority). 
 226. Id. at 17–23, 388 S.W.3d at 439–42 (Brown, J., joined by Gunter & Baker, JJ., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part); see also id. at 23–26, 388 S.W.3d at 442–43 (Baker, 
J., joined by Brown & Gunter, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 227. Id. at 19, 388 S.W.3d at 440 (Brown, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(emphasis added) (citing Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 14, 380
S.W.3d 429, 437). 
 228. Paschal, 2012 Ark. at 24, 388 S.W.3d at 442 (Baker, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part). 
 229. Id. at 25–26, 388 S.W.3d at 443.  
 230. Id. at 26, 388 S.W.3d at 443.  
 231. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 443. 
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far the court is willing to go in interpreting the fundamental right to privacy 
protected by the Arkansas Constitution. To date, for example, the court has 
not addressed the extent to which the state constitutional right extends to 
informational privacy interests, or whether it protects personal autonomy 
with respect to matters other than intimate sexual relationships and familial 
interests. 
IV. THE ARKANSAS COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY
As noted above, the Arkansas courts have generally recognized the 
four variations on the common law right of privacy enumerated in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. This section comprehensively addresses each 
of the four privacy torts as developed by judicial interpretation of Arkansas 
common law. 
A. Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to resolve 
a disputed claim for appropriation of name or likeness on the merits. In Olan 
Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, the plaintiff prevailed in a jury trial alleging the 
unconsented use of her photograph for advertising purposes.232 On appeal, 
the parties did not dispute the jury’s finding that Olan Mills had invaded the 
plaintiff’s privacy, and the defendant conceded that she was entitled to nom-
inal damages.233 But the court upheld a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff 
$2,500 over the defendant’s objection that the law did not support compen-
satory damages for mental anguish in the absence of physical injury.234 The 
Olan Mills court made a point of limiting its holding to the “particular facts 
of [the] case and the extent of the damages . . . awarded.”235
Thus, the sole legal issue resolved by Olan Mills was the availability of 
damages for mental anguish; the court had no occasion in that case to adopt 
a common law right of privacy.236 A later decision by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court would underscore this point and the central substantive question pre-
sented in Olan Mills.237 In 1980, the court suggested that the Olan Mills 
court had strained to uphold the challenged award of damages on appeal, 
even to the extent of recognizing an invasion of privacy as a subterfuge to 
allow recovery for mental injury not accompanied by any physical injury, 
 232. 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962). 
 233. Id. at 498–99, 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 234. Id. at 499, 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 235. Id. at 498, 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 236. See id., 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 237. See M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980). 
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contrary to the traditional “impact” rule in Arkansas.238 The court observed 
that Olan Mills had even “resorted to the right of privacy to support an 
award” of damages for mental anguish, suggesting that the right of privacy 
was merely a foil for avoiding the “constructive” physical impact Arkansas 
courts had long required to support a damage award for mental distress 
alone.239
The fact that the Arkansas appellate courts have never directly ad-
dressed a claim for appropriation of name or likeness on its merits means 
that the federal courts have taken the lead in diversity cases to predict how 
the state courts would rule on the issue. In doing so, the federal courts have 
too narrowly interpreted Olan Mills in identifying the elements of a claim 
for appropriation of name or likeness. The Arkansas Supreme Court has 
repeatedly cited the Restatement in clarifying the elements of a privacy 
claim. For the misappropriation tort, the elements required by the Restate-
ment reflect the underlying basis for the claim: to remedy the mental an-
guish of a plaintiff whose name or likeness is used by a defendant for its 
own advantage without the plaintiff’s permission. As explained in detail 
below, the federal courts have unduly limited the claim to commercial uses 
by the defendant, in the absence of any contrary holding by the Arkansas 
courts.240   
For example, in Stanley v. General Media Communications, Inc.,241 two 
high school girls sued the publisher of Penthouse Magazine for publishing 
their names and photograph alongside an article reporting the results of a 
 238. Id. at 274–77, 596 S.W.2d at 684–86.  
 239. Id. at 279, 596 S.W.2d at 687. Ultimately, the court squarely adopted the common 
law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, thereby “abandon[ing] [its] 
strained efforts to find a tort or a theoretical physical impact or injury and the consequent 
tenuous reasoning in order to justify the award of damages for mental anguish.” Id. at 279–
80, 596 S.W.2d at 687. 
 240. In 1992, the federal courts addressed a case involving what appears to have been a 
classic case of appropriation of likeness. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. 
Globe Int’l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd in part sub nom. Peoples Bank & Trust 
Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992), modified 
on remand sub nom. Mitchell v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Ark. 1993). 
A 96-year-old woman’s photograph was used without her consent by the defendant publisher 
to accompany a fictitious story in a supermarket tabloid with the headline, “Pregnancy forces 
granny to quit work at age 101.” Id. at 792. A decade earlier, the same tabloid had published 
a “fairly accurate account” of the plaintiff using the same photograph, which it had purchased 
from a local newspaper. People’s Bank, 978 F.2d at 1069. While the facts appear to have 
clearly supported a claim for commercial appropriation of the plaintiff’s likeness, the case 
went to trial and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on a false light invasion of privacy theory. Id. at 
1070. For a discussion of the case in the context of false light, see infra notes 502–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 241. 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ark. 2001). 
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Florida beach contest held during spring break.242 They filed a complaint in 
federal court asserting various claims, including invasion of privacy by mis-
appropriation and false light publicity.243 In enumerating the elements of the 
misappropriation claim, the federal court cited a comment to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts explaining that mere publication of one’s likeness in 
a commercial newspaper or magazine is not alone sufficient to support a 
claim for misappropriation.244 Citing a Texas federal district court case, the 
court held that the defendant must have capitalized on the plaintiff’s likeness 
to sell more publications,245 citing Olan Mills in concluding that the misap-
propriation privacy tort requires commercial use of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.246
On this reasoning, the federal district court granted the defendants 
summary judgment.247 First, even though Penthouse had identified the plain-
tiffs by name and hometown in the article, the court reasoned that they 
failed to show that they “would be easily identified by the general public,” 
relying once again on the Texas federal district court case.248 Second, the 
plaintiffs failed to show that their names or photographs had been used to 
advertise or otherwise promote sales of the magazine.249 The court conclud-
ed that summary judgment was proper because the publisher had not appro-
priated the plaintiffs’ names or likeness for commercial use.250
The Stanley court incorrectly interpreted Olan Mills and the Restate-
ment in holding that the plaintiff must establish a commercial use to support 
a claim for invasion of privacy by misappropriation. To the contrary, the 
relevant section of the Restatement and its accompanying comments do not 
require a commercial use to support the claim.251 Rather, like the Arkansas 
Model Jury Instructions, the Restatement requires only that the use of plain-
tiff’s name or likeness must be to the defendant’s advantage, commercial or 
 242. Id. at 704. The plaintiffs had voluntarily participated in the contest to determine 
who, while blindfolded, could most quickly unwrap and fit a condom on a white plastic phal-
lus. Id. 
 243. Id. The false light claim was dismissed because the plaintiffs admitted that the pho-
tograph was accurate, and the court reasoned that the text accompanying the photo could not 
reasonably be interpreted as a false statement of fact. Id. at 707. 
 244. Id. at 706 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(c) [sic] cmt. (1977)).  
 245. Stanley, 149 F. Supp. at 706 (citing Fredrickson v. Hustler Mag., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 
1360 (N.D. Tex. 1985)). 
 246. Id. (citing Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962), 
without a specific pinpoint reference). 
 247. Id. at 706–07. 
 248. Id. at 706 (citing Fredrickson, 607 F. Supp. at 1360). 
 249. Id.
 250. Id. at 706–07.  
 251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C & cmt. b (1977).  
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otherwise.252 The Restatement’s requirement concerning the nature of the 
defendant’s use is a straightforward disjunctive standard. Commercial use 
by the defendant is sufficient, but not necessary, as long as the defendant 
uses the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant’s own purposes or 
benefit.253
Unfortunately, the mistake in Stanley was recently replicated in 
LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc.254 In that case, an oph-
thalmologist sued his former affiliate, a laser surgery corporation, in part for 
sending a patient notification letter bearing his forged digital signature with-
out his consent, and for displaying his name and likeness in its advertising 
after the affiliation had terminated.255 While the court denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, it erred in holding that under Arkansas law, “the defend-
ant must have capitalized on the use of the plaintiff’s likeness or name by 
selling more of a product or service.”256
Olan Mills, the only case the Arkansas Supreme Court has ever decided 
concerning a claim for misappropriation of name or likeness, undoubtedly 
involved a use of plaintiff’s likeness for commercial purposes.257 But the 
defendant in that case did not dispute the merits of the plaintiff’s privacy 
claim.258 While the Olan Mills court expressly recognized the privacy claim 
only to the extent of the facts presented, the court’s holding was limited to 
the sole issue on appeal: whether the plaintiff could recover more than nom-
inal damages despite the lack of physical injury accompanying her claim for 
mental anguish.259 Nevertheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly 
cited Olan Mills as authority for having adopted the common law right of 
252. Id.; see also ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 (Ark. Supreme Court 
Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (“Fourth, that [defendant]'s use of [plaintiff]'s 
[name][or][likeness] was for [defendant]'s own purposes or benefit, commercial or other-
wise”) (emphasis added). But see id. cmt. (citing Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 706, as having 
“confirmed” that the tort requires commercial use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness). 
 253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (plaintiff may recover “even 
though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is 
not a pecuniary one”); ELDER, supra note 51, § 6:3 (citing a host of cases allowing recovery 
for appropriation of name or likeness for noncommercial uses). Only in a very limited num-
ber of states like New York, which does not recognize a common law privacy cause of action 
but has enacted a restrictive statutory cause of action for misappropriation, do the cases re-
strict recovery to commercial uses only. ELDER, supra note 51, § 6:3 (text accompanying note 
16). 
 254. 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 899 (E.D. Ark. 2011). 
 255. Id. at 893, 894. 
 256. Id. at 899 (citing Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706
(W.D. Ark. 2001)). 
 257. See Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 496, 353 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1962). 
 258. Id. at 498, 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
 259. Id. at 498–99, 353 S.W.2d at 24. 
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privacy in the four iterations defined in the Restatement.260 If the Arkansas 
courts were to squarely address the issue, they would most likely recognize 
a noncommercial use as sufficient to support a claim for misappropriation, 
as long as the defendant uses the plaintiff’s identity for its own benefit with-
out consent.261
The other elements of the appropriation claim are straightforward as 
outlined in the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.262 First, the plaintiff must 
prove damages.263 Second, the defendant must have used the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.264 Third, the plaintiff must be identifiable by the public 
from the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity.265 Fourth, as discussed 
above, the use must be for the defendant’s own purposes or benefit, com-
mercial or otherwise.266 Fifth, the defendant’s use must be the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s compensable harm.267
Related to the privacy tort for misappropriation of name or likeness is 
the cause of action for invasion of what is now commonly known as the 
“right of publicity.”268 Neither the Arkansas courts nor the federal courts 
applying Arkansas law have ever explicitly recognized this cause of action, 
nor have they had occasion to distinguish it from the right of privacy based 
on appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity.269 A later section of this Article 
addresses the right of publicity in more detail.270 For now, it is sufficient to 
note that neither Arkansas statutes nor case law has addressed the issue. 
 260. E.g., Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 636–38 & n.8, 590 S.W.2d 840, 
844–45 & n.8 (1979); see ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 cmt. (Ark. Su-
preme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (citing Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 9, 
678 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1984), in support of the Restatement definition). 
 261. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 652C (1977). But see HOWARD W. BRILL &
CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33:11, at 639 (5th ed. 2004) (“The tort 
of appropriation is limited to instances of commercial use of a person’s name or likeness.” 
(citing Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 701)).  






 268. See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 2D
§§ 1:1–1:7 (2012). 
 269. See generally Rashauna A. Norment, Post-Mortem Right of Publicity in Arkansas: 
Protecting Against the Unauthorized Use of a Person’s Identity for Commercial Purposes, 34 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 507 (2012) (advocating that Arkansas adopt a post-mortem 
right of publicity).
 270. See infra Part V.B. and accompanying notes. 
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B. Intrusion on Seclusion 
Unlike other privacy claims, intrusion on seclusion has been a frequent 
subject of litigation in Arkansas.271 The Arkansas Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the claim in 1981 in CBM of Central Arkansas v. Bemel,272 a debt 
collection case. The plaintiff sued after the defendant collection agency re-
peatedly called her at work and at home over a period of ten months to re-
cover a small unpaid balance on a hospital bill for her son, who had been 
hospitalized after attempting suicide.273 Insurance coverage paid most of the 
hospital expenses, but a balance of about $400 remained unpaid.274 The col-
lection agency sent the plaintiff some fifty letters and made about seventy 
phone calls to her during this period.275 Although plaintiff had protested to 
the defendant’s agents that she worked until midnight and therefore slept 
until about 10:00 a.m., many calls were made to her home in the early morn-
ing hours while she was sleeping.276
The case was tried to a jury on alternate theories of invasion of privacy 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.277 After the jury awarded 
Bemel $1,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000 in punitive damages, 
the trial court denied the collection agency’s motion for a directed verdict.278
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence presented 
at trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict for intrusion on seclusion, 
as defined in section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.279 In par-
ticular, the court focused on the frequency and persistence of the collection 
agency’s efforts to collect the debt, which it considered a substantial enough 
interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion to support the claim.280
 271. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 272. 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981).  
 273. Id. at 224, 623 S.W.2d at 519. 
 274. Id., 623 S.W.2d at 519. 
 275. Id., 623 S.W.2d at 519. 
 276. Id. at 225, 623 S.W.2d at 519. 
 277. Id. at 224, 623 S.W.2d at 519. 
 278. Bemel, 274 Ark. at 224, 623 S.W.2d at 519. 
 279. Id. at 225–26, 623 S.W.2d at 519–20. The court observed that it had “recognized 
such a cause of action in Olan Mills.” Id. at 225, 623 S.W.2d at 519. In that case, however, 
the court merely referenced section 867 of the 1939 Restatement, which then recognized a 
general claim for invasion of privacy, including “unauthorized publication of a person who is 
not in public life.” Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 497–98 & n.1, 353 
S.W.2d at 23–24 & n.1 (1962). The Olan Mills court did not recognize a claim for intrusion 
on seclusion. Nor did it expressly hold that Arkansas recognizes a claim for invasion of pri-
vacy or even misappropriation of likeness, except to the extent the court upheld the jury’s 
damage award on appeal. See id. 
 280. Bemel, 274 Ark. at 225–26, 623 S.W.2d at 519–20. 
“There is likewise no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclu-
sion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary 
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The Arkansas Supreme Court next addressed a claim for intrusion on 
seclusion in Dunlap v. McCarty.281 The complaint alleged invasion of priva-
cy based on verbal communications in two separate phone calls to Mrs. 
McCarty made by the wife of Mr. McCarty’s former brother-in-law.282 The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs but awarded no damages.283 Never-
theless, the defendants appealed, arguing among other things that the action 
was time-barred and therefore should have been dismissed.284
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed. The court observed that if the 
plaintiffs had a privacy claim of any sort, it was a claim for intrusion on 
seclusion.285 Relying on the Restatement, the court cited several illustrations 
of conduct that could support a claim for intrusion on seclusion, finding 
none analogous to two phone calls.286 The court then questioned whether 
oral communications alone could even support a claim for invasion of priva-
cy, noting that courts had been divided on the issue.287 Leaving that issue 
aside,288 the court observed that the facts presented did not qualify as either a 
“classic case of invasion of privacy by intrusion on seclusion or one of def-
amation.”289 But no matter how the claim was denominated, the court ob-
served that the plaintiffs were seeking special damages based solely on oral 
communications, for which an Arkansas statute specifically provides a one-
year statute of limitation.290 Because the complaint was filed more than one 
reasonable man, as a result of conduct to which the reasonable man would 
strongly object. . . . It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such 
persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that 
becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.”  
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (1977)). 
 281. 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984). 
 282. Id. at 6, 678 S.W.2d at 362.
 283. Id., 678 S.W.2d at 362. 
 284. Id., 678 S.W.2d at 362.  
 285. Id. at 9, 678 S.W.2d at 364. 
 286. Id., 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, 
illus. (1977)).  
 287. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 9–10, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citations omitted); see ELDER, supra 
note 51, § 1:2. 
 288. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364. The court has not resolved the issue 
since first acknowledging it in Dunlap. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421
cmt. (2012) (citing Dunlap in observing that the court has expressly declined to resolve the 
issue). 
 289. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364. The court had earlier characterized 
Bemel as a “case of harassment by a bill collector and a classic case of invasion of privacy.” 
Id. at 9, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518). While the court 
downplayed the conduct in this case as dissimilar from a classic invasion of privacy, several 
jurisdictions have found defendants liable for intrusion on seclusion for actions interfering 
with family or other nonmarital relationships. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 2:25 (citing cases). 
 290. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 37-201).  
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year after the defendant made the phone calls, the court concluded that the 
claim was time-barred.291
Soon after, the court upheld an award of compensatory and punitive 
damages for invasion of privacy in AAA T.V. & Stereo Rentals, Inc. v. 
Crawley.292 The defendant repossessed a rented television set from the plain-
tiff’s home when she was just one week behind in making payments.293 To 
effect the repossession, the defendant’s employees forced open her front 
door and removed the television while the plaintiff was at work.294 She testi-
fied that she had been called off the assembly line, and she was embarrassed 
and frightened for her children when she learned that unknown intruders had 
broken into her home.295
On her invasion of privacy claim, the jury awarded $4,590 in compen-
satory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages.296 Among other issues on 
appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s jury instructions, including 
its failure to define invasion of privacy as “an unreasonable and substantial 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”297 The defendant also complained 
that the jury was instructed that if it found an invasion of privacy, the plain-
tiff was entitled to “substantial damages.”298 The court affirmed, observing 
that the “jury may well have felt a degree of indignation over the flagrant 
intrusion suffered by Mrs. Crawley at the hands of AAA’s employees . . . 
.”299 Moreover, having interposed only a general objection to the jury in-
structions at trial, the defendant failed to show reversible error.300
The Arkansas appellate courts once again addressed claims of intrusion 
on seclusion in a pair of companion cases in which co-employees sought 
damages from Wal-Mart based on an investigation of its employees and 
recovery of allegedly stolen property.301 In the first, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Lee,302 the court upheld a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff a total of 
 291. Id. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 365. For most invasion of privacy claims under Arkansas 
law, the three-year statute of limitations applies. See Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 634, 
899 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1995) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (Repl. 2005)) (affirming 
summary judgment in invasion of privacy case on statute of limitations grounds); see infra 
Part IV.G.1. and accompanying notes (discussing statute of limitations defense). 
 292. 284 Ark. 83, 679 S.W.2d 190 (1984). 
 293. Id. at 84, 679 S.W.2d at 191. 
 294. Id., 679 S.W.2d at 191.  
 295. Id. at 85, 679 S.W.2d at 191. 
 296. Id. at 84, 679 S.W.2d at 191. 
 297. Id. at 86, 679 S.W.2d at 191–92 (citing, e.g., CBM of Cent. Ark. v. Bemel, 274 Ark. 
223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981)). 
 298. Crawley, 284 Ark. at 86, 679 S.W.2d at 191–92. 
 299. Id. at 85, 679 S.W.2d at 191. 
 300. Id. at 86, 679 S.W.2d at 192 (quoting ARK. R. CIV. P. 51). 
 301. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002); Addington 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003). 
 302. 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634. 
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$1,651,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.303 Among other claims, 
the plaintiff alleged intrusion on seclusion and publicity placing him in a 
false light.304 On appeal, Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s evidence was 
insufficient to establish the essential elements of intrusion,305 which the ma-
jority carefully enumerated by directly quoting the jury instruction.306
In affirming the judgment and jury verdict, the court explicitly adopted 
the Restatement definition of intrusion on seclusion,307 observing that the 
“touchstone” of the privacy tort for intrusion is “[a] legitimate expectation 
of privacy.”308 While neither party challenged the jury instruction, it was 
closely patterned after the Restatement definition,309 listing the following 
elements: (1) damages sustained by plaintiff; (2) intrusion by defendant, 
physically or otherwise, on plaintiff’s solitude without permission, invita-
tion, or valid consent; (3) substantial interference by defendant with plain-
tiff’s solitude; (4) interference of a kind an ordinary person would consider 
highly offensive; (5) conduct by defendant to which a reasonable person 
would object; and (6) proximate causation.310 The jury was also instructed 
that “[a] person validly consents to an intrusion if, in the totality of circum-
stances, the consent is given freely and without coercion.”311
On appeal, Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff offered insufficient evi-
dence to support two essential elements of the intrusion claim: that the de-
fendant’s interference was substantial, and that the plaintiff had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.312 Both points rested on the underlying argument that 
the plaintiff had consented to defendant’s allegedly intrusive conduct not 
only verbally and in writing, but also implicitly by failing to object while the 
investigation and search were underway on his property.313
The court observed that an actionable intrusion occurs only if the de-
fendant believes or is substantially certain that he lacks permission to en-
gage in the intrusive conduct.314 Because the defendant’s actual knowledge 
 303. Id. at 744, 74 S.W.3d at 660. 
 304. Id. at 713, 74 S.W.3d at 640. 
 305. Id. at 719, 74 S.W.3d at 644. 
 306. Id. at 720–21, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45. Because neither party objected to the jury in-
struction, the appellate court did not address whether or not the instruction accurately de-
scribed the claim for intrusion. See id. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 645. 
 307. Id. at 720, 74 S.W.3d at 644 (citing with approval Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods 
of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
308. Lee, 348 Ark. at 720, 74 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 877).  
 309. See id. at 720–21, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45. 
 310. Id. at 720, 74 S.W.3d at 644; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B 
(1977). 
 311. Lee, 348 Ark. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45. 
 312. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 645. 
 313. See id. at 721–27, 74 S.W.3d at 645–49. 
 314. Id. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 645 (citing Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 876); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
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that he lacks permission is an essential element, the plaintiff has the burden 
to prove the defendant was aware, or at least substantially certain, that the 
plaintiff did not consent.315 In this respect, the plaintiff must prove not only 
that he did not consent, but also that the defendant in fact believed (or at 
least was substantially certain) that the plaintiff did not consent.316
Despite this heavy burden of proof, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lee 
upheld the jury verdict, along with its finding that the plaintiff had success-
fully established each required element.317 The majority reasoned that the 
evidence showed that any verbal consent he gave was limited in scope, 
which the defendant’s investigation and search had far exceeded.318 With 
respect to the plaintiff’s written consent, the jury correctly concluded that it 
was involuntary and hence invalid because it had been coerced.319
One justice added a lengthy dissent challenging the majority’s conclu-
sion that the plaintiff had not validly consented to the defendant’s investiga-
tion and search.320 The dissenter reasoned that the plaintiff could not have 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy when he gave both verbal and writ-
ten consent to the search.321 Further, the dissent would have held that the 
evidence “overwhelmingly” established that plaintiff’s consent was both 
knowing and voluntary because the written form he signed had specifically 
authorized the defendant’s agents to search plaintiff’s entire premises and 
 315. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. 
on Jury Instructions 2013) (consent defense). The consent instruction is not to be used with 
the instruction for intrusion on seclusion because “the absence of consent or other authority is 
part of a plaintiff’s burden of proof under such a claim.” Id. note on use. 
 316. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (second element). Although the 
issue is not free from doubt, the court’s reasoning that nonconsent is an element of a claim 
for intrusion on seclusion, rather than an affirmative defense, appears to be consistent with 
the majority rule. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 2:12 (citations omitted) (“[T]he preferable 
perspective . . . is that consent, whether express or implied, negates the existence of the tort 
itself.”). The plaintiff’s legitimate interest in solitude or seclusion, a required element of the 
claim, may be negated by his own conduct implying consent. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B). Nevertheless, the plaintiff can vitiate express or implied consent 
by showing that it was involuntary, that it was procured by fraud, or that the intrusion ex-
ceeded the scope of the consent given. Id. (citing cases, including Lee, 348 Ark. at 720, 74 
S.W.3d at 644). 
 317. Lee, 348 Ark. at 727, 74 S.W.3d at 649. 
 318. Id. at 724–27, 74 S.W.3d at 646–48.  
 319. Id. at 726, 74 S.W.3d at 648. “The jury determined that [plaintiff’s] written consent 
was not given freely and without coercion and, thus, was not valid consent. Considering the 
totality of the circumstances now before us, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to 
support the jury’s decision.” Id., 74 S.W.3d at 648.  
 320. Id. at 745, 74 S.W.3d at 660 (Thornton, J., dissenting). 
 321. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 660.  
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take any property they deemed necessary.322 Nor did the plaintiff object or 
otherwise indicate that the search should be limited in scope.323
The dispositive issue in Lee turned out to be whether the plaintiff’s 
verbal, written, and implied consent was “valid,” defined as “given freely 
and without coercion.”324 As the majority observed, the issue of consent and 
the scope of any consent are both fact questions for the jury.325 The plaintiff 
believed he had verbally consented only to a limited search for fishing 
equipment and lifejackets, and he was under the impression he would be 
fired if he refused consent.326 While the defendant’s evidence contradicted 
the plaintiff’s testimony, the majority correctly observed that the credibility 
of witness testimony was a question of fact for the jury to resolve.327 In this 
case, the majority identified substantial evidence in the record supporting 
the jury’s decision.328
In the second companion case, Addington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,329
the plaintiff did not fare so well before the trial court. The defendant won 
summary judgment on all claims, including intrusion on seclusion.330 On 
appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals followed the precedent established in 
Lee,331 holding that summary judgment on the intrusion claim was precluded 
because genuine issues of material fact remained concerning whether Ad-
dington’s consent to the search was valid.332 The court cited Lee in reasoning 
that while the standard for determining the validity of consent to search in a 
criminal context was not controlling, it was nevertheless “helpful.”333 Thus, 
“[c]onsent must be given freely and voluntarily to be valid.”334
It must be shown that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied. 
The voluntariness of consent must be judged in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. In a civil case, the issue of whether consent was valid is a 
question of fact that must be decided by the trier of fact.335
 322. Id. at 749, 74 S.W.3d at 663. 
 323. Lee, 348 Ark. at 749, 74 S.W.3d at 663. 
 324. Id. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45 (majority opinion). 
 325. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 645. 
 326. Id. at 721–22, 74 S.W.3d at 645–46.  
 327. Id. at 724, 74 S.W.3d at 646.  
 328. Id. at 726–27, 74 S.W.3d at 648.  
 329. 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003). 
 330. Id. at 445, 105 S.W.3d at 373 (outrage, false light invasion of privacy, intrusion 
invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligence). 
 331. See supra notes 302–28 and accompanying text. 
 332. Addington, 81 Ark. App. at 457, 105 S.W.3d at 380. 
 333. Id. at 456, 105 S.W.3d at 380.
 334. Id., 105 S.W.3d at 380 (citing Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 
634 (2002)). 
 335. Id., 105 S.W.3d at 380 (citations omitted).
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Observing that the Arkansas Supreme Court had upheld a jury verdict for 
the plaintiff under similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
summary judgment and remanded for trial.336
More recently, in Coombs v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.,337 the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals addressed a claim for intrusion on seclusion against the 
plaintiff’s former employer and two of its vice-presidents. The employer 
sued a former employee for violating a covenant not to compete, and the 
plaintiff counterclaimed; he also filed a third-party complaint against two of 
his former co-employees for invasion of privacy, wrongful discharge, and 
related claims.338 During an out-of-town retreat with several other employ-
ees, Coombs had become intoxicated and retreated to the hotel room he 
shared with Allensworth, one of the third-party defendants.339 There, 
Coombs passed out on the floor, still fully clothed.340 Sometime later, 
Allensworth and Emerson, the other third-party defendant, entered the hotel 
room and found Coombs asleep on the floor.341 Using a cell phone, the two 
photographed Coombs in a prone position after placing a cigarette in his 
mouth, spraying his face with shaving cream, and writing messages on his 
person.342 One of the pranksters called other employees into the hotel room 
to view Coombs in this vulnerable state.343 Coombs recalled none of these 
events the next morning, but he later learned what happened when he 
viewed the photographs depicting him in various states of undress.344 The 
photographs were also allegedly displayed to other employees.345
The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the intru-
sion counterclaim, reasoning that Coombs was aware that he was sharing the 
hotel room with another person and had voluntarily become intoxicated.346
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed after reiterating the elements of 
the intrusion claim as enumerated in the Arkansas Model Jury Instruc-
tions.347 The court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that the hotel room was 
shared, noting that a physical intrusion is not necessary to support the 
 336. Id. at 456–57, 459, 105 S.W.3d at 380, 382. 
 337. 2012 Ark. App. 24, 388 S.W.3d 456.   
 338. Id. at 3–4, 388 S.W.3d at 460. 
 339. Id. at 1–3, 388 S.W.3d at 459–60. 
 340. Id. at 2, 388 S.W.3d at 459. 
 341. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 459.  
 342. Id. at 2–3, 388 S.W.3d at 459–60. 
 343. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 3, 388 S.W. 3d at 460. 
 344. Id., 388 S.W. 3d at 460.  
 345. Id., 388 S.W. 3d at 460.
 346. Id. at 5, 388 S.W.3d at 461. 
 347. Id. at 4–5, 388 S.W.3d at 460–61 (quoting ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
CIVIL 420 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013)). 
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claim.348 “Thus, protection is afforded not just for the physical realm but for 
a person’s emotional sanctum and to safeguard the notions of civility and 
personal dignity. Further, a person’s visibility to some does not necessarily 
strip him of the right to remain secluded from others.”349 The court could not 
agree with the trial court that no intrusion had occurred as a matter of law.350
The Court of Appeals also rejected the employer’s argument that the 
intrusion, if any, was not highly offensive to a reasonable person.351 It rea-
soned that a fact finder could view the acts of the third-party defendants as 
“an invasion of Coombs’s bodily space during a time when he was unaware 
of his surroundings and as making him an object of ridicule among his co-
workers.”352
Finally, the court identified an unresolved fact issue: whether Coombs 
had comported himself in a manner consistent with an “actual” expectation 
of privacy.353 The court reviewed the allegations by both parties and found 
them inconclusive enough to present a fact issue precluding summary judg-
ment.354
The Court of Appeals also addressed an issue of first impression in the 
context of a claim for invasion of privacy: whether an employer can be vi-
cariously liable for intrusive conduct committed by its supervisory employ-
ees.355 Coombs argued in part that the former employer could be liable for 
the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory.356 The court 
agreed, relying on Arkansas cases holding that an employer may be vicari-
ously liable for acts of its employees carried out in the scope of employ-
ment.357 In this case, the co-employees’ conduct occurred during a work 
retreat at which the plaintiff’s attendance was mandatory.358 It was a fact 
question whether the offensive conduct was “purely personal” or occurred 
while the co-employees were acting in the course of their employment re-
sponsibilities.359 The court concluded that “[w]hen an overlap of the busi-
 348. Id. at 5, 388 S.W.3d at 461. “An intrusion may occur physically ‘or otherwise.’” Id.,
388 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420). 
 349. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 5, 388 S.W.3d at 461 (multiple citations to cases from 
other jurisdictions omitted). 
 350. Id. at 6, 388 S.W.3d at 461. 
 351. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 461. 
 352. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 461–62. 
 353. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 462. 
 354. Id. at 7, 388 S.W.3d at 462. 
 355. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 7–8, 388 S.W.3d at 462–63. 
 356. Id. at 7, 388 S.W.3d at 462. 
 357. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 462 (citing, e.g., Porter v. Harshfield, 329 Ark. 130, 948 S.W.2d 
83 (1997)). Whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment or not depends 
on whether the employee is carrying out the purpose of the employer’s enterprise or instead is 
acting exclusively in the employee’s own interest. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 462 (citations omitted). 
 358. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 2, 388 S.W.3d at 459. 
 359. Id. at 8, 388 S.W.3d at 462–63. 
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ness and the personal are present in an employee’s actions, an employer may 
be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, depending on 
the circumstances.”360
In late 2012, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed some intriguing 
issues of first impression with respect to an intrusion claim in Cannady v. St. 
Vincent Infirmary Medical Center.361 Compared to the court’s progressive 
resolution of privacy issues over the last decade, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court took a surprisingly regressive approach to the novel legal issues the 
case presented. The case involved the tragic murder of Anne Pressly, a well-
known Little Rock newswoman.362 Her mother, Patricia Cannady, sued the 
hospital and three of its employees alleging invasion of privacy and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.363 Cannady sued on her own behalf 
and as administratrix of Pressly’s estate.364
Cannady claimed that the defendant hospital employees had unlawfully 
accessed Pressly’s medical records and failed to take proper steps to prevent 
improper access to medical records in the hospital’s electronic database.365
The three employees were each convicted after pleading guilty to violating 
the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),366
which criminalizes wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health 
information.367 Therefore, the defendants had no basis for disputing either 
the intrusion itself or that it was intentional. 
Cannady appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment on 
all claims, not only those filed on her own behalf but also those filed on 
behalf of the Pressly estate.368 With respect to the intrusion claim on behalf 
of the estate, the trial court held that the claim did not survive the dece-
dent.369 On appeal, Cannady argued that the trial court had erred in interpret-
 360. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 463 (citing J.B. Hunt Transp. v. Doss, 320 Ark. 660, 899 S.W.2d 
464 (1995)).  
 361. 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d ___, reh’g denied, Nov. 8, 2012. 
 362. Id., ___ S.W.3d ___.
 363. Id. at 1, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 364. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 365. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 366. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6)(a)(2) (2006). 
 367. Id. Upon conviction, federal statutes classify a “simple criminal violation” for know-
ingly obtaining health information in violation of HIPAA as a misdemeanor punishable by up 
to one year in prison, a fine of up to $50,000, or both. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006); see 
PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY § 3:2.5 (2007). A violation of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, however, does 
not allow the victim to file a civil cause of action against the perpetrator. See Bonney v. Ste-
phens Mem. Hosp., 17 A.3d 123, 127–28 (Me. 2011). “[A]ll courts that have decided this 
question have concluded that HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action.” Id. at 127. 
But cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107 (Supp. 2011) (authorizing civil cause of action by a 
victim of conduct by another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law).
 368. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 1, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 369. Id. at 1, 4, ___S.W.3d at ____. 
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ing the Arkansas survival statute370 to mean that Pressly’s privacy claim did 
not survive.371 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed on the survival is-
sue.372 In rejecting the privacy claim on behalf of the estate, the court relied 
primarily on Ward v. Blackwood,373 an Arkansas case decided nearly a cen-
tury and a half earlier, long before any court in the United States had ever 
recognized the right of privacy.374
Under the Restatement, a claim for invasion of privacy is generally 
considered personal in nature because it involves an injury to a personal 
right.375 Thus, the legal question before the Cannady court was whether a 
claim for invasion of the personal right of privacy survives after the death of 
the person whose privacy has been invaded.376
The court quoted the following subsections of the applicable Arkansas 
survival statute: 
(a)(1) For wrongs done to the person or property of another, an action 
may be maintained against a wrongdoer, and the action may be brought 
 370. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2005). 
 371. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 4, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 372. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 373. 41 Ark. 295 (1883). The court also quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I 
cmt. b (1977). Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 7, ___S.W.3d at ___ (absent a statute to the contrary, 
an invasion of privacy claim “cannot be maintained after the death of the individual whose 
privacy is invaded,” excepting a claim for appropriation of name or likeness). However, the 
court ignored the language quoted from the Restatement recognizing that states may allow for 
survival of claims by statute. Id., ___S.W.3d at ___. The Arkansas survival statute does just 
that. Nevertheless, the court interpreted the language of the statute referring to “wrongs done 
to the person . . . of another” to exclude invasion of privacy claims, even though they protect 
a right the Restatement itself characterizes as a “personal right.” Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___.
 374. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 5–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. In 1883, neither Arkansas nor any 
other state recognized the common law right of privacy. See supra notes 31-51 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, Arkansas law at that time did not recognize any claim for mental an-
guish or emotional distress alone apart from physical injury. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. 
v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42, 48, 104 S.W. 551, 553 (1907) (no recovery for mental anguish or hu-
miliation independent of physical injury or other recoverable damages, even if legal duty was 
willfully violated). The rationale for that holding was that “mental suffering unaccompanied 
by physical injury . . . is deemed to be too remote, uncertain, and difficult of ascertainment . . 
. .” Id., 104 S.W. at 553. But see M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 275–76, 596 S.W.2d 
681, 684–685 (1980) (expressly recognizing, for the first time, a claim seeking recovery for 
emotional distress independent of physical injury or other recoverable damages; observing 
that Taylor had been implicitly abrogated); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 139, 25 S.W.2d 
428, 428 (1930) (mental suffering alone was recoverable as an element of damages that prox-
imately resulted from defendant’s willful act); Lyons v. Smith, 176 Ark. 728, 729, 3 S.W.2d 
982, 983 (1928) (mental suffering, annoyance, fear, intimidation, and so forth, will support a 
cause of action for damages even when unaccompanied by physical injury, if caused by 
“willful and wanton wrong”). For a brief discussion of Counce and its interpretation of the 
court’s reasoning in Olan Mills, see supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text. 
 375. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. a. 
 376. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 4, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
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by the person injured or, after his or her death, by his or her executor or 
administrator against the wrongdoer or, after the death of the wrongdoer, 
against the executor or administrator of the wrongdoer, in the same man-
ner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts.  
(2) Nothing in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be so construed as 
to extend its provisions to actions of slander or libel.377
The plain language of the subsection (a) suggests that the estate may assert a 
claim for invasion of privacy after the person’s death because invasion of 
privacy is undoubtedly a “wrong[ ] done to the person . . . of another.”378
To the contrary, the Arkansas Supreme Court held otherwise.379 Rely-
ing on the 1883 case of Ward, which had interpreted “an earlier version” of 
the survival statute,380 the court held that the current version preserves only 
actions substantially characterized by bodily injury or physical damage, not 
“torts which do not directly affect the person, but only the feelings or repu-
tation, such as malicious prosecution.”381 The court rejected Cannady’s ar-
gument that the only torts excepted from the survival statute are libel and 
slander, as expressly provided in subsection (a)(2).382
In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged but declined to fol-
low other jurisdictions that have allowed a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy by surviving relatives based on facts similar to those presented in 
Cannady.383 Instead, the court cited and quoted at length from a 1913 Ar-
kansas case384 holding that claims on behalf of a defunct corporation did not 
survive its dissolution.385 In that case, the court had reasoned in part that 
 377. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a) (Repl. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___S.W.3d at ___. 
 380. Id. at 5–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. In 1883, when Ward v. Blackwood was decided, the 
survival statute read as follows:  
For wrongs done to the person or property of another, an action may be main-
tained against the wrong-doers, and such action may be brought by the person in-
jured, or, after his death, by his executor or administrator, against such wrong-
doer, or, after his death, against his executor or administrator, in the same man-
ner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts. 
Gantt’s. Dig. § 4760. 
 381. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 5, ___S.W.3d at ___ (quoting Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 
295, 298 (1883)). 
 382. Id. at 5, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 383. Id. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (citing Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998) 
(holding that immediate relatives of decedent had a privacy interest in decedent’s autopsy 
records that supported claim against county employees for improperly accessing and display-
ing autopsy photographs)).   
 384. Ark. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 110 Ark. 130, 137, 161 S.W. 136, 138 
(1913). 
 385. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
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“‘the statute means injuries of a physical character to actual, visible, and 
tangible property, and not to property rights or interests which in their nature 
are invisible and intangible.’”386
The court ultimately agreed with the defendants’ arguments that the 
survival statute “[did] not provide for the claim of invasion of privacy to 
survive the death of the decedent.”387 In doing so, the court ignored the un-
disputed fact that the defendants’ conduct had been so egregious with re-
spect to the decedent’s privacy interests that they had pleaded guilty to fed-
eral criminal offenses for violating HIPAA’s privacy protections.388 The 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s reasoning relied largely on common law that 
long predates not only the court’s own recognition of the right of privacy, 
but also the court’s recognition of other intentional tort claims that allow 
recovery for emotional injury independent of any physical injury or property 
damage.389
In relying on century-old common law, the court also disregarded the 
language of the modern Arkansas survival statute, which plainly allows for 
the survival of claims “[f]or wrongs done to the person or property of anoth-
er,”390 excepting only claims for slander or libel.391 While the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has not questioned its own outdated interpretation of the sur-
vival statute, the Arkansas General Assembly itself has amended the statute 
to recognize “wrongs” to the person manifested by emotional and other in-
tangible harm.392 Most recently, the survival statute was amended in 2001 to 
include a new subsection (b) that explicitly allows an estate to seek damages 
for “loss of life,” a category of intangible injury,393 in addition to any other 
 386. Id. at 6, ___S.W.3d at ___ (quoting Ark. Life Ins. Co., 110 Ark. at 137, 161 S.W. at 
138).  The quoted language has nothing whatsoever to do with personal rights, but rather 
distinguishes injuries to corporate intangible property interests from injuries to tangible prop-
erty. In stark contrast, Patricia Cannady asserted a privacy claim for intrusion on her deceased 
daughter’s personal interest in seclusion, not her property interests. 
 387. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. After summarizing the parties’ respective arguments and 
without elaborating, the court simply observed, “This holding is in line with this court’s 
adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and our case law, most notably Ward. Thus, 
we affirm the grant of summary judgment on this point.” Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 388. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___. The complaint alleged, apparently without objection, 
that defendants Holland, Griffin, and Miller had each pled guilty to a violation of HIPAA, 
specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6)(a)(2) (2006), which prohibits wrongful disclosure of 
individually identifiable health information. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
 389. E.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 273–77, 596 S.W.2d 681, 684–85
(1980); see supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text. 
 390. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 391. See id. § 16-62-101(a)(2). 
 392. See id. § 16-62-101. 
 393. See Joshua Michael Robles, Note, Arkansas’s Application of Hedonic Damages to 
Wrongful-Death Suits: Is Arkansas’s Method Misconceived?, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 299, 308–09 (2011) (loss of life, like mental anguish and emotional distress, is consid-
ered a type of noneconomic harm). 
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elements of recoverable damages.394 Yet the Cannady court completely 
omitted that subsection from the statutory language the opinion directly 
quoted.395
In short, the Cannady court erred by ignoring the plain language of the 
current survival statute, considered in the context of common law develop-
ments in the latter half of the twentieth century. At the very least, the court 
should have acknowledged the 2001 amendment and its implications for 
outmoded case law that interpreted former survival statutes to exclude per-
sonal torts resulting in noneconomic or intangible harm. Cannady represents 
an unfortunate step backward in Arkansas privacy law. The opinion fails to 
acknowledge that the survival statute itself is a departure from the common 
law rule that tort actions did not survive the plaintiff.396
Especially in light of the 2001 amendment, the fact that the Arkansas 
courts have never questioned century-old case interpretations of the prede-
cessor survival statutes is irrelevant. The court has held that in construing 
statutes, the language in question must be considered “in the context of the 
statute as a whole.”397 The Arkansas General Assembly had no reason to 
include a specific provision in the survival statute excluding defamation 
claims unless it had intended the general reference to “wrongs to the person” 
to allow survival of other “wrongs done to the person or property of anoth-
er.”398 Moreover, a statute must be interpreted “just as it reads, giving the 
words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.”399
Cannady reflects an unduly strained interpretation of the Arkansas survival 
statute given the developments in Arkansas privacy law over the last half 
century. 
Occasionally the federal courts have interpreted Arkansas common law 
in resolving claims alleging intrusion on seclusion. While not binding on 
Arkansas courts, a number of these federal cases are cited in commentary to 
 394. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(b). “In addition to all other elements of damages 
provided by law, a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss of life as an inde-
pendent element of damages.” Id.  
 395. See Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 5, ___ S.W.3d ___. See also supra note 377 and accom-
panying text.  
 396. “At common law, all actions for tort died with the tortfeasor. That rule is still in 
effect in [Arkansas], except where changed by statute. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-62-101 
(1987) has removed that bar as to tortious injury to the person.” Westridge v. Byrd, 37 Ark. 
App. 72, 73, 823 S.W.2d 930, 930–31 (1992) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
Lauderdale v. Smith, 186 F. Supp. 958, 959 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (observing that Arkansas sur-
vival statute allowing survival of personal tort claims, other than libel and slander, is contrary 
to federal common law rule that only contract and property tort actions survive). 
 397. Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 205, 4 S.W.3d 493, 496 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 398. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1). 
 399. Green, 339 Ark. at 205, 4 S.W.3d at 495. 
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the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.400 The earliest was Williams v. Amer-
ican Broadcasting Companies, Inc.401 The opinion primarily addressed a 
question of federal evidence law pertaining to the reporter’s privilege assert-
ed in consolidated cases involving the same incident.402 However, the court 
also addressed one of the plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of privacy.403
The facts of Williams presented a classic example of intrusion on se-
clusion by virtue of overzealous news reporting. Defendant ABC aired a 
segment of its 20/20 television program in January 1981, addressing the 
extent to which the medical profession was engaging in unnecessary sur-
gery.404 The program allegedly included portions of a videotape taken by 
defendant’s reporters of Mrs. Davidson, without her knowledge or consent, 
while she was undergoing hip replacement surgery at Boone County Hospi-
tal, performed by Dr. Williams.405 In considering the parties’ respective in-
terests relevant to the assertion of the reporter’s privilege, the court delineat-
ed the four distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy recognized by 
Professor Prosser, including intrusion on seclusion.406
This tort requires actions on the defendant’s part in the nature of prying 
or intrusion which is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. 
The “thing” into which there is intrusion or prying must be, and be enti-
tled to be, private. As Prosser notes, “when the plaintiff is confined to a 
hospital bed, and in all probability when he is merely in the seclusion of 
his home, the making of a photograph is an invasion of a private right, of 
which he is entitled to complain.”407
The court concluded that the reporters’ “outtakes” sought in discovery might 
be relevant to prove the fact of the alleged intrusion and its extent, so they 
were “clearly discoverable.”408
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also ad-
dressed a claim for intrusion on seclusion under Arkansas law in Alexander 
v. Pathfinder, Inc.409 Mrs. Alexander filed several state and federal claims 
against the defendants, an intermediate care facility for the mentally retard-
 400. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 cmt. (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. 
on Jury Instructions 2013). 
 401. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983). 
 402. Id. at 660.  
 403. Id. at 668–69. 
 404. Id. at 660.
 405. Id.
 406. Id. at 669 (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, ch. 22 (3d ed. 1964); 
Bill Prewett, Note, The Crimination of Peeping Toms and Other Men of Vision, 5 ARK. L.
REV. 388 (1951)). 
 407. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 669 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 406, § 112, ch. 22). 
 408. Id.
 409. 189 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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ed, its employees, and others, after her son was discharged from the facili-
ty.410 Among other state law claims, she sued for intrusion on seclusion.411
She alleged that the facility’s employees had improperly audiotaped her 
conversations with her son, including some conversations in his room, as 
well as her personal conversations with facility staff.412
The Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Alexander’s intrusion 
claims on the basis of implied consent because she had not objected when 
facility staff overtly audiotaped her conversations.413 Alexander had previ-
ously testified at an administrative hearing that she had not objected when 
facility employees entered her son’s room carrying tape recorders for the 
apparent purpose of recording her conversations with him.414 Although the 
administrative record indicated that she had later objected, the court held 
that her failure to do so at the inception was “fatal” to that part of her intru-
sion claim.415 With respect to the recording of her own conversations with 
facility staff, Mrs. Alexander knew the staff had been directed to record all 
her conversations, and the court observed that no Arkansas law precluded 
one party to a conversation from recording a conversation with the other 
party’s knowledge.416 Therefore, the trial court had properly dismissed both 
of her intrusion claims.417
In 2000, the Eighth Circuit once again addressed a claim under Arkan-
sas law for intrusion on seclusion in Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of 
Trumann, Inc.418 The plaintiff, a food service worker, sued her former em-
ployer for intrusion on seclusion for contacting her physician to determine 
whether she had a staph infection at the time she was terminated.419 When 
the plaintiff applied for unemployment compensation, she denied having a 
staph infection at the time of her termination.420 To secure the medical in-
formation, the defendant’s corporate manager supplied plaintiff’s physician 
with a worker’s compensation authorization the plaintiff had signed previ-
 410. Id. at 738. 
 411. Id. at 735. 
 412. Id. at 742. 
 413. See id. at 742–43. 
 414. Id.
 415. Alexander, 189 F.3d at 742–43. 
 416. Id. at 743. While not directly relevant to the facts presented, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
60-120(a) (Repl. 2005) allows a party to a cordless or cell phone conversation to record it 
with or without the other party’s knowledge. Alexander, 189 F.3d at 743. 
 417. See id. at 742–43. 
 418. 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 419. Id. at 874. Arkansas health regulations forbid food preparation establishments from 
employing workers with communicable diseases such as staph infections. Id. at 874 n.2 (cit-
ing Ark. Dept. of Health Regs., Food Service Establishments § 3-101 (effective Oct. 28, 
1993)).  
 420. Id. at 874.  
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ously after she sustained an on-the-job injury a few days before developing 
the infection.421
The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages.422 The 
trial court set aside the punitive damages award but allowed the verdict 
awarding compensatory damages to stand.423 Because the sole cause of ac-
tion was intrusion on seclusion, the Eighth Circuit panel424 reviewed appli-
cable Arkansas law in some detail.425 The majority concluded that the evi-
dence was insufficient to permit the jury to find that the manager’s intrusion 
highly offensive to a reasonable person,426 that plaintiff’s conduct in telling a 
co-worker about her staph infection was consistent with any subjective in-
tent to keep the medical information private,427 and that any expectation of 
privacy she did have was objectively reasonable considering her employ-
ment in the food service industry.428
Summarizing Arkansas law defining the privacy tort of intrusion on se-
clusion, the courts have repeatedly deferred to the applicable provisions of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its commentary.429 Consistent with 
the Restatement, the Arkansas Model Jury Instruction requires five ele-
ments: (1) damages sustained by the plaintiff; (2) an intentional intrusion, 
either physical or otherwise, on the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, to which 
the defendant believed or was substantially certain the plaintiff did not val-
idly consent; (3) an intrusion highly offensive to a reasonable person, caused 
by defendant’s conduct to which a reasonable person would strongly object; 
(4) an actual expectation of privacy manifested by the plaintiff’s conduct; 
and (5) a proximate nexus between the intrusion and plaintiff’s damages.430
The second and fourth elements impose on the plaintiff the burden to show 
the absence of valid consent, whether express or implied, to the defendant’s 
intrusion.431 Notwithstanding the plain language of the Arkansas survival 
 421. Id. at 873–74.  
 422. Id. at 873. 
 423. Id. 
 424. One member of the panel concurred specially on the basis that the evidence in the 
record negated the third element of the intrusion claim, a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
because plaintiff had told two of her co-workers about the staph infection shortly after learn-
ing about it from her doctor. Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 879 (McMillian, J., concurring specially). 
 425. See id. at 871. 
 426. Id. at 877. 
 427. Id. at 877–78. 
 428. Id. at 878–79. In this respect, the majority reasoned that the defendant employer had 
a legitimate reason to inquire about her infectious medical condition out of concern for public 
health. Id. Under such conditions, “an employer’s need to know trumps an employee’s right 
to privacy.” Id. at 879 (citation omitted). 
 429. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 430. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on 
Jury Instructions 2013). 
 431. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424 note on use.
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statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recently held that a claim for intru-
sion does not survive the death of the person whose privacy was invaded by 
the defendant’s intrusive conduct.432   
C. Publicity Given to Private Facts 
While the Arkansas appellate courts have never directly addressed an 
action for giving publicity to private facts, on several occasions they have 
recognized the existence of the claim in dicta.433 Applying Arkansas law, the 
federal courts have occasionally addressed this privacy tort, predicting that 
Arkansas courts would apply the definition and guidelines outlined in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.434 The Arkansas Supreme Court has pub-
lished a jury instruction enumerating the elements of the claim, modeled 
after the relevant provisions of the Restatement.435
Consistent with the Restatement,436 the plaintiff must establish seven 
essential elements to successfully litigate a claim for invasion of privacy by 
public disclosure of private facts: (1) plaintiff sustained damages; (2) de-
fendant made a public disclosure about plaintiff; (3) before the disclosure, 
the public lacked knowledge of the fact; (4) the disclosure of the fact would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (5) the defendant knew or should 
have known that the fact disclosed was private; (6) the fact disclosed was 
not of “legitimate public concern”; and (7) the public disclosure was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.437
To satisfy the second element requiring “public disclosure,” the plain-
tiff must establish that the defendant communicated the fact “to the public at 
large or to so many persons that the matter is substantially certain to become 
one of public knowledge.”438 It is not sufficient to establish “publication” of 
the fact to just one or a small number of persons; the fact must be highly 
likely to become a matter of public knowledge.439 The federal courts have 
 432. See Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 433. E.g., Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 637, 590 S.W.2d 840, 844 (1979) 
(dicta) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(c)); see also Williams v. Am. 
Broad. Cos., 96 F.R.D. 658, 669 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (dicta). 
 434. See Wood v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D. Ark. 1986) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D), aff’d, 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 669; Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ’g Co., 6 Media L. Rptr. 
(BNA) 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980); Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, LLC, 446 B.R. 306, 
314 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011). 
 435. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422. 
 436. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. 
 437. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422. 
 438. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. 
 439. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. 
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twice rejected privacy claims for publicity given to private facts for lack of 
evidence to support the “public disclosure” element.440
The federal courts first acknowledged such a claim under Arkansas law 
in Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publishing Co.441 In that case, the court held 
in part that the information disclosed pertained to a matter of legitimate pub-
lic concern, and therefore the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.442 In Boyd, the 
parents of a deceased three-year-old child sued the newspaper for publishing 
an article that reported the child’s full name and the fact that he had alleged-
ly died as a result of cardiac arrest while under anesthesia administered by a 
physician, who was then a defendant in an unrelated wrongful death case 
alleging medical malpractice.443 In a court hearing involving a discovery 
matter, the trial court suggested that the parties should protect the privacy 
interests of patients who had died under similar circumstances.444 The next 
morning, the newspaper reported the trial court’s ruling that evidence con-
cerning others who had died under anesthesia, including plaintiffs’ son, 
would be admissible at trial.445 The child’s parents claimed that by printing 
his name and implying that he had died as a result of improper medical care, 
the newspaper had invaded their privacy.446
The court disagreed and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 
claim, citing alternative grounds.447 First, the court predicted that Arkansas 
courts would not recognize a relational privacy interest on behalf of the 
plaintiffs for an alleged invasion of their deceased son’s privacy.448 Second, 
the court held that the information was a matter of legitimate public concern 
because their son had been a victim of a tragic fatal accident.449 The court 
reasoned that his death had again become a matter of legitimate public con-
cern ancillary to the then-pending medical malpractice action against his 
anesthesiologist.450
The federal court once again addressed a claim under Arkansas law for 
publicity given to private facts in Wood v. National Computer Systems, 
Inc.451 An Arkansas teacher filed a diversity claim for invasion of privacy 
 440. Wood v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 
1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1987); Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, LLC, 446 B.R. 
306, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011). 
 441. 6 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980). 
 442. Id. at 1023. 
 443. Id. at 1021. 
 444. Id.
 445. Id. 
 446. Id.
 447. Boyd, 6 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) at 1020.
448. Id. at 1022 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. a). 
 449. Id.
 450. Id. at 1023. 
 451. 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D. Ark. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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against a testing company for erroneously mailing her teacher certification 
test results to another teacher who had taken the same test.452 The plaintiff 
promptly reported the error to the media, and within three days she received 
her successful test results.453 The district court held in part that she could not 
support her claim for giving publicity to private facts because her scores had 
been sent inadvertently to only one other individual.454 Furthermore, any 
public knowledge about the incident was attributable to the plaintiff’s own 
contacts with local media, not any wrongful conduct by the defendant.455
Therefore, even if the information had become a matter of public 
knowledge, it was not the result of defendant’s conduct. 
In a more recent bankruptcy case, Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, 
LLC,456 the federal district court once again held that the plaintiff failed to 
meet the “publicity” requirement of her privacy claim.457 A creditor had 
electronically filed a proof of claim that erroneously included the plaintiff’s 
date of birth and medical information, in violation of court rules.458 While 
the document was accessible via the federal court’s electronic case filing 
system, the court reasoned that the public could not access the document 
without taking specific affirmative steps to seek out the information.459 Just 
because bankruptcy court records technically qualify as public records was 
not enough to satisfy the “publicity” element of the claim.460 Further, the 
plaintiff did not assert that anyone had actually accessed the proof of claim 
or her personal information, which had been accessible by the public for 
only three days.461 Therefore, the plaintiff failed to state a claim.462
A disclosure is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” only if a per-
son would be seriously upset or embarrassed by the disclosure.463 The stand-
ard excludes normal everyday activities, or even “unflattering conduct” that 
 452. Id. at 1094–95. 
 453. Id. at 1094. 
 454. Id. at 1099. 
 455. Id. Affirming, the Eighth Circuit observed, “Here, there was no ‘publicity,’ properly 
so called, but only disclosure to a single other person.” Wood, 814 F.2d at 545.  
 456. 446 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011). 
 457. Id. at 315. 
 458. Id. at 308–09; see, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9037 (requiring creditors to redact all 
private information when filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy court). While the plaintiff 
argued that disclosure of plaintiff’s medical information amounted to a HIPAA violation, the 
parties agreed that no private cause of action arose from the HIPAA violation. Dunbar, 446 
B.R. at 309–10.  
 459. Dunbar, 446 B.R. at 314–15.  
 460. Id. at 315 (citing In re French, 401 B.R. 295, 318 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009)). 
 461. Id. at 312, 315. 
 462. Id. at 315. 
 463. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on 
Jury Instructions 2013). 
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would cause only minor or moderate annoyance to a person with “ordinary 
sensitivities.”464
If the information publicized relates to a matter of “legitimate public 
concern,” a claim for publicity given to private facts is defeated. To deter-
mine whether this affirmative defense bars the claim, several factors must be 
considered:465
(1) the social value of the fact published, (2) the depth of the intrusion 
into [plaintiff’s] private affairs, (3) the extent to which [plaintiff] volun-
tarily placed [himself][herself] into a position of public notoriety, [(4) 
the nature of the state’s interest in preventing the disclosure,] (5) whether 
the fact is a matter of public record [and (6) if the fact publicized con-
cerned events that occurred in the past, whether there is any continued 
public interest in the fact published].466
As previously noted, a federal district court concluded in 1980 that the in-
formation there at issue was a matter of legitimate public concern, and there-
fore could not support a claim for publicity given to private facts.467
One federal case alleging violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right 
of privacy is particularly instructive on the element requiring proof that the 
defendant knew the information disclosed was private.468 In Holman v. Cen-
tral Arkansas Broadcasting Co.,469 plaintiff attorney and his wife were ar-
rested and detained in jail on several charges, including driving while intox-
icated.470 When counsel arrived to secure the couple’s release, the plaintiff 
attorney began “hollering, cussing and screaming.”471 Defendant’s reporter 
was nearby with a tape recorder, which picked up the outburst.472 The court 
held that the plaintiff could not have made the statements the reporter could 
easily overhear with an expectation that the communications would be pri-
vate, and therefore the allegations did not support a civil rights claim under 
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.473 The court also observed that “no right to privacy 
is invaded when state officials allow or facilitate publication of an official 
act such as an arrest.”474
 464. Id.  
 465. Id.
 466. Id. The bracketed language is to be included only if supported by the evidence. Id. 
note on use. 
 467. Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ’g Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1020, 1023 
(W.D. Ark. 1980); see supra notes 449–50 and accompanying text. 
 468. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422.
 469. 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979).  
 470. Id. at 543. 
 471. Id.
 472. Id.  
 473. Id. at 544–45. 
 474. Id. at 544. 
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Given the dearth of Arkansas precedent interpreting the seven essential 
elements of publicity given to private facts, the Arkansas courts are likely to 
defer to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to resolve any other issues not 
specifically addressed in the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions, just as they 
have done for other common law privacy claims.  
D. False Light Publicity  
After intrusion on seclusion, the most frequently litigated privacy claim 
in Arkansas is publicity placing plaintiff in a false light. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court first recognized a claim for false light publicity in Dodrill v. 
Arkansas Democrat Co.475 The defendant newspaper had published a story 
erroneously reporting that the plaintiff, an attorney whose law license had 
been suspended, failed his required retake of the bar examination.476 The 
plaintiff sued the newspaper for both defamation and false light invasion of 
privacy.477 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant on both claims, and the plaintiff appealed.478
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed summary judgment on the def-
amation claim, rejecting the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was a 
public figure and could not prove the newspaper acted with actual malice.479
The court remanded that claim to the trial court with instructions to apply 
the negligence standard of fault to the plaintiff’s defamation claim—whether 
the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care before publishing the defama-
tory article.480 The court added that a finding of negligence would support 
the defamation claim, but punitive damages could not be awarded in the 
absence of a finding of actual malice.481
The court then turned to the summary judgment denying plaintiff’s pri-
vacy claim.482 After acknowledging the existence of the false light claim 
under Arkansas law,483 the court affirmed for lack of evidence that the de-
 475. 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979). 
 476. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 477. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 633, 590 S.W.2d at 842.
 478. Id. at 631, 590 S.W.2d at 841. 
 479. Id. at 636–37, 590 S.W.2d at 844. 
 480. Id. at 637, 590 S.W.2d at 844. 
 481. Id., 590 S.W.2d at 844. Three of the seven justices dissented from the court’s ruling 
reversing summary judgment on the defamation claim. They would have held that the plain-
tiff attorney was in fact a public figure because he held a position of public trust and had 
breached that trust when suspended from the practice of law. Id. at 640–41, 590 S.W.2d at 
846 (Hickman, J., joined by Smith & Holt, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters cautioned that the 
majority’s ruling unduly constrained the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 641, 590 S.W.2d at 846.  
 482. Id. at 637, 590 S.W.2d at 844 (majority opinion). 
 483. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at 845. 
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fendant either knowingly published the false information, or that the defend-
ant acted with actual malice, defined as reckless disregard as to the truth or 
falsity of the published material.484 The court apparently reasoned that even 
if the plaintiff was not a public figure, he was still required to prove actual 
malice to support his false light claim because the publication’s subject mat-
ter (whether or not a previously suspended lawyer qualified for readmission) 
was a matter of public concern.485 Relying on New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,486 the court held that the plaintiff had the burden to prove actual malice 
by clear and convincing evidence.487 Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendant on the false 
light claim.488
The Arkansas Supreme Court next addressed a false light claim in 
Dodson v. Dicker.489 The defendant, a private citizen, had written a letter to 
several state officials making disparaging remarks about the individual then 
serving as president of the State Board of Therapy Technology and her 
spouse, David Dicker.490 Mr. Dicker alone sued for defamation and false 
light invasion of privacy.491 At trial, he won a jury award of $7,000 in actual 
damages and $5,000 in punitive damages.492 On appeal, the court reversed, 
holding that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict on both 
claims.493 The court reasoned that nothing in the defendant’s letter to state 
officials reasonably could be considered an assertion of objective fact, as 
required to support a defamation claim.494
 484. Id. at 638–39, 590 S.W.2d at 845–46 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E). The Eighth Circuit has held that actual malice in 
this context means publication of false information with intent that the public construe the 
information as factual. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, 
Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 485. See Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 639 & n.9, 590 S.W.2d at 845 & n.9 (observing that the 
Supreme Court had retracted from Time, Inc. v. Hill with respect to defamation claims, thus 
requiring only public figures to prove actual malice, but the Court had not revisited that issue 
with respect to false light claims (citing Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 
(1974)). 
 486. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 487. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 639, 590 S.W.2d at 845. 
 488. Id. at 639–40, 590 S.W.2d at 846. 
 489. 306 Ark. 108, 812 S.W.2d 97 (1991). The court acknowledged the claim in dicta in 
Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 9, 678 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1984), which addressed an unsuc-
cessful claim for intrusion on seclusion. 
 490. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 110, 812 S.W.2d at 97–98. 
 491. The plaintiff characterized the defamation claim as one for libel per se. Id., 812 
S.W.2d at 98. Marinetta Dicker was not a party to the suit, perhaps because she was then a 
public figure as president of the State Board of Therapy Technology. See id., 812 S.W.2d at 
97. 
 492. Id., 812 S.W.2d at 98. 
 493. Id. at 110, 112, 812 S.W.2d at 98, 99. 
 494. Id. at 112, 812 S.W.2d at 99. 
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With respect to the false light claim, the court observed that while Mr. 
Dicker was not himself a public figure, the letter’s content addressed matters 
of general public concern; therefore, the plaintiff was required to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had acted with actual mal-
ice in transmitting the letter.495 The court considered the evidence pertaining 
to defendant’s subjective state of mind when she wrote the letter, concluding 
that she had been motivated not by actual malice but rather her general dis-
satisfaction with the State Board’s operations.496 Under the circumstances, 
the defendant’s First Amendment freedom of speech prevailed over the 
plaintiff’s privacy concerns.497
As reflected in Dodrill and Dodson, a plaintiff may join defamation 
and false light invasion of privacy claims in the same proceeding.498 Howev-
er, the plaintiff may recover only once for any single publication.499 While 
the claims are related, defamation remedies harm to one’s reputation, while 
a false light claim redresses the emotional injury associated with publicity 
casting the person in a false light.500 While required to support a defamation 
claim, reputational harm is not required to support an invasion of privacy 
claim for false light.501
The Eighth Circuit addressed a claim for false light invasion of privacy 
in People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe International 
Publishing, Inc.502 An elderly woman recovered a sizeable money judgment 
against a tabloid publisher for portraying her as a pregnant 101-year old 
woman.503 The publisher argued on appeal that the published story was ob-
viously fictional, and therefore not actionable, because the content of the 
 495. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 113, 812 S.W.2d at 99 (citing Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 
265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979)); see also Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 
F. Supp. 2d 701, 707 (W.D. Ark. 2001) (citing Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840; Peo-
ple’s Bank & Trust v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1992)). 
 496. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 115, 812 S.W.2d at 100. 
 497. See id., 812 S.W.2d at 100. 
 498. Id., 812 S.W.2d at 98; Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at 845; see also Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 739 n.4, 74 S.W.3d 634, 656 n.4 (2002).  
 499. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 108, 812 S.W.2d at 98; Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at 
845 (citing, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (1977)). 
 500. See Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 10, 678 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1984). While the 
Arkansas courts recognize false light invasion of privacy as a claim distinct from defamation, 
they have also held that the defenses applicable to defamation claims apply as well to claims 
for false light invasion of privacy and publicity given to private facts, which both require 
publicity as a necessary element. E.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422, 423
(Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 652F to 652G).  
 501. See Dodson, 306 Ark. at 113, 812 S.W.2d at 99 (citing Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 
S.W.2d 840; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E). 
 502. 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 503. Id. at 1067. The jury awarded her $650,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000 
in punitive damages. Id.
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story was not reasonably believable.504 The court disagreed, holding that it 
could not say as a matter of law that the story accompanying the plaintiff’s 
photograph, when read as a whole, was not reasonably believable to readers 
as conveying actual facts about the plaintiff, even though some would strain 
credulity.505 Moreover, the court rejected the publisher’s argument that the 
supermarket tabloid was obviously intended as fiction and therefore could 
not support a claim for portraying the plaintiff in a false light.506 To the con-
trary, the court held that the tabloid’s style and format suggested the pub-
lisher’s intent that readers believe its material was factual.507 Therefore, the 
story was a calculated falsehood that would support a remedy without impli-
cating First Amendment considerations.508
Finally, the publisher challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a finding of actual malice.509 The court observed that mere failure to 
investigate the accuracy of a published falsity is not sufficient.510 However, 
“purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category.”511 In this case, 
the editor who selected the photograph to accompany the story was aware 
that it portrayed the plaintiff ten years earlier, but he assumed she had since 
died.512 In 1980, the defendant’s editor had been working for the local news-
paper when it published the same photograph to illustrate an accurate story 
about the plaintiff.513 Under the circumstances, the court held that the evi-
dence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant had 
purposefully avoided the truth when it published the plaintiff’s photograph 
to accompany a fabricated story.514
In two companion cases discussed earlier in this Article,515 the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court addressed claims for false light invasion of privacy as 
well as other privacy claims.516 In Lee, the court addressed the appellant’s 
argument that the evidence failed to show actual malice.517 In doing so, the 
 504. Id. at 1068. 
 505. Id. at 1069. 
 506. Id. at 1069–70. 
 507. People’s Bank, 978 F.2d at 1070.
 508. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)). 
 509. Id. at 1069–70. 
 510. Id. at 1070. 
 511. Id. (citing Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989)). 
512. Id.
 513. People’s Bank, 978 F.2d at 1070. 
 514. Id.
 515. See supra notes 301–36 and accompanying text. 
 516. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002); Addington v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003). The claims for intrusion on 
seclusion, also advanced in these cases based upon the defendant’s search of each plaintiff’s 
property, were addressed in an earlier subsection of this Article. See supra notes 301–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 517. Lee, 348 Ark. at 742–43, 74 S.W.3d at 658–59. 
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court carefully sidestepped whether a private figure is required to prove ac-
tual malice in the first place when the facts publicized do not pertain to a 
matter of public concern.518 Citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,519 the court 
held that plaintiffs other than public figures need not prove actual malice to 
recover for defamation.520 Nevertheless, noting that neither party had chal-
lenged the trial court’s jury instruction requiring proof of the elements by 
clear and convincing evidence, the court reviewed the evidence with that 
standard in mind.521 On the issue of actual malice, the record included clear 
and convincing evidence, when viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, that 
supported the finding of actual malice.522
In Addington, the court reached the opposite conclusion.523 The plain-
tiff’s false light claim was denied on summary judgment.524 On appeal, the 
court upheld the disposition of that claim.525 The court reasoned that the 
plaintiff failed to present evidence that the offending statements were 
false.526 Even if they were, the court held that they were protected by quali-
fied privilege.527 In this case, unlike in Lee, the court held that the defendant 
had good reason to believe that Addington possessed property that was 
rightfully the defendant’s, and therefore the plaintiff failed to overcome the 
qualified immunity defense.528
 518. Id. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 656–57. The Arkansas Model Jury Instructions 
acknowledge that the Supreme Court has expressly left the issue open. See ARKANSAS MODEL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 cmt. (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) 
(citing Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634).  
 519. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 520. Lee, 348 Ark. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 657. 
 521. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 657.  
 522. Id. at 744, 74 S.W.3d at 659. 
 523. Addington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 454, 105 S.W.3d 369, 379 
(2003). 
 524. Id. at 445, 105 S.W.3d at 373. 
 525. Id. at 454, 105 S.W.3d at 379. In doing so, however, the court erroneously held that 
a plaintiff must prove the elements of the false light claim by clear and convincing evidence, 
citing Dodrill. Addington, 81 Ark. App. at 452, 105 S.W.3d at 377. This statement is not 
consistent with the holdings of the court in false-light claims. If applicable, the plaintiff must 
prove only the element of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence to satisfy First 
Amendment considerations announced in New York Times Co., Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). And in Lee, the jury was given an instruction erroneously requiring proof of every 
element by clear and convincing evidence, but neither party challenged the instruction on 
appeal. Lee, 348 Ark. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 657. No court in Arkansas has ever held that a 
plaintiff must prove each required element of a claim for false light publicity by clear and 
convincing evidence. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 (confirming that 
only actual malice, if applicable, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; all other 
elements require proof only by a preponderance of evidence).
 526. Addington, 81 Ark. App. at 453, 105 S.W.3d at 378. 
 527. Id. at 453–54, 105 S.W.3d at 378–79. The qualified privilege defense is discussed 
infra Part IV.G.3. and accompanying notes. 
 528. Id. at 454, 105 S.W.3d at 378–79. 
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The most recent case addressing a claim for invasion of privacy by 
false light publicity was Hobbs v. Pasdar.529 The plaintiff, the stepfather of 
one of the three young murder victims in the case commonly known as the 
“West Memphis 3,” sued the members of the Dixie Chicks, a singing group, 
for defamation and false light invasion of privacy.530 The plaintiff chal-
lenged the veracity of a statement posted on the defendants’ website as well 
as certain statements they had made at a fundraising rally implicating him in 
the murders.531 After lengthy analysis, the trial court granted summary 
judgment on both claims.532 The dispositive issue was whether the plaintiff 
was a “limited purpose” public figure. The court reasoned that he was be-
cause he had voluntarily injected himself in various ways into the public 
controversy regarding the murders.533 The court also correctly observed that 
a limited purpose public figure must establish the element of actual malice 
by clear and convincing evidence to substantiate a claim for either defama-
tion or false light invasion of privacy.534
As the court observed, to establish actual malice requires “‘sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the Defendant, in fact, entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’”535 Because the plaintiff’s 
evidence failed to support a finding of actual malice, the court granted 
summary judgment on both claims.536
In summary, to support a claim for publicity casting plaintiff in a false 
light under Arkansas law, the plaintiff must establish each of the following 
elements: (1) damages, (2) publicity by the defendant given to a matter that 
placed the plaintiff in a false light, (3) publicity pertaining to a matter that 
would cause a reasonable person to justifiably feel seriously offended and 
aggrieved, and (4) proximate cause.537 Each of these four elements must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence.538 In addition, for public 
figures, or for publicity relating to a matter of public concern, the plaintiff 
 529. 682 F. Supp. 2d 909 (E.D. Ark. 2009). While the parties disputed whether Arkansas 
or Tennessee law applied in that case, the court held that summary judgment was appropriate 
no matter which state’s law applied. Id. at 925. 
 530. Id. at 909.  
 531. Id. at 912–14. 
 532. Id. at 932. 
 533. Id. at 926–30. 
 534. Id. at 930, 932 (citing Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 638–39, 590 
S.W.2d 840, 845 (1979)). 
 535. Hobbs, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (quoting Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638–39, 590 S.W.2d at 
845). 
 536. Id.
 537. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on 
Jury Instructions 2013). 
 538. Id. 
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must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, meaning proof 
that enables a conclusion without hesitation that the allegation is true.539
E. Breach of Fiduciary Duty  
The Arkansas courts have not expressly held whether a party otherwise 
aggrieved by an invasion of privacy may have a cause of action for breach 
of fiduciary duty as an alternative remedy. However, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court has held on several occasions that a party to a fiduciary relationship 
may sue another party to that relationship for breach of a duty arising from 
the nature of the relationship.540 Unlike a claim for invasion of privacy, 
breach of fiduciary duty does not require proof of intentional conduct, at 
least not when self-dealing is alleged.541
Many fiduciary relationships impose a duty of confidentiality.542 But 
whether or not a breach of a specific duty of confidentiality may give rise to 
a cause of action by a party aggrieved by the breach remains an open ques-
tion in Arkansas. Other jurisdictions have held that a breach of a fiduciary’s 
duty of confidentiality may support an action for damages for the resulting 
harm, including emotional distress.543 The Arkansas Supreme Court has re-
cently limited remedies in actions for breach of fiduciary duty; damages for 
emotional distress unaccompanied by “quantifiable economic loss” are not 
recoverable.544 Nevertheless, breach of fiduciary duty may be a proper basis 
for recovery for disclosure of confidences, as long as the plaintiff sustains 
some amount of pecuniary damages to accompany a claim for emotional 
distress or mental anguish. 
 539. Id. Whether a plaintiff who is not a public figure and who claims invasion of privacy 
by false light publicity pertaining to a matter not of public concern must prove actual malice 
remains an open question in Arkansas by virtue of the court’s reasoning in Lee. See
ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 cmt. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 
348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002)). 
 540. E.g., Sexton Law Firm, P.A. v. Milligan, 329 Ark. 285, 298, 948 S.W.2d 388, 395 
(1997). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (“One standing in a 
fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a 
breach of duty imposed by the relation.”); ELDER, supra note 51, §§ 5:1–5.3. 
 541. Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 185–86, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2002) (“Self-dealing 
breaches the fiduciary duty even when the action taken is innocent and unintentional.” (citing 
Hosey v. Burgess, 319 Ark. 183, 890 S.W.2d 262 (1995))).
 542. See generally ELDER, supra note 51, § 5:1. Whether a fiduciary duty exists in any 
particular case is a question of law. See Long v. Lampton, 324 Ark. 511, 520, 922 S.W.2d 
692, 698 (1996). 
 543. E.g., Fierstein v. DePaul Health Ctr., 24 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
 544. See Rees v. Smith, 2009 Ark. 169, at 3–4, 301 S.W.3d 467, 471  (reversing jury 
award of $10,000 for emotional distress based on alleged breach of fiduciary duty arising 
from attorney-client relationship when defendant demanded sexual favors from plaintiff in 
exchange for his continued legal representation). 
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F. Remedies 
1. Damages 
A plaintiff who successfully litigates a common law invasion of priva-
cy claim in Arkansas may recover compensatory damages545 for mental an-
guish and pecuniary loss.546 Because all four privacy torts require proof of 
intent, Arkansas law does not preclude an award of purely economic dam-
ages.547 Compensatory damages are not presumed; the plaintiff must demon-
strate actual damages as an element of the privacy claim.548 However, once 
the evidence establishes that the plaintiff sustained mental anguish, it is for 
the jury to weigh the plaintiff’s feelings that might reasonably follow from 
the intrusion.549 A court will not reverse a jury award of damages unless the 
amount is “clearly the result of passion or prejudice, or so great as to shock 
the conscience of the court.”550
The plaintiff may recover damages even if difficult to quantify, and ex-
pert testimony is not required.551 “Arkansas law has never insisted on exact-
ness of proof in determining damages, and if it is reasonably certain that 
some loss occurred, it is enough that damages can be stated only approxi-
mately.”552
545. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977).  
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is entitled 
to recover damages for  
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;  
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind 
that normally results from such an invasion; and  
(c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause. 
Id.  
 546. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 744, 74 S.W.3d 634, 660 (2002) 
(upholding award of compensatory and punitive damages); AAA T.V. & Stereo Rentals, Inc. 
v. Crawley, 284 Ark. 83, 84, 679 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1984) (affirming award of compensatory 
and punitive damages for invasion of privacy in repossessing rented television).  
 547. Cf. Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 15, 385 S.W.3d 822, 832–
33 (declining to resolve whether purely economic losses may be recovered in negligence 
actions). 
 548. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 419–423 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. 
on Jury Instructions 2013). On the other hand, a plaintiff may recover nominal damages for 
the privacy invasion in the absence of proof of actual damages. Cf. Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 
Ark. 5, 6, 678 S.W.2d 361, 362 (1984) (jury returned verdict for plaintiffs but awarded no 
damages; judgment reversed on appeal on statute of limitations grounds).  
 549. See Crawley, 284 Ark. at 85, 679 S.W.2d at 191. 
 550. Id., 679 S.W.2d at 191 (citations omitted).   
 551. Agracat, Inc. v. AFS-NWA, LLC, 2010 Ark. App. 458, at 6–7, 379 S.W.3d 64, 68–
69 (citations omitted).
 552. Id. at 7, 379 S.W.3d at 69.  
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If the plaintiff secures an award of compensatory damages, punitive 
damages are also available.553 However, nominal damages554 will not support 
an award of punitive damages.555 To recover punitive damages for any claim 
accruing on or after March 25, 2003, the plaintiff must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence556 (1) that the defendant knew or should have known 
that the conduct would naturally result in harm and nevertheless continued 
the conduct with malice or reckless disregard as to the consequences, or (2) 
that the defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose 
of causing harm.557 Assuming evidence is presented, the jury may consider 
the defendant’s financial status in awarding punitive damages.558 Any puni-
tive damage award is subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution.559 Under the Arkansas statute, punitive dam-
ages awards are subject to judicial scrutiny.560
 553. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206 (Repl. 2003) (“In order to recover punitive damages 
from a defendant, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant is liable for com-
pensatory damages . . . .”); Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 
879 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Hale v. Ladd, 308 Ark. 567, 571, 826 S.W.2d 244, 247 (1992)); 
Bell v. McManus, 294 Ark. 275, 277, 742 S.W.2d 559, 560 (1988); see Bayer CropScience 
LP v. Schafter, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d 822, 831 (citations omitted) (“[P]unitive 
damages are dependent upon the recovery of compensatory damages, as an award of actual 
damages is a predicate for the recovery of punitive damages.”). For cases upholding punitive 
damages awards for privacy torts, see Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe International Pub-
lishing, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding award of $850,000); Crawley, 284 
Ark. at 84, 679 S.W.2d at 191 (upholding award of $15,000); CBM of Central Arkansas v. 
Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981) (upholding award of  $4,000). 
 554. What constitutes a “nominal” award varies depending on the facts of each case. See 
Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 933, 582 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1979) (citing Ray Dodge, Inc. v. 
Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972)). 
 555. Id. at 933, 582 S.W.2d at 31 (citing Manhattan Credit Co. v. Skirvin, 228 Ark. 913, 
311 S.W.2d 168 (1958)). 
 556. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “proof that enables [the jury] without 
hesitation to reach a firm conviction that [an] allegation is true.” ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 2218 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013). 
 557. Id.; see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-206 to -211 (Repl. 2005) (governing punitive 
damage awards). The Arkansas Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional section 16-55-
208, which capped punitive damages in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant intended to cause injury or damage. Bayer CropScience LP, 2011 Ark. at 13, 385 
S.W.3d at 831. 
 558. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 2218; see Porter v. Lincoln, 282 Ark. 
258, 261-B, 668 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1984); Bank of Cabot v. Ray, 279 Ark. 92, 94, 648 S.W.2d 
800, 801 (1983).  
 559. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–18 (2003); 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994). 
560. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-210 (referring to judicial duty to “[s]crutinize” all punitive 
damage awards to ensure compliance with “applicable procedural, evidentiary, and constitu-
tional requirements” and to “[o]rder remittitur where appropriate”). 
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2. Injunctive Relief 
In the early part of the twentieth century, before Arkansas courts rec-
ognized privacy torts, it was not uncommon to enjoin conduct that would 
later support an invasion of privacy claim.561 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
has long since abandoned the common law rule that equitable relief is not 
available for infringements implicating only personal rights in the absence 
of property damages, at least if the plaintiff has an inadequate remedy at 
law.562 The cases are unclear, however, whether equitable relief remains 
available to prevent disclosure of information pertaining to personal matters. 
In one case, the Arkansas Supreme Court initially granted the plaintiff a 
temporary restraining order to prevent disclosure of records but later dis-
solved it, holding that the specific records in question were not protected 
under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.563
Common law relief for invasion of privacy is now well recognized in 
Arkansas. Nevertheless, if a plaintiff can establish the traditional elements 
supporting equitable relief, especially if the plaintiff’s remedy at law is in-
adequate or incomplete, the Arkansas courts would likely be amenable.564
However, an injunction that prevents publication or otherwise implicates the 
First Amendment may be subject to challenge as a prior restraint.565
G. Defenses 
1. Statute of Limitations   
A variety of affirmative defenses may be asserted against claims for 
invasion of privacy. Perhaps the most obvious is the statute of limitations. In 
Arkansas, because a claim for invasion of privacy is not expressly enumer-
ated in any other statute of limitations, the three-year “catchall” statute of 
limitations for tort claims generally applies.566 However, the Arkansas Su-
561. E.g., Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957). 
 562. See id. at 295–96, 307 S.W.2d at 83–84.  
 563. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 225, 766 S.W.2d 909, 911 
(1989). 
 564. See Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. v. TCB Transp., Inc., 312 Ark. 343, 345, 849 
S.W.2d 509, 511 (1993) (mere existence of cause of action at law does not deprive court of 
equity jurisdiction unless legal remedy is “clear, adequate, and complete” (quoting Honor v. 
Yamuchi, 307 Ark. 324, 870 S.W.2d 267 (1991))). 
 565. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Mo. 2003). See generally ELDER,
supra note 51, § 6:15. 
 566. O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 317, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1997) (“It has long 
been the law in this state that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not 
otherwise limited by law.” (citing Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934))); 
see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-56-104 to -105 (Repl. 2005); Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 
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preme Court has applied the one-year limitation period to bar a privacy 
claim alleging an invasion solely based on two telephone conversations, 
after declining to decide whether oral communications alone can support a 
claim for invasion of privacy.567 Absent concealment of the wrong or other 
tolling conduct, the limitation period begins to run when the wrongful act 
occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers the wrongful nature of the conduct 
itself.568
2. Consent  
As for other intentional torts, consent is generally an absolute defense 
to a privacy claim.569 For intrusion on seclusion claims, however, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has held that consent negates the cause of action, so the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate that consent was lacking.570
As defined by the Arkansas Model Jury Instruction for intrusion on seclu-
sion, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is particularly daunting. To establish the 
claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “believed or was substan-
tially certain that [he or she] lacked the necessary legal authority or personal 
permission, invitation, or valid consent to commit the intrusive act.”571 The 
standard appears to require proof of defendant’s subjective belief or certain-
631–32, 899 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1995); Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 10, 678 S.W.2d 361, 364 
(1984). 
 567. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364–65 (holding that whether the alleged 
intrusion amounted to defamation or intrusion on seclusion, it sought special damages based 
on spoken words, to which the one-year statute of limitations applied).  
 568. Norris, 320 Ark. at 633, 899 S.W.2d at 71–72 (citing Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 
771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994)). 
 569. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. 
on Jury Instructions 2013). Similarly, a constitutional right of privacy may be waived. See 
Pulaski Cnty. v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 220–21, 264 S.W.3d 465, 467–
68 (2007) (intervenor, a county contractor, waived any constitutional right of privacy she 
may have had in the content of email messages to county official addressing both business 
and personal matters).
 570. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (defining intentional intrusion 
element to include proof that the defendant “believed or was substantially certain that [de-
fendant] lacked the necessary legal authority or personal permission, invitation, or valid 
consent to commit the intrusive act”); see also ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 
424 note on use (precluding use of consent instruction with ARKANSAS MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 “since the absence of consent or other authority is part of a plain-
tiff’s burden of proof under such a claim”). The rationale may be that the claim rests on an 
intrusion on the plaintiff’s seclusion, so a plaintiff must first establish an objective manifesta-
tion of a desire to maintain solitude or seclusion.
 571. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420. 
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ty that consent was lacking; proof of constructive knowledge or objective 
awareness is not sufficient.572
Scholars have observed that the absence of consent is more accurately 
described as an element of a privacy claim that the plaintiff must assert and 
prove.573 While the distinction may appear to be academic, treating consent 
as an affirmative defense eases the pleading burden on the plaintiff574 and 
reduces the risk of a pre-answer dismissal for failure to allege non-consent. 
Requiring proof of non-consent as an element of the intrusion claim puts the 
burden on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s conduct was unau-
thorized. 
Unlike some states’ laws,575 Arkansas law does not require written or 
even express consent to avoid liability; consent may be either express or 
implied by the plaintiff’s conduct or inaction.576 However, the plaintiff’s 
consent must be voluntary, and it may be limited in scope. Consent is vitiat-
ed if the defendant exceeds the scope of the consent granted.577 Whether or 
not the plaintiff consented is an issue of fact for the jury.578
3. Qualified and Absolute Privilege  
The defenses and privileges applicable to defamation claims apply 
alike to privacy torts that require publicity as an element, specifically false 
 572. Contrast the requirement that the intrusion must be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person” as a result of defendant’s conduct that a “reasonable person” would find strongly 
objectionable. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420. Under that standard, the 
plaintiff’s subjective feelings about the intrusion are not relevant. Yet the plaintiff is required 
to prove that the defendant subjectively believed he or she lacked valid consent to commit the 
intrusion. Id.  
 573. E.g., ELDER, supra note 51, §§ 2:12, 3:9, 4:8, 6:6; see, e.g., Leggett v. First Interstate 
Bank of Or., N.A., 739 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (“Strictly speaking, consent is 
not a defense to invasion of privacy. Rather, lack of consent is an element of the tort . . . .”). 
But see Green v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 242 S.W.3d 374, 379 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (declin-
ing to hold that “lack of consent” is an element of a claim for appropriation of name or like-
ness).  
 574. As noted earlier, Arkansas is a fact-pleading state. ARK. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 575. An example is New York. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009) (to 
avoid liability, defendant must establish plaintiff’s written consent). 
 576. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424; see, e.g., Alexander v. Pathfinder, 
189 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff failed to object when defendant’s employees 
tape-recorded her conversations). 
 577. Wal-Mart Co., Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 727, 74 S.W.3d 634, 649 (2002) (holding 
that plaintiff’s written and implied consent were not voluntary, and defendant’s conduct 
exceeded the scope of plaintiff’s verbal consent). 
 578. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424; Lee, 348 Ark. at 724, 74 
S.W.3d at 647.
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light and publicity given to private facts.579 The corollary to this principle is 
that those defenses do not bar either misappropriation of name or likeness or 
intrusion on seclusion, neither of which require publicity or even publication 
as an element.580 For example, a defendant who commits an intrusion on 
seclusion may not assert absolute privilege as a defense on the rationale that 
the intrusion was necessary to secure evidence to be offered in a pending 
judicial proceeding.581 Whether a qualified privilege exists in a particular 
context is a question of law.582 But once the court decides that the privilege 
applies, it is a question of fact whether a particular statement is privileged.583
The Arkansas courts have seldom addressed qualified or absolute privi-
leges in the privacy tort context. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
considered a qualified privilege defense in Lee in conjunction with the plain-
tiff’s claims for false light, intrusion, and defamation.584 In doing so, the 
court concisely defined the defense and articulated its parameters:  
“A communication is held to be qualifiedly privileged when it is made in 
good faith upon any subject-matter in which the person making the 
communication has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, 
and to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it con-
tains matters which, without such privilege, would be actionable.” [T]he 
qualified privilege must be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a 
proper purpose and . . . does not extend to irrelevant defamatory state-
ments that have no relation to the interest entitled to protection. The 
qualified privilege is lost if it is abused by excessive publication; if the 
statement is made with malice; or if the statement is made with a lack of 
grounds for belief in its truthfulness. The question of whether a particu-
lar statement falls outside the scope of the qualified privilege for one of 
these reasons is a question of fact for the jury.585
 579. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652F-652G (1977); see also ARKANSAS 
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422 cmt., 423 cmt. 
 580. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420, 421; see also Froelich v. 
Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973) (qualified privilege applicable to defamation claim 
does not apply to claim for intrusion on seclusion, for which publication is not an element). 
One scholar has criticized this position as “dubious” and inconsistent with the consensus in 
other states that the set of qualified privileges applicable to defamation law generally applies 
to all claims for invasion of privacy. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 2:13 (citations omitted). 
 581. See Froelich, 516 P.2d at 996.
 582. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 409 cmt. (citing Minor v. Failla, 329 
Ark. 274, 282, 946 S.W.2d 954, 958 (1997), overruled on other grounds, United Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Murphy, 331 Ark. 364, 961 S.W.2d 752 (1998)). 
 583. Id. (citing Lee, 348 Ark. at 724, 74 S.W.3d at 647). 
 584. Lee, 348 Ark. at 734–37, 743–44, 74 S.W.3d at 653–55, 659.  
 585. Id. at 735, 74 S.W.3d at 653–54 (quoting Minor, 329 Ark. at 283, 946 S.W.2d at 
958–59) (other internal citations omitted); see also id. at 743–44, 74 S.W.3d at 659 (reiterat-
ing the same standard). The elements of the qualified privilege defense in the context of a 
defamation claim are set out in ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 409. 
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In Lee, the court concluded that the communications in question were 
not privileged because the defendant’s agent who made the challenged 
statements had no basis for believing they were truthful.586 But in Addington,
the Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for the defendant 
in a related claim, holding that the plaintiff failed to overcome the qualified 
immunity defense with respect to his claims for false light invasion of priva-
cy and defamation.587
The general definition of qualified privilege encompasses several more 
specific variations.588 They include the reporter’s privilege (sometimes 
known as the newsworthiness privilege), the fair-report privilege, and the 
public records privilege. Each of these will be addressed in turn. 
a. Reporter’s privilege  
A defendant is generally entitled to a qualified privilege for communi-
cations pertaining to public figures and matters of public concern.589 More 
specifically, First Amendment considerations weigh especially heavily in 
favor of news publishers and reporters. But unlike some other states’ laws,590
Arkansas law does not recognize absolute or qualified immunity for report-
ers or news media in defending defamation or privacy claims; nor does it 
carve out any general exception for “newsworthy” publications. 
In Williams v. American Broadcasting Cos.,591 the federal district court 
addressed Arkansas substantive law governing news media privileges in the 
context of a discovery dispute. A patient and her surgeon filed several tort 
 586. Lee, 348 Ark. at 737, 743, 74 S.W.3d at 655, 659. 
 587. Addington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 453–54, 105 S.W.3d 369, 
378–79 (2003) (applying qualified privilege to affirm summary judgment on both false light 
and defamation claims). However, the court reversed and remanded the intrusion on seclusion 
claim, to which the qualified immunity defense did not apply. See id. at 457, 105 S.W.3d at 
380 (holding that a fact question remained as to whether plaintiff’s consent was voluntary). 
 588. One variation on qualified immunity as a defense is the requirement that a false light 
claim include proof of actual malice, at least when the challenged communication relates to 
public figures and matters of public concern. See supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
Because false light claims involving publicity raise First Amendment concerns, the qualified 
immunity defense raises the burden of proof as a prerequisite for a claim seeking damages for 
communications of the sort most likely to warrant First Amendment protection–those involv-
ing public figures and those pertaining to matters of public concern. Compare ARKANSAS 
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 407 (providing jury instruction for defamation claim by 
private figure plaintiff; requiring at minimum proof of negligence in failing to determine truth 
of statement before publication) with ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 408
(providing jury instruction for defamation claim by public figure plaintiff, requiring clear and 
convincing evidence that defendant published the defamatory fact “knowing it was false or 
with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity”). 
 589. See supra notes 484–85, 539 and accompanying text.  
 590. See ELDER, supra note 51, §§ 3:17, 4:2.  
 591. 96 F.R.D. 658, 662 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
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claims against a news broadcaster and its reporter, including giving publicity 
to private facts, defamation, and false light invasion of privacy.592 The de-
fendants asserted the “reporters’ privilege” in an effort to avoid producing 
the “out-takes” of videotape footage used in producing a television pro-
gram.593
The court observed that no reporter’s privilege was recognized at 
common law.594 The only reporter’s or newsman’s privilege ever recognized 
under Arkansas law was based on a statute precluding the required disclo-
sure of a reporter’s sources except under limited circumstances.595 But the 
Arkansas courts have never adopted an expansive interpretation of the statu-
tory privilege, and the federal court in Williams declined to do so, conclud-
ing that under Arkansas law, no reporter’s privilege applied to the film “out-
takes.”596
Turning to the defendant’s argument asserting a constitutionally based 
privilege, the court cited a United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in 
acknowledging a limited constitutional basis for protecting newsmen against 
disclosure of editorial processes.597 Yet that limited privilege had to give 
way when “a member of the press is alleged to have circulated falsehood 
and is sued for injury to the plaintiff’s reputation,” and the plaintiff seeks 
evidence material to a “critical element” of the claim.598 The court reasoned 
that any other conclusion would render plaintiffs powerless to prove actual 
malice as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,599 or to prove malice 
in order to recover punitive damages.600 The court concluded that the de-
 592. Id. at 668–69. The false light and defamation claims were asserted by a surgeon who 
claimed that the defendants had falsely portrayed him as engaging in unnecessary medical 
procedures. Id. at 660. The other privacy claims were asserted by the patient, whose surgery 
was filmed by the defendants without her knowledge or consent. The claims were consolidat-
ed by the court because they arose from the same set of facts. Id. at 662. 
 593. Id. at 660. 
 594. Id. at 663. 
 595. Id. at 662–63 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 43-917). The statutory privilege applies to 
both civil and criminal proceedings. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 663 (citing Saxton v. Ark. Ga-
zette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 135, 569 S.W.2d 115, 116 (1978)). 
 596. Id.  at 663, 665.  
 597. Id. at 668–69 (discussing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)). The federal dis-
trict court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in an unpublished opinion, recently suggested 
that more stringent pleading requirements may apply to defamation claims against distribu-
tors of newspapers and magazines, i.e., “specific allegations of facts demonstrating either 
actual knowledge of the tortious nature of the book or facts giving rise to a duty to investi-
gate.” Steinbuch v. Hachette Book Grp., No. 4:08CV00456 JLH, 2009 WL 963588, at *3 
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2009) (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 465 (E.D. Cal. 1979)). In 
the absence of such specific allegations, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for public 
disclosure of private facts. Id. at *4. 
 598. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 670. 
 599. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 600. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 670.
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fendant’s constitutional argument was inconsistent with the principle that 
“malicious libelous utterances are not constitutionally protected.”601 Thus, 
the plaintiff’s motions to compel production were granted.602
No Arkansas court since has cited Williams or otherwise addressed 
whether a reporter or news organization has a qualified or absolute privilege 
in the context of a privacy claim. The case has been cited with approval on 
several occasions by other courts. 
b. Fair report privilege  
Arkansas defamation law recognizes a privilege for “fair reporting” of 
an official proceeding or public meeting.603 The privilege attaches with re-
spect to the report of a proceeding or meeting, and a defendant is not liable 
unless the plaintiff establishes that the publication exceeds the scope of the 
privilege.604 The defendant exceeds the scope of the privilege if the pub-
lished report does not accurately report the substance of the meeting or pro-
ceeding, and if the defendant fails to take steps reasonably necessary to in-
sure the accuracy of the publication.605 The Arkansas courts have not ad-
dressed a privacy claim in which the defendants have asserted the fair report 
privilege. However, the privilege would certainly apply to an invasion of 
privacy claim for false light publicity to the same extent it applies to defa-
mation.     
c. Public records privilege606
The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act607 generally provides for 
public access to information contained in “public records,” broadly defined 
as records “required by law to be kept” or “otherwise kept and which consti-
tute a record of the performance” or nonperformance of “official func-
 601. Id. 
 602. Id. 
 603. Arkansas Model Jury Instructions refer to the qualified privilege defense as the “fair 
report” privilege. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 410 & cmt. (Ark. Su-
preme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (citing, e.g., Whiteside v. Russellville News-
paper, Inc., 2009 Ark. 135, at 6–7, 295 S.W.3d 798, 801–02). 
 604. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 410. The instruction is modeled after 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977). 
 605. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 410; see Whiteside, 2009 Ark. at 6–7, 
295 S.W.3d at 801 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611).
 606. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 3:15 n.31.  
 607. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-103 to -110 (Supp. 2011). 
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tions.”608 The Arkansas courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the 
statute is to be liberally interpreted in favor of disclosure.609
However, just because information is in a public record does not pre-
clude a cause of action for invasion of privacy; nor does it bar assertion of a 
constitutional, statutory, or common law privacy interest in the information. 
For one thing, the Act includes a number of exceptions barring access to 
certain kinds of records.610 Moreover, to the extent that an individual asserts 
a constitutional or other privacy interest in information contained in public 
records, the public’s interest in the records must be balanced against the 
individual privacy interests.611 As might be expected, an individual’s privacy 
interest in particular public records and the information they contain varies 
depending on a number of factors,612 including the government’s purpose in 
maintaining the records and the public’s interest in accessing them.613
An individual’s criminal history records are almost always exempt 
from privacy claims, even information pertaining to arrestees who have not 
been convicted of any offense. The earliest Arkansas case was Mabry v. 
Kettering.614 Arrestees sought to preclude federal law enforcement officials 
from publishing their photographs and distributing them nationwide.615 Cit-
ing a number of cases from other jurisdictions, the court held that law en-
forcement officers may use photographs of those in custody who have been 
charged with a crime for the purpose of identifying the accused.616 Even 
records pertaining to unsubstantiated and unfounded administrative reports 
 608. Id. § 25-19-103(1). 
 609. E.g., Bryant v. Weiss, 335 Ark. 534, 538, 983 S.W.2d 902, 904 (1998).  
[T]he intent of the Freedom of Information Act was to establish the right of the 
public to be fully apprised of the conduct of public business. As a rule, statutes 
enacted for the public benefit are to be interpreted most favorably to the public. 
The Freedom of Information Act was passed wholly in the public interest and is 
to be liberally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy purposes may be 
achieved. 
Id. (citing, e.g., City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 184–85, 801 S.W.2d 275, 278 
(1990)). 
 610. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b). 
 611. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 231, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 
(1989) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977)). 
 612. See id., 766 S.W.2d at 915 (observing that the plaintiff’s privacy interest in nondis-
closure varied among the items she sought to prevent defendants from releasing). 
 613. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has rejected an attorney’s argument that 
the attorney-client privilege provides a basis for an exception to disclosure of public records 
under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 225–26, 766 S.W.2d at 912 (attorney-
client privilege is a rule of evidence only and does not provide an exception to a substantive 
act requiring disclosure of public records). 
 614. 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746 (1909); see also Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 122 
S.W. 115 (1909) (second appeal). 
 615. Mabry, 89 Ark. at 551–52, 117 S.W. at 746. 
 616. Id. at 553, 117 S.W. at 747.   
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of possible child abuse may not be subject to an individual’s privacy claim if 
a statute requires the information to be included in a public registry, and if 
sufficient statutory safeguards are in place to protect the individual’s privacy 
interests.617
While the accused may have only a limited privacy interest, if any, in 
criminal history records, family members of the accused may have a legiti-
mate interest in preventing the release of criminal investigation records im-
plicating matters personal to them. In McCambridge v. City of Little Rock,
the court recognized that the plaintiff had a constitutional privacy interest in 
certain criminal investigation records relating to her son’s murder-suicide.618
But the court also emphasized that the public had a strong interest in having 
access to records relevant to solving crime.619 In balancing those interests, 
the court concluded that the public’s interest in the records outweighed the 
mother’s constitutional privacy interests.620
The Arkansas courts have repeatedly held that exceptions to the Arkan-
sas Freedom of Information Act must be narrowly construed.621 The several 
exceptions to the Act include “[p]ersonnel records to the extent that disclo-
sure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal priva-
cy[,]”622 and “[m]edical records, adoption records, and education records as 
defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 . . . un-
less their disclosure is consistent with the provisions of that [federal] act.”623
Both exceptions protect against the disclosure of records that implicate im-
portant individual privacy concerns with respect to employment, medical 
care, family relationships, and educational matters. A full discussion of the-
se exceptions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, each of these 
 617. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Heath, 312 Ark. 206, 215, 848 S.W.2d 927, 932 
(1993).
 618. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914. 
 619. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915. 
 620. Id. at 232–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915; cf. Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 598, 826 S.W.2d 
252, 255 (1992) (holding that personnel record exception in Arkansas Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requires weighing public's right to knowledge of records against individual right 
to privacy). 
 621. E.g., Thomas v. Hall, 2012 Ark. 66, at 13, 399 S.W.3d 387, 395. “[T]his court has 
consistently held that it interprets exceptions to the FOIA narrowly and in favor of disclosure. 
Ambiguous exemptions will be interpreted in a manner favoring disclosure.” Id., 399 S.W.3d 
at 395 (citation omitted). The party seeking to avoid disclosure has the burden of proof that 
the information is within the scope of an exception. See Stilley v. McBride, 332 Ark. 306, 
313, 965 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1998). 
 622. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(12) (Supp. 2011); see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (Supp. 
2011). 
 623. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2).  
2013] ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY 511
two exceptions has been the subject of litigation and considerable public 
debate.624
4. Other Statutory Defenses  
Specific statutes may permit conduct that might otherwise support a 
claim for invasion of privacy, and therefore may be asserted in defense. For 
example, a party to a cordless or cell phone communication may record it, 
even without the knowledge of the other party to the call.625
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Arkansas privacy law has evolved considerably since the Arkansas Su-
preme Court first recognized the common law right of privacy fifty years 
ago. The development of the state’s right of privacy, grounded both in 
common law and the Arkansas Constitution, is largely attributable to the 
courts; the Arkansas General Assembly has taken a relatively low profile in 
the development of the civil right of privacy. This section identifies legal 
issues related to the right of privacy that Arkansas policymakers have not 
yet resolved. 
A. Misappropriation of Name or Likeness 
While the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a judgment for misappro-
priation of name or likeness in Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd,626 no Ar-
kansas appellate court, then or since, has had an opportunity to directly con-
 624. E.g., Stilley, 332 Ark. at 314, 965 S.W.2d at 128–29 (precluding disclosure under 
personnel records exception of police officers’ home addresses; purpose of Act is to keep 
electors advised of performance of public officials and to enable them to learn and to report 
on public officials’ activities); Young, 308 Ark. at 598, 826 S.W.2d at 255 (interpreting 
“clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” to preclude disclosure of examination 
results of other candidates for promotion to police lieutenant); see Ark. Gazette Co. v. So. 
State Coll., 273 Ark. 248, 251, 620 S.W.2d 258, 260 (1981) (“No one has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy concerning the amount of public funds dispersed [sic] to him [by a pub-
lic educational institution] unless that person clearly comes within one of the exceptions [to 
the Arkansas FOIA] which by law are required to be closed to the public.”); cf. Nat'l Ar-
chives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (interpreting analogous excep-
tions in federal act with respect to Vince Foster suicide). Exceptions to the Arkansas Freedom 
of Information Act have been the subject of a host of Arkansas Attorney General opinions. 
E.g., Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2011-152 (personnel records); Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2012-
083 (educational records).  
 625. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(a) (Repl. 2005) (not unlawful for one party to record a 
conversation, with or without other party’s consent); see Alexander v. Pathfinder, 189 F.3d 
735, 743 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 626. 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962). 
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sider this privacy claim. In recognizing other privacy torts, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the applicable provisions of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts that define the elements of each claim. Accord-
ingly, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions generally follow the Restate-
ment definitions.627
Under the Restatement definition, a claim for misappropriation of name 
or likeness requires proof that the defendant used the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for the defendant’s advantage. As in Olan Mills, in which the de-
fendant used the plaintiff’s studio photographs without authorization to ad-
vertise its photography services, the cause of action sometimes seeks a rem-
edy for a defendant’s commercial use of one’s identity. Yet the Restatement 
explicitly provides that commercial use is not required.628 Some states, like 
New York, have enacted statutes restricting the cause of action to situations 
involving commercial use.629 The Arkansas right of privacy, however, is 
governed by common law alone, and the state courts have never undertaken 
to limit recovery to situations involving a defendant’s commercial use. 
In two cases, however, the federal courts have erroneously assumed 
that the cause of action requires the plaintiff to prove commercial use by the 
defendant.630 To the contrary, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions adopt 
the broader definition of the claim as set forth in the Restatement.631 The 
comment to the model jury instruction muddies the issue by observing that 
the federal district court “confirmed” that the tort requires commercial 
use.632 But no Arkansas court has ever held that appropriation of name or 
likeness is actionable only if the defendant engages in commercial use of the 
plaintiff’s identity. Nor has the Arkansas General Assembly enacted any 
statute so limiting the cause of action.  
 627. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420–424 (Ark. Supreme Court 
Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013). 
 628. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).  
The common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated is the appro-
priation and use of the plaintiff's name or likeness to advertise the defendant's 
business or product, or for some similar commercial purpose. Apart from statute, 
however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies al-
so when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own 
purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even 
though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some 
states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of the name or 
likeness.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 629. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009). 
 630. LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 899 (E.D. 
Ark. 2011); Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (W.D. Ark. 
2001).  
 631. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 & cmt.  
 632. Id. (citing Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d 701).
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The claim for invasion of privacy by misappropriation of name or like-
ness is correctly defined in Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 421 to require 
use for the defendant’s advantage, which need not be a commercial one.633
B. The Right of Publicity  
In many states, the courts and legislatures have explicitly acknowl-
edged considerable evolution in the common law right to damages for mis-
appropriating one’s name or likeness for the defendant’s benefit. In the early 
years, only private individuals could pursue a common law action to redress 
emotional injury for invasion of privacy. Most courts considered public offi-
cials and public figures to have waived any right to privacy, or at least to 
have implicitly consented to invasions of privacy when they elected to join 
the public arena.  
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, however, many courts began 
to acknowledge the property interests of celebrities in protecting the eco-
nomic value of their public personas.634 The traditional common law right to 
recover damages for invasion of “privacy” by misappropriation of one’s 
identity thus evolved to what is now better known as the “right of publici-
ty.”635 A plaintiff seeking redress for violation of the right of publicity may 
recover for the economic loss associated with the defendant’s use.  
No court, state or federal, has addressed whether Arkansas recognizes 
the common law right of publicity.636 In other states, the right of publicity 
has become such a frequent matter of litigation that several legislatures have 
enacted specific statutes governing the right.637 Some states treat the right as 
an expansion of the privacy right against misappropriation of name or like-
 633. Compare id. (requiring proof that the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s name or likeness 
was for defendant’s “own purposes or benefit, commercial or otherwise”) with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (stating that the prohibited use “is not limited to commer-
cial appropriation”). 
 634. E.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 
1983) (applying Michigan law); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 491–
92 (3d Cir. 1956) (interpreting Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York law).
 635. See generally Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A “Haystack in a Hurri-
cane,” 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977 (1982) (describing evolution of the right of publicity).
 636. But see Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 199, 203 & n.9 (2002) (erroneously suggesting that Arkansas adopted the common law 
right of publicity in Olan Mills). Olan Mills did not assert the right of publicity. See Olan 
Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 496–97, 353 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1962). The plaintiff 
was neither a celebrity nor a public figure; she was a private person. Id. at 495, 353 S.W.2d at 
22. Nor did she seek compensation for the economic value of her photograph as used by the 
defendant; rather, she sought damages for emotional injury. Id. at 496, 353 S.W.2d at 23.
Olan Mills was simply a classic privacy claim seeking damages for mental anguish as a result 
of the defendant’s misappropriation of her likeness.  
 637. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2013). 
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ness, but in fact it redresses a different kind of injury altogether.638 Many 
courts cite the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition639 as the basis for 
the common law right of publicity.640 Neither the Arkansas General Assem-
bly nor the Arkansas courts have addressed the issue. 
C. Descendibility  
A related issue is whether a claim for violation of the right of privacy, 
or any of its variations, survives a plaintiff who dies before securing a 
judgment awarding damages. Most states recognize privacy as a right per-
sonal to the plaintiff.641 Like other personal rights, in most states the right 
does not survive the plaintiff642 and is not heritable unless a state statute pre-
serves the right to the plaintiff’s estate.643
The issue of descendibility has been litigated frequently over the last 
decade as the early generations of mass media celebrities pass away, leaving 
substantial economic value in their surviving public identities. For example, 
Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe have been the subjects of extensive liti-
gation and even legislation addressing the descendibility of the economic 
value of their celebrity identities.644 The premature death of Michael Jackson 
is another illustration that issues involving descendibility of publicity rights 
are likely to multiply with future generations of celebrities.645
 638. Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights 
for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1606–07 
(2001) (describing different interests protected by the two torts).  
 639. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
 640. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003). 
 641. ELDER, supra note 51, § 1:3.
 642. See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895). “Whatever right of privacy 
Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights, in the legal sense of that 
term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler died, her own individual right of privacy, whatever it may 
have been, expired at the same time.” Id.; see also Clift v. Narrangansett Television LP, 688 
A.2d 805, 814 (R.I. 1996) (“[T[he right to privacy dies with the person.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977). 
 643. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b. 
644. E.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (like-
ness of Elvis Presley); Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 
309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (name, image, and voice of Marilyn Monroe). 
 645. See, e.g., Robert C. O’Brien & Bela G. Lugosi, Update to the Commercial Value of 
Rights of Publicity: A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words . . . or Sometimes a Million Dol-
lars, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. (No. 3, Fall 2009); see also Erin K. Mai, Comment, “‘Cause 
This is Thriller!”: The True Price of Fame and an Analysis of the Current System for Calcu-
lating Estate Taxes on the Post-Mortem Right of Publicity, 3 EST. PLANNING & COMMUNITY 
PROP. L.J. 1, 1 (2010). 
2013] ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY 515
Several states have enacted legislation to address the descendibility is-
sue.646 Those state statutes that allow the right of publicity to survive vary 
widely as to the length of time the right survives the decedent.647 Arkansas 
has yet to address whether claims for invasion of privacy by misappropria-
tion of name or likeness survive the plaintiff.  
In Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court followed the majority rule against survivability of a claim for 
intrusion on seclusion,648 even though the Arkansas survival statute general-
ly provides that claims for personal injury survive the decedent.649 The 
Cannady court held that the right of privacy is generally personal to the 
plaintiff and therefore does not survive the plaintiff’s death.650 However, in 
dicta the court observed that the Restatement makes an exception for priva-
cy claims for misappropriation of name or likeness, at least to the extent that 
an invasion may implicate a property interest.651 Thus the issue remains 
open with respect to other privacy torts, especially those that implicate eco-
nomic interests. Cannady decided only that claims for intrusion on seclu-
sion, which generally seek a remedy for mental anguish and emotional dis-
tress rather than economic loss, do not survive the plaintiff.652
D. Invasion of Privacy by Oral Communications Alone  
In Dunlap v. McCarty,653 the plaintiffs claimed damages for intrusion 
on seclusion based on two telephone conversations between the parties. The 
appellate court reversed a judgment for the plaintiffs and an award of nomi-
nal damages on statute of limitations grounds, applying the one-year limita-
tion period applicable to “actions for words spoken whereby special damag-
 646. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-208 
(LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1448 (2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 
(West 2000); cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (LexisNexis 2010) (although traditional 
right of privacy terminates upon death, the right of publicity, which protects one’s personality 
from commercial exploitation, survives). 
 647. Compare, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g) (West 1997) (70 years) with 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8316(c) (West 2007) (30 years). 
 648. 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d ___. 
 649. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2005). Based on the plain language of the 
statute, the only exceptions are claims for slander and libel. See id. § 16-62-101(a)(2). Never-
theless, the Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted “personal injury” claims strictly to pre-
clude survival of personal injury claims not involving physical injury. 
650. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___ S.W.2d at ____.  
 651. Id., ___ S.W.2d at ___ (distinguishing Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 
1998)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977). 
 652. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___ S.W.2d at ___. 
 653. 284 Ark. 5, 6, 678 S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (1984). 
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es are sustained.”654 In passing, however, the court expressed skepticism 
about invasion of privacy claims based solely on oral communications, not-
ing that other state courts were divided on the issue.655 The court specifically 
declined to address “whether mere oral communications can be the basis of 
a claim for invasion of privacy”656 because it was not necessary to reach the 
issue.  
While the court has never revisited the issue, the “oral publication limi-
tation” referenced by the Dunlap court, once recognized by a slim minority 
of early courts, has been rejected by the great majority as antiquated and 
lacking rational justification.657 The clear consensus of the decisions ad-
dressing the issue rejects any such distinction based on the means of com-
munication. For example, several cases in other jurisdictions have consid-
ered debt collection practices often involving verbal telephone harass-
ment.658 Nevertheless, the issue remains unresolved by the Arkansas courts. 
E. False Light Publicity Claims by Private Plaintiffs Not Implicating Mat-
ters of Public Concern 
Because privacy claims alleging publicity portraying the plaintiff in a 
false light may implicate First Amendment concerns, the United States Su-
preme Court has imposed additional requirements on public figures who 
seek to recover damages and on private persons who seek to recover for 
false light publicity involving matters of public concern.659 Specifically, the 
Court has held that to recover damages, a public figure must establish that 
 654. Id. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1983) (current 
version ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-104(4) (Repl. 2005)). Read in context, this specific lan-
guage suggests that the General Assembly sought to apply a one-year statute of limitations to 
slander per quod, which requires proof of special damages. A separate subsection 16-56-
104(3) applies a one-year statute of limitations to “words spoken slandering the character of 
another,” id., known at common law as slander per se, see United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy, 
331 Ark. 364, 368–69, 961 S.W.2d 752, 755 (1998). The Arkansas Supreme Court abolished 
the distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod in 1998, holding that 
reputational injury or “special damages” must be shown to recover an award of damages in 
any action for defamation. Id. at 370, 961 S.W.2d at 756. 
 655. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 9–10, 678 S.W.2d at 364. 
 656. Id. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364. 
 657. ELDER, supra note 51, § 1:2.  
 658. See, e.g., Dawson v. Assocs. Financial Servs. Co. of Kan., Inc., 529 P.2d 104, 111 
(Kan. 1974) (finding that debt collection phone calls may amount to intrusion on seclusion 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B cmt. d (1977) (“[W]hen the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and 
frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, . . . his privacy is invaded.”). 
 659. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (applying to false light privacy 
claim the standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1976), for 
defamation claims by public figures). 
2013] ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY 517
the defendant acted with actual malice.660 In addition, if the publicity in-
volves a matter of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must overcome 
constitutional concerns by meeting a higher burden of proof, although the 
extent of that burden has not been clearly delineated.661
The issue not yet resolved by the federal courts is whether a private 
plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover damages for false light inva-
sion of privacy pertaining to a matter not of legitimate public concern.662 At 
least one scholar has predicted that First Amendment restrictions do not 
apply to private individuals who allege an invasion of privacy by false light 
publicity not involving a matter of public interest.663 However, the Eighth 
Circuit, applying Arkansas law, held in 1992 that even a private plaintiff 
must establish actual malice to recover damages for false light invasion of 
privacy, even though the publicity did not involve a matter of legitimate 
public concern.664 More recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly left 
the question open in Lee, pointedly noting that neither party had objected to 
the jury instructions requiring the private plaintiff to prove actual malice.665
F. Scope of Familial and Relational Privacy Rights  
Both state and federal courts have acknowledged that the right of pri-
vacy implicates familial and relational interests.666 For example, in 
 660. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 283.  
 661. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E Caveat; ELDER, supra note 51, § 4:13.  
 662. See, e.g., West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 647–48 (Tenn. 
2001) (adopting simple negligence standard for private plaintiff/private matter false light 
claims in light of United States Supreme Court’s “uncertain position . . . with respect to the 
constitutional standard for false light claims brought by private individuals about matters of 
private interest”); ELDER, supra note 51, § 4:13, at 4-155 (“In private person-non-public 
interest cases the law is undeveloped.”).  
 663. ELDER, supra note 51, § 4:13, at 4-156; see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (holding Gertz restrictions generally inapplicable to 
private plaintiffs alleging defamation not involving a matter of public interest). 
 664. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 978 
F.2d 1065, 1067–68 & n.2 (reasoning that proof of actual malice by clear and convincing 
evidence was required by Arkansas law). 
 665. Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 740, 74 S.W.3d 634, 657 (2002). “[T]he 
effect of the Gertz decision upon the Court's holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill has been left in a 
state of uncertainty. For this reason, the American Law Institute added a caveat to section 
652E leaving open the question of whether there may be liability based upon a showing of 
negligence as to truth or falsity.” Lee, 348 Ark. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 657 (citations omitted). 
 666. E.g., Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, at 9–10, ___ 
S.W.3d ___, ___; McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 230, 766 S.W.2d 909, 
914 (1989); Alexander v. Pathfinder, 189 F.3d 735, 742–43 (8th Cir. 1999) (mother raised 
privacy interests of her disabled son when her conversations with him in his room were audi-
otaped); see also Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167–69 (2004) 
(observing that family of Vince Foster had legitimate interest in protecting photographs of 
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McCambridge,667 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the mother of a 
murder-suicide victim had a constitutional privacy interest in restricting 
disclosure of certain documents, including a letter her son had written to her 
before he died.668 Similarly, in a federal Freedom of Information Act case, 
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the surviving family 
members of suicide victim Vince Foster could assert their own privacy in-
terests in seeking to limit public disclosure of photographs of the de-
ceased.669 The Court relied in part on the “well-established cultural tradi-
tion” acknowledging the family’s right to control the disposition of the re-
mains and to limit the use of photographs of the body, which had “long been 
recognized at common law.”670 The Court also emphasized, however, that 
the privacy interests acknowledged by certain exceptions to the Freedom of 
Information Act go beyond the common law right of privacy.671
The Arkansas Supreme Court has expressly and repeatedly acknowl-
edged familial and relational privacy interests in recognizing a state consti-
tutional right of privacy.672 The constitutional right protects the privacy of 
sexual relationships between consenting adult partners,673 as well as eligibil-
ity to become foster parents regardless of marital status or sexual orienta-
tion.674 The constitutional privacy interest recently led a divided court to 
reverse a criminal conviction of a high school teacher for engaging in a con-
sensual sexual relationship with an adult student.675 On the other hand, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court recently rejected a mother’s privacy claim assert-
ing that her own right of privacy was violated when hospital employees vio-
lated federal criminal law by viewing photographs of her daughter, the vic-
suicide victim from public disclosure). But see Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ’g Co., 6 
Media L. Rep. 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (rejecting privacy interests asserted by parents 
for newspaper’s unauthorized publication of name of their deceased child).   
 667. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909. 
 668. Id. at 230–32, 766 S.W.2d at 914–15.
 669. Favish, 541 U.S. at 171 (“[P]ersonal privacy protected by [FOIA] Exemption 7(C) 
extends to family members who object to the disclosure of graphic details surrounding their 
relative's death. . . .”). 
 670. Id. at 169 (citing, e.g., McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 231–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915).  
 671. Id. at 170 (citations omitted). 
 672. E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 15, 380 S.W.3d 429, 
437 (acknowledging right of sexual cohabiters to engage in private, consensual, noncommer-
cial acts of sexual intimacy in the privacy of their homes without prohibiting them from par-
enting by adoption or foster care); Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350
(2002) (recognizing “fundamental right to privacy implicit in [Arkansas] law protect[ing] all 
private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults”).  
 673. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350. 
 674. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 21, 380 S.W.3d at 440. 
 675. Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, at 15, 388 S.W.3d 429, 438.
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tim of a brutal rape, who later died of injuries inflicted by her assailant.676
The court refused to recognize a common law relational privacy interest, 
rejecting the reasoning of courts in a minority of other states that have al-
lowed recovery in analogous circumstances.677
The Arkansas Supreme Court has been progressive in interpreting the 
state constitution to limit government invasions of relational and familial 
privacy interests. Yet the court has been much less inclined to recognize 
common law remedies against nongovernmental defendants for violation of 
familial and relational privacy interests. It remains to be seen whether the 
Arkansas Supreme Court will reconcile the two lines of cases, or whether 
the Arkansas General Assembly will enact legislation to address the issue. 
G. Scope of the Arkansas Constitutional Right of Privacy  
The most recent privacy law cases issued by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court illustrate a division among the justices concerning the scope of the 
fundamental right of privacy implicit in the Arkansas Constitution. In 2002, 
the court unanimously recognized in Jegley v. Picado that the constitutional 
right protects consensual sexual relationships between consenting adults, 
barring prosecution of gay and lesbian couples for violating the Arkansas 
criminal sodomy statute.678 Not long after, the court rejected an argument 
that mandatory DNA sampling for non-violent felons violated the state con-
stitutional right of privacy.679 In dicta, the court distinguished Jegley, sug-
gesting that the state constitutional right to privacy applied only to intimate 
sexual activity in one’s home.680
In 2006, the court struck down a regulation of the Arkansas Child Wel-
fare Agency Review Board declaring that no person who lives in a house-
hold with an adult homosexual may qualify as a foster parent.681 The majori-
ty declined to reach the privacy issue, reasoning that the Board lacked statu-
tory authority to adopt the regulation because it had not been shown to pro-
mote the health, safety, and welfare of children.682 But Justice Brown con-
curred separately, noting that he would have reached the privacy issue. He 
 676. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, at 10, ___ S.W.3d ___, 
___. However, the court reinstated the mother’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Id. at 10–11, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
 677. See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Hwy. Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 4th Dist. 2010); Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959); Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 
P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).  
 678. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350. 
 679. Polston v. State, 360 Ark. 317, 201 S.W.3d 406 (2005). 
 680. Id. at 332, 201 S.W.2d at 414 (dicta).  
 681. Dep’t of Human Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 
55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006).
 682. Id. at 65, 238 S.W.3d at 8. 
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reasoned that the regulation violated the constitutional privacy right of pro-
spective foster parents “attending sexual conduct in the bedroom between 
two consenting adults.”683
In 2011, the court unanimously extended the scope of the constitutional 
right of privacy to protect the right of unmarried cohabiting sexual partners 
to decide whether to become foster parents.684 The unanimous court rea-
soned that cohabiting sexual partners, whether heterosexual or homosexual, 
should have the right to decide whether to become parents.685 The court 
struck down Act I because it automatically barred same-sex cohabiting cou-
ples from becoming foster parents as a matter of law, even if they otherwise 
met the qualifying criteria.686
The diverging perspectives on the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding 
the scope of the fundamental privacy right were revealed most clearly in 
2012 in Paschal v. State,687 in which a slim majority reversed the conviction 
of a high school teacher for violating an Arkansas statute prohibiting a pub-
lic schoolteacher from engaging in sexual contact with a student under age 
twenty-one. The conduct that led to the teacher’s prosecution was a consen-
sual relationship with an eighteen-year-old student.688 The majority reversed 
the conviction, holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
Paschal.689 The three dissenting justices narrowly interpreted the right of 
privacy grounded in the Arkansas Constitution to protect only “a right to 
privacy . . . for consenting adults to have sexual relations in the privacy of 
their homes.”690 The dissenters would have upheld Paschal’s conviction, 
reasoning that his conduct indisputably violated the criminal statute and did 
not implicate the fundamental right of privacy.691
In summary, the Arkansas Supreme Court unanimously embraces the 
principle that the Arkansas Constitution guarantees a fundamental right of 
privacy with respect to consensual adult sexual relationships. However, the 
parameters of that right remain unclear, undoubtedly inviting continued liti-
gation.692 It remains to be seen whether a majority of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court will continue to extend the right to any adult consensual sexual rela-
tionship, with a focus on personal autonomy to engage in consensual sexual 
 683. Id. at 70, 238 S.W.3d at 11 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 684. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 26, 380 S.W.3d 429, 443. 
 685. Id. at 18–19, 380 S.W.3d at 439. 
 686. Id. at 24–25, 380 S.W.3d at 442. 
 687. 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429. 
 688. Id. at 3, 388 S.W.3d at 432. 
 689. Id. at 11–12, 388 S.W.3d at 436. 
 690. Id. at 19, 388 S.W.3d at 440 (emphasis added) (Brown, J., joined by Gunter & 
Baker, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
 691. Id. at 22–23, 388 S.W.3d at 441–42. 
 692. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “‘[o]bscure’ might best describe the [constitu-
tional] right of privacy.” Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 2006).  
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relationships; or whether the court’s policy focus is to protect the right of 
cohabiting partners and their families to make personal decisions, in the 
setting of the home, about how they conduct their daily lives. 
H. Private Civil Claims for Invasion of Privacy Based on Violation of 
Criminal Statutes 
Under the Arkansas crime victims civil liability statute,693 criminal 
conduct that would amount to a felony offense under Arkansas law may 
support a civil cause of action for damages by any person harmed by the 
defendant’s conduct.694 If the person dies, the cause of action survives and 
may be filed on behalf of the estate.695 First enacted in 1997, the crime vic-
tims civil liability statute was amended in 2011 to exclude criminal abuse of 
adults696 and Medicaid fraud.697 Otherwise, conduct defined by Arkansas 
law as a felony may be the factual basis for a civil claim, whether or not the 
offender is prosecuted for the criminal offense. Only a preponderance of the 
evidence is required to prove each element of the claim, and a prevailing 
plaintiff may recover attorney fees and costs as well as damages.698
To date, no published decision has relied on the crime victims civil lia-
bility statute to support a civil claim redressing invasion of privacy. But the 
Arkansas General Assembly has recently enacted several criminal statutes 
addressing such privacy-related offenses as identity fraud, computer fraud, 
breach of privacy, and similar offenses. The elements of these novel crimi-
nal offenses may or may not squarely fit within the elements of the four 
traditional variations on the common law right of privacy. Therefore, the 
crime victims civil liability statute may offer an alternative basis for assert-
ing a claim for invasion of privacy beyond the four privacy torts recognized 
by Arkansas common law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Moreo-
ver, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognizes that a statutory claim and a 
common law claim seeking damages for the same injury may be asserted in 
the same action.699
 693. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107 (Supp. 2011).
 694. Id. § 16-118-107(a)(1); see LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 
F. Supp. 2d 886, 903 & n.7 (E.D. Ark. 2011) (holding that plaintiff stated facially plausible 
claim for civil recovery under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107 alleging violation of Arkansas 
criminal forgery statute).
 695. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107(a)(2)–(3). 
 696. Id. §§ 5-28-101 to -110 (Repl. 2005 & Supp. 2011). 
 697. Id. §§ 5-55-101 to -114 (Repl. 2005 & Supp. 2011).
 698. Id. § 16-118-107(a)(2)–(3). 
 699. See Koch v. Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC, 361 Ark. 192, 202, 205 S.W.3d 
754, 762 (2005) (holding that jury was entitled to reach conflicting results in relation to ordi-
nary negligence claim and statutory claim, which were distinct).  
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Arkansas felony criminal offenses within the scope of the crime vic-
tims civil liability statute include voyeurism,700 video voyeurism,701 financial 
identity fraud,702 stalking,703 residential704 or commercial burglary,705 for-
gery,706 criminal impersonation,707 computer fraud,708 computer trespass,709
unlawful acts involving electronic mail,710 and computer password disclo-
sure,711 among others. Moreover, another Arkansas statute specifically au-
thorizes a civil cause of action for damages, including loss of profits, by any 
person injured by the commission of certain computer-related crimes, 
whether or not classified as felony offenses.712
Arkansas common law has long recognized that a violation of a statute 
or ordinance may be considered by the factfinder as evidence of negli-
gence.713 Because invasion of privacy generally has been considered an in-
tentional tort, it is debatable whether this common law rule might be used in 
support of a claim for invasion of privacy.   
A related issue is whether a violation of a federal criminal statute may 
support a civil claim for invasion of privacy under Arkansas law. For exam-
ple, in Cannady, three of the hospital’s employees pleaded guilty to a crimi-
nal violation of HIPAA for unlawfully viewing medical records and photo-
graphs of the plaintiff’s decedent.714 Thereafter, the decedent’s mother, on 
her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter’s estate, filed suit against the 
hospital for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.715 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 
the privacy claims, reasoning that a claim for invasion of privacy does not 
survive the decedent, and the mother could not assert her own relational 
 700. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-102(c)(2) (Supp. 2011) (class D felony). 
 701. Id. § 5-16-101(a) (Supp. 2011).  
 702. Id. § 5-37-227(a) (Supp. 2011) (class C felony; class B felony if victim is elderly or 
disabled).  
 703. Id. § 5-71-229(a) (Supp. 2011) (class B felony for first degree; class C felony for 
second degree).  
 704. Id. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2006) (class B felony). 
 705. Id. § 5-39-201(b)(1) (class C felony). 
 706. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-201 (Supp. 2011) (class B or C felony). 
 707. Id. § 5-37-208 (Repl. 2006) (class D felony for first degree).  
 708. Id. § 5-41-103(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony).  
 709. Id. § 5-41-104(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony if violation causes loss or damage of 
$2,500 or more).  
 710. Id. § 5-41-205(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony).  
 711. Id. § 5-41-206(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony if committed to devise or execute 
scheme to defraud or illegally obtain property). 
 712. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-106(a) (Repl. 2006) (any computer-related crime in sub-
chapter 1 of Chapter 41).  
 713. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 601, 901 (Ark. Supreme Court 
Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013). 
 714. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, at 2, ___ S.W.3d ___. 
 715. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
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privacy claim based on the undeniable violation of the decedent’s privacy 
interests.716
Because the defendant hospital’s employees pleaded guilty to a viola-
tion of HIPAA, that criminal conduct might have provided a basis for assert-
ing a claim for invasion of privacy under the crime victims civil liability 
statute, or perhaps even under common law.717 Arkansas courts have occa-
sionally allowed a violation of a federal statute or regulation to be consid-
ered evidence of negligence.718 While the Arkansas courts have been lenient 
in allowing fact finders to consider statutory violations as evidence of negli-
gence, it is unclear whether they would do so in support of a claim for inva-
sion of privacy.719
Thus, aside from the Arkansas statutes expressly authorizing civil 
claims based upon conduct that would justify criminal prosecution, it re-
mains an open question whether a defendant’s violation of a federal or state 
statute may be considered in support of a tort claim for invasion of priva-
cy.720
V. CONCLUSION
From its beginning in the early years of the twentieth century, privacy 
law has been shaped and influenced by societal norms. As developments in 
technology continue to enable widespread media publicity, electronic sur-
 716. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. 
717. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 (2012) 
(“When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely on 
the statute to decide that an affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope of the duty.”). 
Both federal and state courts may rely on federal statutes or regulations to rec-
ognize an affirmative duty in tort law. When they do so, they are determining 
state law, as there is no general federal common law. The use of a federal enact-
ment to find a state-law affirmative duty is permissible so long as the federal 
provision does not preempt state tort-law liability. The use of federal legislation 
as the basis for finding an affirmative duty is, in this respect, analogous to a court 
determining that violation of a federal provision constitutes negligence per se in 
a tort case governed by state law.  
Id. cmt. b. 
 718. See, e.g., Koch v. Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC, 361 Ark. 192, 207–08, 205 
S.W.3d 754, 766 (2005) (dicta) (holding violations of federal nursing home regulations pro-
vided evidence of negligence, even if the regulations did not specifically govern the case 
(citing Dunn v. Brimer, 259 Ark. 855, 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976))); Franco v. Bunyard, 261 
Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1977) (holding violation of federal gun control laws was 
sufficient evidence of negligence to preclude summary judgment). 
 719. A federal trial court has recently suggested rather cryptically that an alleged viola-
tion of a federal criminal statute does not apply to the Arkansas crime victims civil liability 
statute. See LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 903 & 
n.7 (E.D. Ark. 2011). 
720. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 38.  
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veillance, and instant global telecommunications, privacy interests and their 
protections have claimed increasing public attention. 
Arkansas was a relative latecomer to the field of privacy law, first ac-
knowledging the state common law right of privacy in 1962. In the years 
since, Arkansas courts have generally interpreted the common law right 
consistent with the four distinct privacy torts identified and defined by the 
American Law Institute in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Forty years 
after recognizing the common law right, Arkansas was among the first to 
interpret its state constitution to guarantee a fundamental right of privacy, at 
least with respect to decision making about intimate consensual adult rela-
tionships.  
The Arkansas Supreme Court continues to clarify the scope of the state 
constitutional right, most recently interpreting it to ensure that households 
with cohabiting unmarried couples are not categorically barred from serving 
as foster parents.721 Whether the fundamental right of privacy implicit in the 
Arkansas Constitution extends to informational privacy, procreational deci-
sion making, or other privacy interests remains to be seen.  
While the Arkansas General Assembly has recently enacted several 
criminal statutes to address concerns related to informational and computer 
privacy, it is unclear whether the threat of criminal prosecution will suffi-
ciently deter intrusive conduct. Arkansas statutes authorize civil claims to 
redress injuries caused by felony violations, but this alternative appears to 
be seldom used because no cases have reached the appellate courts.  
The Arkansas Supreme Court has taken the lead in delineating the pro-
gressive state of privacy law in Arkansas. Yet challenging new issues are on 
the horizon. Recent enactments of the Arkansas General Assembly restrict-
ing abortion rights will no doubt test the limits of the state constitutional 
right of privacy. The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision holding 
the federal statutory definition of marriage unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause raises important privacy-related 
issues for Arkansas and other states with respect to defining the traditional 
institution of marriage. Finally, the new Restatement (Third) of Torts is well 
underway by the American Law Institute, which may suggest further oppor-
tunities for expanding the reach of privacy rights in Arkansas. Twenty years 
from now, the evolving state of privacy law in Arkansas will no doubt call 
for yet another update. 
 721. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 26, 380 S.W.3d 429, 443. 
